Skeptikos II

11/10/06
Spinoza's definitions

I. Cause of itself


I. By CAUSE OF ITSELF (sui causa) I understand that whose essence involves
existence; or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.


everything conceived exists - the question is in what sense?

i.e. as something that exists just as a conception (in conception) - or something that
exists as outside of conception -

that which exists in conception and outside of conception - i.e. the idea of a table and
a table - exists two dimensionally - inside (as conception) and outside (as matter)

my point: anything can be conceived as existing

that is - that which is conceived exists

that which exists in the non-conceptual mode - on the outside - may or may not exist
as a conception

it depends on whether it has come under the purview of consciousness

what is conceived may or may not exist extra-conception

whether it does or not is a matter of looking

it is a question of experience

to say something exists - is simply to acknowledge it

that is to focus on it

and perhaps further to characterize it

therefore:

existence is reference

apart from this the concept has no content - it is open - or empty

the concept of existence as such is a concept without focus - therefore it refers - quite
ironically to - nothing


p.s.


to assert 'x' and to assert ' x exists' - is to what?

reassert 'x'?

it is as it were to underline 'x'

to assert existence is not to add anything

it is to mark 'x'

to give it focus

it is to pick it out


II. Finite in kind


II. A thing is said to be FINITE IN ITS KIND (in suo genere finita) when it can be
limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite
because we can conceive of another body larger than it. Similarly, thought is limited
by another thought. But body cannot be limited by thought, nor thought by body.


a thought is limited by another thought -

a body limited by another body

a thought is not a body and a body is not a thought

the external world or dimension - the world of bodies is not of the internal world or
dimension

and visa versa

the inside is not the outside - the outside is not the inside - as a matter of logic

the conscious dimension is not the non-conscious dimension

the unity of the inside and the outside - is reality

is reality for conscious entities

what occurs in this two dimensional world - is the unity of the two dimensions

we can only speak of the two dimensions as separate in an analytical / theoretical
sense

in practice - in fact - all human activity is the unity of the conscious and non-
conscious

that is any act can be analyzed in terms of its conscious dimension and its non-
conscious dimension

its internality and its externality

the unity as such - the unity qua unity - has no other description but a dimensional
description

the unity qua unity is unknown - is unstatable

it can only be seen in terms of the internal world of consciousness and the external
world of the non-conscious

we cannot grasp the essence - only its dimensions


III. Substance


III. By SUBSTANCE (substantia) I understand that which is in itself and is conceived
through itself. That is, that the conception of which does not depend upon the
conception of another thing, from which it has to be formed.


that which is in itself is that which is not in anything else

that is - that which has no parameters

or that which cannot be defined

therefore substance cannot be known

and

the conception of which does not depend upon the conception of another thing -

is a conception that is not bound

I argue it is of the nature and logic of a conception that it is bound

therefore

substance is that which cannot be conceived

so

if we are to still give substance a positive sense

it can only be as the unknown

otherwise the concept has no place at all

to recognize the unknown is to place everything in context


IV. Attribute


IV. By ATTRIBUTE (attributum) I understand that which the intellect perceives of
substance as constituting its essence.


firstly -

what the intellect perceives as essence I would argue is the unknown

on this view 'knowledge' is not what is essential

it is the ground of knowledge that is essential - the object of knowledge -

and the object of knowledge - the ground of knowledge - is the unknown

intellectual perception - or conception - of attributes or characteristics - if we assume
we are talking here about something other than the unknown - is on this view - non-
essential

so if there are attributes - intellectually perceived characteristics - they are not
essential

secondly -

in short consciousness distinguishes itself and that which it is not

the fundamental distinction of consciousness is logical

consciousness recognizes itself as internal and what it is not as external to it - x and
~x

the primary distinction - or intellectual perception - is of metaphysical dimensions -
not of attributes

the ground of the internal / external distinction - (mind / matter - if you like) is not a
substantial distinction - it is distinction of dimensions - dimensions of the unknown

the distinction is based in logic

substance on this view can only be regarded as logical space

its essential characteristics are the dimensions of this space


V. Mode


V. By mode (modus) I understand the modifications of substance; that which is in
something else, through which it is conceived.


a mode as that which is in something else - through which it is conceived

in something else -

conceived in terms of what it is in -

that is known in terms of its epistemological context

i.e. an event in that which is external to consciousness - the surface - the physical
world - will be known in terms appropriate to that dimension - will be known as of
that dimension

and similarly - a thought - a mental event - will be known - will be apprehended as
being of the internal dimension - and understood in terms appropriate to that
dimension

knowledge like the world itself (the conscious and non-conscious dimensions) is
binary

there is no 'unified knowledge' - all knowledge is dimensional

we understand the world in terms of its dimensions

all events though in this world are two dimensional

a thought will have a physical correlate - a physical expression - in the surface that is
the body - i.e. brain activity

and the body too will express itself - manifest in thought

the unity is there - but it cannot be understood in a unitary manner

that is to say i.e. - a physicalist - surface account dose not - cannot - explain the
internal dimension -

and the mental is not the physical

we can speak of an event as having a physical and mental dimension

as to the event itself - in itself - there is no description - if you are to speak of it as
such - it can only be as the logical ground of internality and externality - and this can
only be referred to as the unknown


VI. God


VI. By God (Deus) I understand an absolutely infinite being: that is, substance
consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence.


an absolutely infinite being -

that which is without limitation

conception is always within - within a context therefore limitation

there is no such thing as open concept

such is the negation of conception

it is to not have a concept

the absolutely infinite being is that which cannot be conceived

infinite attributes -

an infinite number of characteristics

is such that it cannot be defined

it is that which cannot be known


VII. Freedom


VII. A thing is said to be FREE (libera) which exists solely through the necessity of
its own nature, and is determined into action by itself alone. That thing is said to be
NECESSARY (neccessaria) or rather COMPELLED (coacta), which is determined
by something else to exist and act in a certain definite and determinate way.


a thing exists in terms of its own nature

its own nature is not determined by itself

the origin of the determination - the first cause - is not known

freedom is the absence of knowledge


VII. Eternity


VII. I understand ETERNITY (aeternitatis) in so far as it is conceived as following
necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing.


the definition of an eternal thing -

that which cannot be understood in terms of duration or time

we have no experience of such a thing

the notion of eternity - is the negative of what we experience

negation has no content - it does not refer to anything - its function is purely formal

it defines what is - in a logical sense -

it gives what is - its parameters - its form and content

beyond what is given in duration or time we have no knowledge

given this 'eternity' is what is not known

it is beyond knowledge - it is the unknown


05/12/07
substance


that which is conceived through itself - can only be that which conceives itself -
is this possible - and what is it to do this?

Spinoza says of substance - that which is in itself - and is conceived through itself

in other words - the conception of which does not need the conception of another
thing - from which it must be formed

that which is in itself is that which is not in anything else - straight up - you might say
- is everything

and it can only be conceived through itself or as itself?

there is no other way to conceive it no other concept required -

the idea of x is x - there is no ~x - we cannot here conceive ~x

OK - but the conception that does not require any other conception?

yes - it's 'the conceived through itself' that instructs one here

is this really the source of his double aspect theory - a body - the body that conceives
itself - a universal mind as it were that corresponds with the universal body?

I think so - however you could have one without the other -

Spinoza though is going for both - and right from the get go -

the idea - that the physical world - the totality does conceive itself -

and further - it is essential - to the notion of substance - from Spinoza's point of view -
that it does -

mind is substance conceiving itself - extension is substance as the object of mind
- the physical world as the extended expression of substance

mind as substance conceiving itself - as substance conceived -

and the thing is the whole issue is objective

objective - in the sense that mind is a characteristic of reality - even if - i.e. - there are
no human beings - the world thinks - we just happen to be expressions of this fact
- instances of the fact

this though gives us no special status - it is true of every thing that exists

subjectivity as we might call it is an objective reality -

there is only objective reality - at this point you might ask - well how then do you
distinguish extension and mind?

good question - mind is extension conceived - extension is mind extended

strictly speaking - for Spinoza - the question does not arise -

so it's not that we conceive substance - it is rather that substance - conceives us -
- this is how you need to think to get Spinoza - it's top down -

so existing in itself - and conceived through itself -

my question is - does it make any sense to speak of the thing in itself - that which
exists without being dependent?

existential dependents -

does it make any real sense to speak of everything?

if it does Spinoza's argument seems to go through

existence as such - we speak of it - but can we really conceive it - is it in fact a
sensible notion?

Kant was spot on - existence is no predicate - it is not a characteristic - it is the ground
- but what is this?

just a conception - to ground predicates - characteristics?

(have to be careful here - a step to the left - a step to the right - nihilism)

existence is no predicate - perhaps the most subversive statement ever made

could we dispense with existential statements - entirely and just have predicates
- predicates that strictly speaking do not refer to anything - actually refer to nothing -
have no referents - no ground - a world of characteristics that - characterize nothing?

Lewis Carroll might get on board here - with his cat - or what's left of it - in such a
world - there would be no substance - only expressions of interest -

and grins


06/12/06
substance II


what I was going to say is -

the conception of that which does not require the conception of anything else just is a
conception of singularity

it is thus the concept of one -

it is for Spinoza the view that there is one concept that explains - explains all diversity
- it is an explanatory concept - and the explanation is singularity

is oneness

if the conception does not require any other conceptions to be formed - then by
definition it is a concept of singularity

for we are here told no other concepts apply -

if you then assume a well formed concept is a conception of something -

then what it applies to - is a singularity

is a matter of logic

therefore what it refers to is one - is substance

and again by definition if the concept applies - then what exists is one substance

so the steps of the argument are:

(1) propose a concept of singularity

(2) assume it applies

alright

it is clear that we can do (1)

but do we the go to (2)?

generally not

why not?

because the fact that we might be able to conceive x is one thing -

whether x applies is quite another matter

in a way Spinoza is proposing in his definition of substance the ontological argument -

how do we know if a concept applies?

say the concept of a golden mountain

if it is meant to be an actually existing mountain of gold

we test the assertion - by looking for that which is asserted -

OK

what though of a concept of metaphysical unity -

everything is one

can this be tested?

no -

the reason being it has no empirical content -

it just cannot be tested - it cannot be falsified

it is not an empirical proposition

it is non-empirical

it is metaphysical

which is to say

what?

not that it is meaningless -

it is meaningful - but not empirical

again it is to say what?

it is to say

we have a view of the world that we hold - regardless of the facts of the world

it is a background view

that functions to - explain - give account for what we cannot know

the human understanding that needs to give some description of the unknown

for deep psychological reasons -

it is an account of the unknown

therefore such conceptions are descriptions of what cannot be known

they are strictly speaking imaginative

this is the category Spinoza's concept of substance falls into -

which is all very well

but it does not apply to the known world - or the knowable world

it cannot be regarded as a true account of what we know

or for that matter a false account

it is a fictional account

the mistake is to assume that all conception relates to the knowable world

this is not so

it is in Ryle's terms a category mistake -

it is to mistake the known for the unknown

and to assume that concepts that properly apply to one -

in fact apply to the other

which is wrong - and big time


06/12/06
conception


I argue that to conceive is to delineate

so you always conceive within a domain

a logical domain

the question

can you therefore conceive of God?

of the totality?

this it would seem is to conceive the domain

in which all conception takes place

don't we do just this?

yet if we do -

given the above theory of conception

how do we do it?

that is if conception is always within domain

what domain is everything - the totality in?

- it seems none

so

is this account of conception wrong?

perhaps we don't always conceive within?

so the conception of everything?

the totality

do we conceive it or only imagine we do?

it's hard to say we don't

still at the same time - the idea that to conceive is to delineate seems dead on -

the two can't be right

one is up the creek

the totality - is really the idea of possibility

everything that is possible is the totality?

also - everything that is -

that does exist

it is the logic of the universal

all

can we conceive all?

we think we can

but isn't it really -

a negative conception?

x exists

~x - that which is not x

so

we conceive all

only the negative of an existential

so

all - is here

that which is not x

x and ~x is?

everything?

(strange logic)

and the point is - isn't it that everything cannot be defined

it must be an open concept

(for otherwise there would be something on the outside of everything)

and as such a negative concept -

this is to say - a positive concept - is a closed concept

it is an existential concept

so

do we conceive - everything - all - the totality?

is to ask

do we conceive negatively - that which is not?

in this case that which is not x

it is to conceive domain isn't it?

and the conception of domain is negative

or that which is outside of the domain is negative

so

a conception posits domain - and its negative

can everything be conceived?

that is can the negative of the domain be conceived?

that is - not everything?

the domain within which everything is

and what is outside of this domain

can you conceive nothing?

not everything?

no I don't think so - you can only conceive positively -
what exists

so what of conceiving everything?

everything

is the domain of the existential

x exists

the domain of x -

is that which exists

is existence

is it a conception or an assumption?

an assumption necessary for conception?

yes I think so

and so

how do we regard this assumption?

is it like a meta conception -

necessary to conceive anything at all?

perhaps

it is in logical terms - the conception of domain

can the assumption be - then -

that which is conceived

I think not -

but this is why - it appears as if it can be a positive conception

because it is always the necessary -

assumption of conception

we easily think that it is - a valid conception

it is not what is being conceived -

it is the ground of conception

and then the argument could be

that to conceive requires an assumption of domain

if domain - is to be conceived -

it must have - such an assumption

but it is the assumption

how is it to function as assumption - to itself?

how can it be what is assumed -

and what rests on the assumption?

therefore

domain is - strictly speaking - not conceived

to conceive everything is to mistake - assumption - for that which rests on the
assumption

this is to say you do not conceive everything - the totality

you conceive - on this assumption

07/12/06
conception II


the conception is an enclosure

the totality is not enclosed

therefore

the totality cannot be conceived

the totality is the ground of conception

it is the space of conception

the space for conception

conception occurs within

the totality is the outside of (all) conception

the totality is logical space

the space in which thought is possible

the totality cannot be thought


10/12/06
the substance argument


the proposal - the definition of substance - as 'that which is in itself and conceived
through itself'

states quite boldly - brazenly perhaps that
(i) there is something that is in itself
(ii) that such conceives through itself

so first up we have an equivalence of domain between that which is - and that which
conceives

substance - exists in its own right

and conceives itself

one might ask

isn't conception an act of the mind?

and for it to be complete

the conception has an object

that which is conceived

so conception and its object - two distinct categories

for x to conceive through itself

suggests x is conception

conceiving itself

thought thinking itself

good definition of God - but where is the world?

Spinoza says - substance is in itself

i.e. it is not a part of anything else

it is thus in some sense existence per se

everything that exists

and is conceived through itself

well yes -

there is nothing else - from which to conceive substance

but is substance conceived

can it be conceived?

presumably if it is conceived through itself

the conception

is within substance

if so

how can the part embrace the whole?

surely on this view

thought - conception is some function within

there cannot that is be an objective conception

a conception from outside

so how can substance - ever be an object

how can it be an object of conception?

so what I am questioning here is the idea - that x can conceive x

on such a view there is no distinction between subject and object

an essential distinction to be drawn if any conception is to take place

that which conceives cannot be that which is conceived

on such an arrangement we cannot say what the conception is -
(except perhaps itself)

and we cannot say what the object of conception is

to go down this track leads to the destruction of sense

the collapse of epistemology

and ontology here is about nothing


10/12/06
sub specie aeternitatis


the thing is this

to define substance (as Spinoza does) one must know it - or know of it

the definition is fine tuning - characterization

now the question

given that we are with substance speaking of everything - the totality

the question is - where does this notion come from - originate?

OK we think - and we think about

we think about what?

what we are aware of - what we see - what we experience -

are we aware of the totality?

in a logical sense - yes

the argument goes -

I am a part of something greater

that greater is finally all that is

yes

so - no question here of experiencing the totality

not logically possible

but know - in the sense of a logical deduction yes

here we are talking about frameworks of knowledge

categories necessary for knowledge

transcendental categories in Kant's terminology

on this view - the totality - substance - in Spinoza's terms

is what?

a reality - an actually existing reality?

or - categories of the understanding necessary for the having of knowledge?

i.e. - is substance - reality or a way of understanding reality?

I think the latter

so we think substance -

substance becomes a way of understanding the world and man's place in it?

what the world is

as it were outside of this understanding

without these categories of knowledge -

is the real question

but in fact it is one we cannot know the answer to

the world as such - in itself as Spinoza has put it - and Kant would too

is unknown

unknowable

so we operate within - within the world

and know - know in terms of categories of understanding

and these are just functions of consciousness

how - human consciousness works - its set up position

consciousness is in the business of knowing

and it comes equipped as it were for the job

you might take the view - alright accept this -

and really therefore - isn't this just all knowledge is?

no need as it were to look beyond - for something else

by definition - on this view - there just isn't anything else

fair enough I think - and I guess such is the Kantian solution

Kant's argument is an account of how consciousness works

basically - if we as conscious entities - operate in such a way - i.e. know - then this
(the transcendental categories) must be presumed

for without them we cannot account for epistemological behaviour

so it is an argument of entailment

I know - what are the conditions necessary for this?

I am not sure that Kant has really answered the question - and certainly - not finally

what he has done at least is say there must be pre-existing conditions for knowledge
if knowledge is to follow

- or what he calls knowledge

could one argue - that we cannot actually know - this

what they are?

we cannot that is get to the transcendental level of understanding

that yes it is a way of seeing the issue

but would it not be more to the point to say - we don't know -

we can't go there -

except in an imaginative sense?

it's a background picture

in general I think what I am asking is - what can you see?

what can be seen?

and it is connected to another question

where are you?

in relation to Spinoza

let me put it this way

to know substance - as an object of thought - to be able to conceive substance

substance must be outside the concept

and therefore the conceiver - outside of substance

was this what Spinoza was trying to get up - or was presuming is possible - something
along these lines anyway - in proposing his sub species aeternitatis argument?

yes - from the point of view of eternity (whatever this really means) we may - in some
sense be able to see - or conceive substance

but who has this point of view -

who can see from that place -

who is in that place?


10/12/06
in itself / through itself


that which is in itself and conceives through itself

this statement of the nature of substance

needs to be tackled head on

first up there is no question here -

substance just is this -

that which is in itself and conceived through itself

conceived through itself -

conceived as what?

conceived as substance -

substance conceived as substance

that is

substance conceiving itself

what can this mean?

what does it conceive itself as?

as substance

OK

so what does this tell us?

how far does this advance us?

what then - can we say - as a result of this - substance is?

presumably -

only that - it is that which is conceived through itself

so are we told anything at all here?

and another question

how does something conceive itself through itself?

what is the logic of this?

we can ask Spinoza - could substance exist - unconceived?

which is to go to the status of the conception of substance

is this essential to the nature - the being of substance?

there seems to be no room for this in what Spinoza has written

substance is that which conceives itself

substance is a concept - as much as the object of the concept

in fact there is no distinction

there is no subjective / objective distinction here in Spinoza's substance

substance is one

it is here thought and extension

thought is extension

extension is thought

the division we see

that is the foundation of our system of logic

on Spinoza's view is simply failing to the see the essential unity

and oneness at the heart of it all

so mind (conception) is substance

extension is substance

substance in itself is

these attributes - and their infinite companions

beyond attributes - can we speak of substance?

it would seem so - given the initial definition

and what is this - what does it come to?

it comes to X is and X is C (conceived)

and then

X is conceived as X

XCX

the conception of X

is not X1 - it is X

so again

substance in itself - independently of attributes - speaking of it in this way just has to
be unknown

what we know of substance is its attributes

its attributes are perceived

and the question - what is being perceived here?

I perceive extension

I perceive thought

do I have any grounds for assuming these attributes are universal - essential features
of reality?

I don't know if I got to where I wanted to get to here

what interests me is substance conceiving itself

how can this be possible?

surely for this to be

substance would have to be the object of a conception?

and if the conception and its object are in some sense apart

separate

and would not the conception have to be outside of substance

which is not possible

therefore substance

cannot conceive itself


11/12/06
that which conceives itself


that which conceives itself is mind

this might be a good preliminary characterization

but how can this characterization be explicated?

what is involved here?

clearly that which conceives itself is that which reflects

OK

but again what is it to reflect?

the thing that reflects is that which can see itself

have an idea of itself

and here we are talking about that which has ideas

and

has an idea of itself

as that which has ideas

the having of the idea of the self

is here an idea of an idea

what does this tell us about ideas

that they can be of that which they are not (the world)

and that which they are

that the idea is not defined by its object

its object can be itself or outside of itself

the object is not what determines the idea

the idea is an idea regardless of whether it holds an idea as its object

or a non-idea as object

OK

but isn't it the case that mind is defined by this capacity

this capacity to

reflect on itself and on the world

reflection is two dimensional

yes

but to reflect on itself

to hold itself as object?

you could say well what we are dealing with is two ideas

idea x and the idea of idea x

just two ideas -

no great mystery

the thing is though

how do you separate out the two ideas?

mind and its idea

are there two?

isn't it just mind -

and that mind can and does

it is the nature of the thing to see itself

mind does not step outside of mind to do this

mind conceives itself

this is what it does

is this a primitive position -

that is there is no further explanation?

is this just what awareness is?

and again there is no outside position or perspective possible

the only perspective is mind

that it conceives itself is just what it does

that is what mind is

for the life of me I don't see how this is possible

and by that I mean I don't get what is going on here

mind

holding itself as object

is mind

which is to say

the idea of mind (held by mind) is mind

how can anything be itself

and be that which sees itself?

are not there two entities here?

(I know this is clumsy - but what can I say?)

or perhaps

a function?

does this make it easier?

the function of reflection

OK

still no explication

just a re-statement in terms of function rather than things

mind is this function?

reflectivity - seems more than function - more like essence

the nature of the thing

perhaps we can say - reflectivity - awareness happens

we call this happening - this action - mind

and we try and explain it in terms of subject and object

but really these categories are categories of the mind in action

they cannot be then turned on the mind to explain its action

if you try and do this - you end up with trying to say

x is subject and x is object

and the whole point of the subject / object distinction

is that the subject and object are not one in the same

they are separate - different and apart

so to say the mind conceives itself

is to say the subject is object

this shows clearly I think that such an analysis does not work

does not get us anywhere at all

so perhaps

awareness - mind

is just simply a primitive - unanalyzable

it analyzes - but it cannot be analyzed

we cannot get behind it

there just is no objective position here

objective / subjective again -

categories of mind -

that cannot be used to account for mind

we recognize the feature - but we cannot say anything else

any attempt to do so - is trying to go outside of knowledge to explain it

we are best to face the fact that here we know that mind is -

not what it is

it is the source of knowledge - and therefore its explanation
is outside of knowledge


11/12/06
mind out of mind


we cannot step outside of mind to see it - to regard it as an object - in the way we i.e.
see a physical object

this is quite obvious - to suggest otherwise is ridiculous

mind is that which explains

it must therefore be regarded as unexplainable in itself

in this sense the mind cannot be known

what can be known is mind as it is - as it appears

that is awareness

awareness is all there is to it

we cannot objectify awareness and place it within awareness

what I mean here is i.e. - Jack Smart and other mind-brain identity theorists argue the
mind is a brain state

what we have here is a theory of mind - physicalism - which it is thought can then be
made applicable to the act of mind - to awareness

so that the idea of physicalism - a conception of mind

is said to explain mind

no such idea - physicalism or another - is a theory of awareness (there is no such
thing) it is a product of awareness

what is produced is not that which produces

or a concept that comes out of mind

is not mind

mind is not an idea

mind is the source of the idea

to apply the idea - as an explanation of mind is to presume a realm of knowledge -
outside of mind

it is to assume there is a place we can see mind from

this is of course ridiculous - unless you think you can argue for an ideal transcendent
realm - in e.g. the way Plato did - or spiritualists and religious people do

such concepts are just posits of mind out of mind


11/12/06

where logic ends


I took Spinoza's definition of substance - that which is conceived through itself - and
argued that this definition is a definition of mind

this was a spin-off of the Spinoza discussion

mind conceives itself

mind - that which conceives - conceives that which conceives

and argued that this view - while true - cannot be explicated

as it stands it is to define the source as its product - or action

and so the definition collapses on itself

mind is greater than its conceptions

therefore if mind conceives itself

the conception (of mind) is lesser than mind

which is to say x is lesser than x

alright

the question is how do we get into this mess?

what all the above points to is that mind reflects

that reflectivity is the essential characteristic of mind

and so to the next and obvious question

what is it?

what is reflectivity?

now I have argued we cannot say

for to answer this question - we have to use concepts of mind

like subject / object for example

to explicate mind

it is again to attempt to use the product of mind to account for mind

and further

behind this idea - the belief - or hope that in some way we may be able to step out of
mind - to see mind - to explain mind

that an extra-mind objectivity is possible

now it is clear at this point that such is absurd

but the thing is absurd yes - but at the same time - it seems like the natural route to
take

why is this?

I think it is because of reflectivity

that is - we reflect on mind

or at least think we can

we can't - we can only reflect within -

but it is reflectivity that suggests that we can

and what are we to say here?

that the fundamental process of mind leads us astray -

that there is - or should be some limit or boundary to reflection -

that we discover - you guessed it - on reflection?

reflectivity - just seems to me to be a process - an action if you like

it is what mind does - just what it does

and like any other natural process - it is just what happens

just what happens in this world

our decisions about it - reflections - on reflectivity - are arguments of reflection

essentially no different from any other reflection - on the world or on mind

we make decisions - for reasons - in this case - for reasons of metaphysics

we never actually get out of it

the fact that we might want to - or think we can

is just another reflection

which from the point of view of logic

makes no sense

this is no great problem so long as it is realized that at such a point we are not actually
doing anything logical

imagination begins were logic ends

12/12/06
mind cannot be conceived


that which is in itself

and is conceived

through itself

it seems for Spinoza

substance exists separate from
any conception of it

any conception of it occurs in it

and any such conception is of it

so how can a conception be in and of?

in and of one in the same thing

surely it is impossible to conceive of something
that is not separate from the conceiving -

from that which does the conceiving?

if we argue mind is subjectivity

it's object is that which is outside of subjectivity

that which is objective

we may choose to think of mind as an object

but perhaps this is just a fact of language

of grammar - of the structure of grammar

once realized - we need to drop the concept of mind
as object

I prefer reflectivity as it is not object-like

but rather operative - an operation - an action

so a conception is a subjective - focus

which is defined by what it includes - and what it excludes

a subjective definition pure and simple

for this reason substance as that which has no negative - no outside

on my view cannot be conceived

cannot be conceived - and cannot be conceived through itself

any conception must be outside of that which is conceived

if it is not outside - it simply cannot be conceived

on this view mind can never be regarded as co-extensive with the external world

it is always within - it cannot be otherwise

the world is outside of mind

mind is in the world

and so

mind cannot be conceived

for it is not outside of itself

yes


12/12/06
existence


existence - conscious existence -

is without foundation

the question of foundation only arises in consciousness

the mind - thinking a basis for itself

Descartes was true to this instinct and followed it to the letter

existence he thought was foundation

but he missed it

for existence - conscious existence - is what seeks foundation

take consciousness out of the equation - and so goes the problem of foundation

the seeking for foundation

could well be said to be the point of consciousness

its essence - what it does - what distinguishes it from the non-conscious

a search for reason

for reason is at the back of consciousness and yet any reason there is is only a product
of consciousness

hence you could say

consciousness makes its own foundation

this is what it does - must do - to be what it is

as a tree seeks nourishment from the ground - in being a tree

we never reach rock bottom here

because any proposal for foundation

is soon recognized for what it is - a fraud

in that it is a product of consciousness - and not what it is based upon

very difficult though to stop looking

even when you know there is nothing to find

nothing that can be found

out of this truly futile endeavour comes the best that we have

all our knowledge - our dreams

14/12/06
beyond mind and matter


I don't think we can say what mind is

just that it posits itself - and recognizes itself - as inside

the world - you might say -

but however you characterize the outside -

that which mind is inside of - the point is -

mind is the inside -

so I argue here a radical thesis of skepticism

which just is that we do not know

we don't know what mind is - or what it is mind is in

I say this to make the point that we can go beyond the idealist / materialist debate -

debate that is about - what

what mind is (what the inside is)

what is outside of mind (what the outside is)

what I am pointing to is the ground of this debate in its purity

the logic of it if you will -

materialism and idealism are attempts to show - to say - we do know - what is

I think we can go beyond these last ditch attempts at knowledge

and point to the absence of knowledge

epistemologically speaking we begin in the midst of it all

and look for foundations

this looking for foundation and all it entails is our living

the act of living - of searching - gives content - to our lives

(content to the contentless I would argue)

foundations are not to be found in either mind or matter

mind and / or matter may function for us - as foundations - in practice

but they are essentially only covers for the unknown

we don't know but we must act

we define - define and create

mind and matter are two such definitions

two such creations

what is behind these creations - these posits

what it is that is behind mind and matter

we cannot know

we cannot say

we begin in the midst of it all

we remain in the midst of it all

we end up in the midst of it all

beyond this (however you characterize it)

we do not know - cannot know

cannot say


17/12/06
metaphysical theories / logical space and metaphysical junk


metaphysical theories - i.e. - materialism and idealism - are attempts to account for the
unknown

to provide a foundation in knowledge - for our actions

what is fundamental is the unknown

these metaphysical theories are covers for the unknown

masks for the unknown

they provide platforms for action

they are in fact substitutes for knowledge -

for foundation

the need for foundation is what is really at issue here

I argue - it is a feature of consciousness - a characteristic of mind - to seek a basis

the point is - if there was foundation

the mind could not know - for it would of necessity be outside of mind - and for that
matter outside of the world

I do not think it makes any sense to speak of such

to go down this track is to mistake metaphysical need for reality

in reality there is no foundation to knowledge

if there was - the question would not arise

idealism begins with mind and argues that the world outside of mind can be shown to
in fact be mind

materialism that the outside reality can be shown to be in fact applicable to the inside

both are attempts to provide a singular account of the nature of reality

if successful both destroy the basis on which they are proposed

in the case of idealism - mind - the inside is extended to cover the outside - and as a
result the distinction is destroyed - there is no outside

if no outside - no inside

on what is idealism based?

and you can put the question - if mind cannot be distinguished from non-mind - does
it in fact have any definition?

what is it - where is it?

in the case of materialism - matter - the outside is extended to cover the inside - and
as a result the distinction is destroyed - there is no inside

if no inside - no outside

on what is materialism based?

again - if matter is all there is - how can it be defined - determined?

to say matter is everywhere - is not necessarily to make a substantial claim - without
metaphysical distinction (which a successful comprehensive theory defeats) it can be
argued there is no content to the materialist thesis

so there is a serious issue of definition if either idealism or materialism is taken to be a
complete account of the nature of reality

can I suggest that idealism is a useful theory of mind - what I would call a prime
position - a place to start - an initial response to the question - what is mind?

and materialism a useful theory of the world outside of mind - again we need to begin
with something in order to deal with what it is (the unknown) we are faced with

either put forward as a comprehensive metaphysics I suggest falls on its own sword

they are best seen natural characterizations - and useful tools

idealism has proven its worth e.g. as a platform for religious aesthetic and ethical
thinking

materialism as a successful impetus for scientific / empirical pursuits

both are best seen as constructs on the unknown

in practice - decisions are made about foundation - positions adopted - platforms used

this is the reality of practice

the theoretical attempt to furnish the world with one all embracing account is more in
the line of a parlor game - an exercise

which nevertheless may - and in fact does yield not just pleasure but new ideas - new
ways of looking at the world

nevertheless most of us operate in a universe of metaphysical junk -

a whole range of ideas systems and concepts

and use determined by need and circumstance

and nothing is guaranteed - you can and do always go back to the junkyard for new
bits and pieces to assemble or attach - or to start foraging again

the metaphysician functions primarily in this space - as an inventor of new ideas - new
ways of seeing - he makes the junk we all need - (and may even have a hand in
managing the yard)

the yard is logical space - the junk - the theories and concepts we need and / or use to
live in the unknown


19/12/06
the point of consciousness


what I have argued is that we begin in the midst of reality

(and for that matter stay there and end there)

our awareness - we understand as awareness of

we are aware of the world - the world outside our consciousness

and we are aware of this awareness -

we are this - awareness of awareness

self - if the term is to mean anything is that which is aware

what that is - is another question

it is at the centre of - awareness of the outside world - and aware of awareness - the
inner world

so that - at the centre - is what we might call self

that - is a logical point

that is as much as we can say - about that

that it is - OK

what about what it is?

this question of what

is what sort of a question?

it is a question of substance

and what is this?

what does substance come down to

composition

to ask what x is composed of is to ask a substantial question

so what is consciousness - made of -

what is the self?

we can only really answer this negatively

consciousness is made of that which is not non-conscious

OK this doesn't take us too far

but it is not frivolous to make the point

that consciousness can only describe itself as what it is not

and the same is finally true of the non-conscious world

what is the world outside of consciousness made of?

that which is not conscious

so we have only logic here

only that which is - and that which is not

no substance

in a final metaphysical sense

any substantial theory of the inside or of the outside

is finally a fiction of consciousness

consciousness' answer to the unknown

or ways of dealing with the absence of substance

of grounding

for itself and for what it sees - the world outside itself

of that which exists we can only say that it exists

this is not to give it any content

content is a construction

the necessary after-thought


19/12/06
the logic of consciousness - assertion and denial


the first moment of consciousness is awareness

(whatever this is)

and awareness of awareness

which is exactly what it is

reflectivity

consciousness knows itself as itself

this is the fact - the presentation

I frankly don't see how this can be further explicated

any supposed explication is just that - or a statement of that which is to be explicated -

it is that is a reflection of and on consciousness

so - here the explication is actually a statement of that which is to be explicated

and of this

there is no explication

the second moment of consciousness is awareness of what it is not - the world - the
outside of consciousness - the object

so consciousness asserts itself and what it is not -
x and ~x

this is the proposition of consciousness

x and ~x

the x's here are not just short hand

they are the unknown realities

the assertion of x (consciousness) is an unknown

the negative of x is an unknown

some have taken this to mean that consciousness brings nothingness to the world -

this is primarily Jean Paul Satre's argument

his argument confuses the negative and non-existence

the negative of consciousness is not nothingness - it is non-consciousness

existence here is not at issue

(existence is not in fact a problem

existence is a question of classification )

what consciousness brings to the world is assertion and its denial

it is the ground of assertion - and denial

consciousness asserts itself positively and defines itself negatively

the definition is really nothing more or less than this

consciousness is not that which is non-conscious

awareness is only definable given the contrast with that which is not aware

in a world with only consciousness - there would be no definition

and hence nothing to speak of

such a world is literally indefinable

for mind to have any functional reality - any reality - it must exist in contrast to the
non-consciousness

and so too the non-conscious

a conscious monism or a non-conscious monism is illiterate

the fundamental operation of consciousness -

everything else is derivative

awareness is assertion and denial

awareness / consciousness is x and ~x

such is the nature of consciousness

and this is not a substantial definition - rather a formal definition

it leaves issues of substance open

there is no ontological commitment in consciousness

the conscious world - or the world of consciousness is -

logical space

the space of x and ~x

this is to say - or another way to say it is that in a world where x and ~x could not be
asserted

there is no consciousness

is it not true that ~x is contained in x?

how else could it be?

x is only defined given ~x

~x only defined given x

consciousness comes into being when reality asserts itself

this is really all that can be said

and in this assertion is contained its denial

we can perhaps say assertion is thus the essential characteristic of consciousness

the non-conscious does not assert

it is non-assertive

and assertion is only possible - only makes any sense - against that which is not
asserted

only - that is given its negative

therefore

the world


21/12/06
illusion


the argument for illusion is what?

that reality is not all its cracked up to be -

may or may not be - real?

heaven forbid

or is it rather that the perceiver may not perceive - correctly?

so again

reality (here I include the perceiver) is not all it's cracked up to be - but the problem
can be isolated to the perceiver -

still though - it is however you work it -

that reality - and I am speaking sub species aeternitatis here - is not - what?

stable?

it can be real
it can be illusory

at this point real looses its universality

real - if real is to mean anything must include - veridical perception and illusory
perception -

and then the question

what are we to say of real?

one answer is - we don't know

so illusion is what?

perceptually -

reason to question the deliverances of the senses

the key to the sceptical door

epistemologically?

the argument of difference

without a clear uncontraversial theory of what is real - what is reality

(and this is not possible)

there is no argument for illusion

there is no illusion - only difference

the sceptical response to difference is to acknowledge it - accept it - embrace it

it is to understand there is no uncontraversial view of reality

that in fact there is no uncontraversial reality

metaphysical

epistemological

political

ethical

the argument of positive skepticism is diversity and tolerance


21/12/06
we begin


we begin with the world as given

we may not be able to accurately describe what it is we face

(what constitutes and accurate description?)

but we are in the midst of a given reality

that is we are not confronted with possibility - a possible world

the world is

possibility is an after thought

possibility is not ontological

possibility is epistemological

possibility is knowing

the possibility of knowing

what it is - that we are - and are in

the given (the world) is given - as undefined

we are given - a working model - in perception

but how to describe this is the question of humanity

descriptions are necessary

necessary for the act of living

to use a metaphor -

our descriptions are tools

different tools required for different jobs

no universal

without tools we don't operate

we don't describe

there is no prototype we can refer to

we can only respond to our biology -

to its imperatives

(and this too a description)

and how we describe this - conceive this - is an indeterminate matter

such is the history of science -

of thought

thought is the basis of action

there is no basis to thought but thought

21/12/06
we begin thinking


we begin thinking in thought

the world outside of thought is non-thought - it is not thought

it is the object of thought

that which thought is primarily directed at

it is the first instance in that thought recognizes what it is not

thought or mind sees itself as situated in non-thought

this is the primary presentation

thought inside a world of non-thought

consciousness in a non-conscious world

in fact we never go beyond this reality

the primary function of thought is to characterize the unknown (that which is not
thought) in thought

it is to transform

to translate the unknown to thought

to knowledge

to appropriate the unknown

in one sense this is all thought does

at the heart of this activity - the essence of it is - uncertainty

thought is uncertain

all that is certain paradoxically is the unknown

but the unknown does not speak

we can only attempt to grasp and characterize it in thought

any such characterization - description

is finally based on description

and whatever is to count as an initial description is finally a matter of decision - and in
general convention

we inherit certain conventions

and we make new ones

they are platforms

on the unknown

masks for the unknown

like the human face


28/12/06
time and space


consciousness

is in time and in space

consciousness in itself - reflecting on itself - is timeless and spaceless?

consciousness - the mind - locates itself in space and time - in reflecting outside itself

that is in identifying that it is in itself - but here most significantly - in the world -

this is an ontological primitive - and an epistemological unknown -

consciousness sees in (itself - the inside) and out - (the world - the outside)

so space and time are - on this view characteristics of the outside of consciousness

of the world -

consciousness is in

perhaps I have overstated the case here

in relation to space

time I think is straightforward -

consciousness regards itself as timeless - in itself

but spaceless?

surely we only have a sense of consciousness

as being in

in - not just the world

but in a body - my body

this it would seem is no secondary reflection

this is primary

so space - is externality

is what consciousness is in

we don't have a sense of consciousness as spaceless

in the same way as we have a sense of consciousness as timeless

space is externality

what is time?

time as internality?

yes

primarily

the succession of conscious states

and also - an externality?

the world - the outside is a succession of states

so there is a correspondence

yes

and of space?

is space internal?

I don't think so

in the sense that

consciousness does not have - or see itself as having internal space

the space of consciousness is what it is in

unless we wish to speak in an idealist or religious manner

spiritual space

the space of the spirit

- an internal space

I don't think so

I come back to the intuition that space is what consciousness is in - therefore in
relation to consciousness - the outside

time as an internality
space the externality

inner space

the inside

the inside of the body - is in my view - consciousness

this is what the inside is -

an inside to the inside I don't get

so can we nevertheless speak of consciousness

as the inside space?

poetically yes

but ontologically I don't think it stacks up

OK

space as the external dimension

therefore consciousness in itself - if it makes any sense to speak of this - is spaceless

now time

the idea of the timeless

does the same apply?

consciousness in itself - timeless

OK we have a sense of this

but the reality of consciousness in the world

is that consciousness is in time

spacelessness and timelessness - abstractions

what follows from this for the question of the nature of space and time?

space is the externality

mind the internality

time as a characteristic of space - of the externality

time as a characteristic of consciousness

consciousness and the world

the inside and the outside

have time as a common attribute

do we still want to say that space is just an external dimension?

inner space is what?

mind

O.K.

outer space - no mind - what I've been calling the world

therefore space and time

characteristics of mind and matter

inner and outer seem to be the main categories here

inner / outer - space / time

space and time common characteristics

therefore essential characteristics

of reality

of the inner - of the outer

this is not to say much

I haven't got too far here


28/12/06
uncertainty


the thing in itself

is like - I have argued regarding substance - a singular conception

a decision to regard a feature of the world

be it mind - or the world itself in isolation

so it is no surprise really

that out of such a deliberation might come concepts like timeless - spaceless -
eternity

they are simply concepts of negation

not time - not space

and because we can come to these concepts

we imagine we are conceiving positively

that there is in fact a timelessness - or no space

or no time - eternity

how to regard this?

if you are prone to run with the ontological argument -

well anything you conceive will have a positive reality

existence

this though depends on the assumption that whatever we think is real - is true

it is indeed a very optimistic view of the mind

perhaps based on the fear - that if the mind is not reliable on any one matter -
perhaps it has no bone fides at all

and this just another version of the idea that the self does not deceive - the self

it is fear of error

which is all very well - but there can as a result be a problem of population - and
population control

Oakum's razor was one sensible methodological attempt to bring some order to the
situation

what I say is that reflection - which is what mind does - what consciousness does - is
an operation

if you like a logical operation -

the action of consciousness -

understood this way - you can see that the performing of an operation does not in itself
create anything

it may transform what is already there - but nothing is brought into the world - by the
operation - the operation of consciousness

so thinking is an operation

the performing of an operation

and the operation is reflection

reflection is just a picture of what is already there

the fact of different pictures tells us mind is never sure

cannot be sure

mind is - reflection is - and is only possible given - uncertainty

here it is clear mind is best described as indeterminate

I have been rather quick here

the thing is - you can't really ever properly speak of consciousness or the mind - in
itself

it is always in relation to

there just are no absolutes

metaphysically speaking it is all relative

so to understand the operation that is mind

you must speak of mind in relation to its object

the object of knowledge

is the unknown

therefore

uncertainty


28/12/06
reflection as an operation


reflection as operation

it is I suggested above to create a picture

this in a sense is what thought per se is

the creating of a picture - an ideal picture

yes - a picture in thought

and if we reflect on this - what?

we can only think

we cannot get an objective vantage point

what we can do is come at it from different directions

different directions?

what is this?

what I am interested in is what is reflection on reflection?

do we make another image - another picture - of the picture given?

yes - I think so

but you might ask - in what sense is it fundamentally different?

and where does it come from - the new picture?

what is its basis?

to reflect is to look at

to create an object of -

of?

of view

this is the operation of mind

that it can step back from itself - and hold itself in view

this suggests what?

that

mind is subject and object

that it can become

either

that its position is not fixed

beyond this

what can we say of it?

we do not know -

the mind outside of its functions

(and these are quite mysterious anyway)

is fundamentally unknown

here I suggest is the door to possibility

some have taken it to open to another realm

eternal life

but really it is simply - and in all purity

the unknown


29/12/06
the world is the possibility of thought


the world is the possibility of thought

the notion of thinking outside of the world may on the face of it strike one as a
reasonable thought

some philosophers - Plato for one - made a career of it

nevertheless it is clear on reflection to be impossible

but what such a notion leads us to is the question

if you cannot get outside of it to define

how then do you define?

how that is do you define the world?

my argument is we can only work from the inside

for all intents and purposes - and in a strictly logical sense - there is no outside

we cannot - to get right to it - define the world

we can only define what is in it

the world is our domain of definition

outside of the world there is no such question

no definition -

thought I have argued is reflection

and reflection is to make - to have pictures

ideal pictures

pictures - only of what is

we cannot conceive what does not exist

still the question - what is it that exists?

the fact of this question tells us

the answer - any answer is a question of possibility

there are that is possible answers to this question

possible pictures

these pictures - conceptions

can only be what is

what is - from an epistemological point of view is a matter of uncertainty

it is the question of knowledge

how and what it is we know

granted the world is

the issue is characterization

and the issue cannot be settled in the way we might wish

that is - objectively

for we have no way of assessing metaphysical characterizations

and by this I mean total views

what test is available?

granted we establish internal criterion in the form of logic

but logic only really decides sensibility

different world views can be offered

and if they are sensible from a logical point of view

then they are possible accounts

from an epistemological point of view

the world is possibility

how to decide between possible accounts of the actual

what possible epistemological world can rightly be given the status of actual?

as I put it above

there is no objective test here

objectivity is a notion that can only function in house

there is no view from the outside

of course - what happens is we make the outside

that is we decide what is in and what is out of the world

for instance - Plato excluded the sensible world from his version of the real

the situation is - at this level

we are best to regard the enterprise as interesting and useful

but not in fact resolvable

the answer is

we do not know

we have possible accounts

and these are all worthy

their actual value is a question of their utility

and this of course is finally a meta decision

what counts as useful

convention

based on necessity or its perception is the best we can do

the content of our possible accounts of the world or of parts or regions of the world

is simply a question of invention

and skillful use of what is epistemologically available

the point being

our conceptions are made out of what is given

perhaps ideas from one context adapted to another

or even the generation of new languages and hence concepts

to describe what we are presented with

invention

what is possible in thought

is only what is given in the world

what this amounts to is

what we can make

in ideal terms

of the non-ideal reality

the reality that is unknown

yet always and only

the object of knowledge


29/12/06
the world of knowledge


Popper's idea of the third world is relevant here

it is in short the world of knowledge

we come into this world as knowers facing the unknown

this relation never alters

however we do not come to an empty slate

the world is full of knowledge

in fact we can speak of the world of knowledge

as the epistemological reality we inherit and which we begin with

any attempt to explain

any act that is of reflection

begins with what is epistemologically given to the knower

this - whatever it is - is what the knower works with

acceptance or rejection

partial or total

the fact remains we begin with epistemological pictures

these pictures are in themselves never fixed or stable

any stability is a matter of decision and convention

what I am trying to get at here is that reflection is never content free

the operation of reflection

is an operation with content

content that exists because it in some sense is given

the mind is always full

the question of what view to take on what issue is a question of which picture to see
the world through

the fact of different metaphysical pictures - points to the unknown - and raises
questions

questions for the reflective mind

what to do?

develop a concept of truth - and regard certain conceptions as false

go for some kind of commitment

or be open to the use of different conceptions

and keep an open mind


29/12/06
the object of knowledge


the knower faced with the unknown conceives

this relation of knower to unknown is fundamental and primitive

we can argue about what conception is

my point here is that conceiving is a primitive essential response of the knower

it is what the mind does

it is of its nature

and to conceive is the making of knowledge

again what this amounts to - is a question of knowledge

but I say whatever it is to make knowledge -

this is the natural act of mind

the world as given - in a primal state is the unknown

the object of knowledge of the mind - is the unknown

knowledge is the natural response of the knower

it is what we do

the knower is a space that is open to the world

the world reflects in this space

the knower reflects on this reflection


01/01/07
consciousness freedom and determinism


consciousness

sees the world outside itself as determined

consciousness sees itself - the world of consciousness as indeterminate

is indeterminate equivalent to free?

freedom?

I think it fair to say the mind regards itself - as being what it is (whatever that is) and
not what it is not

the mind is not free to be not mind

this being said

relative to the non-conscious world

the mind is -

free - or different?

different - yes

free - well I think yes if free is not determined

and here determined - is that which is non-conscious

I will stick with indeterminate

but in what sense?

the world of the mind is the world of knowledge

the mind is free to the extent that it does not know

that it is not determined by knowledge

I argue that knowledge is an illusion - necessary - but still an illusion

and so the mind is only determined - if we can use that word -

by illusion

to see through this - the illusion of knowledge

is to see to its absence

the absence of knowledge is what leaves the mind free

it is the reason for its indeterminism

in the non-conscious world - this question does not arise

or should I say it doesn't arise for the non-conscious world - just because it is non-
conscious

if this is how consciousness sees itself and sees the world

what can we say of the world in itself - per se?

well we can't say anything

nothing to be said

even to say we don't know -

is this going beyond bounds - strictly speaking?

we might need two senses of the unknown here

the unknown in the sense of the absence of knowledge

and the unknown in the sense of the world beyond knowledge


03/12/07
mind and matter a logical unity


the world outside of mind presents as mindless

mindless here is material

the outside (of mind) is material

mind is internal to matter

the unity of mind and matter in a conscious - self-conscious individual - is not a
substantial equality

it is logical

the logical necessity of an inside - only being what it is - given the outside

and the outside - being what it is - and because of its - the relationship with the inside

the unity is dimensional

and this is the point - it is not substantial

the unity - is unknown - extra-dimensional

the person as Strawson put it

in my view - is in itself without definition

it is - the unity - in whatever manifestation - beyond definition -

it is - as a logical entity - the unknown

the unity of mind and matter (the whole - in this case) is beyond definition

and the unknown - I am presenting here - as a logical unity - a logical point if you like

true - this idea of the logic of the unity of dimensions (internal / external) is a logic
only given consciousness

for this is all logic is - a product of consciousness

or should I say consciousness in relation to the non-conscious

so

outside of this logic?

is a no go zone

it is the outside of the domain of mind

it cannot be legitimately addressed - from a logical point of view

only imaginatively

this is the function - the point of the imagination to go where there is no logic

art is the answer to absence


03/01/07
reflected reality


what I have been putting in various forms and arguments is the view that our reality is
a reflected reality

that our knowledge so called is reflection

what we know is reflection

in one form or another not hard to grasp

empiricists held it as a tenet that the world reflects on consciousness

rationalists that the world outside mind is only known given the mind's reflections on
it

I go with a third view a sceptical view

that we do not know

and that our reflections - are in fact reflections on and of the unknown

so what of that beyond reflection?

I say it is the object of knowledge - which I define as the unknown - and I say our
reflections - in so far as we hold them to be knowledge - are all open to question

still they are reflections

the mind reflects

and if we understand that there is no bed rock to reflection

nothing can be the touch stone to truth

nevertheless we still have the fact of reflection

we still have reflection as the epistemological reality of conscious - self-conscious
beings

reflection is an act of knowledge - in the sense that no one reflects from nothing

we are given in whatever form as epistemological entities something to work with

and we always have something to work with -

this data - epistemological data - becomes the object of reflection

it is what we reflect upon

what I argue is that it takes some thought to see that there is nothing that can be
known beyond this facade of reflection

the world beyond this is what cannot be known

Descartes thought that a good start in this business was himself

and who could argue with the common sense wisdom of this

he came quickly to see that what he could not question was that he thinks

the point being - yes he did know something - and it was at the very least about
himself

Descartes of course had not abandoned his pursuit of knowledge - it was a life raft
and he clung to it

really though - all he had actually managed to identify was that he reflects

now to say what this is - is of course to reflect upon it

it is to perform an epistemological operation

and its status - epistemological - ontological - is a matter of reflection

so here I am suggesting that the knower so called is reflection bound

logically speaking Descartes was no further down the road of his inquires at the end as
he was at the beginning

and what of Descartes himself - or for that matter you or I

if you take reflection out of the picture?

what do we know of ourselves?

what can we know?

I say we must regard ourselves as unknowns


04/01/07
reflection and unity


reflection

what it is - how it is to be described or explained?

is finally no more than an other reflection

a reflection on reflection

we can't get outside of it - in fact strictly speaking we can't say there is an outside to it

so where is the self in all this?

the self is a reflection

a meta reflection

an organizing principle

an argument for stability -

and one that seems to work

at the centre of this?

well some say - mind

as if there is a substance - to which these - all reflections - refer logically

the primary reflection of the outside world is just this - of substance

this is the walking down the street view

it doesn't last long

if - if you reflect on it

but substance is a reflective construct

the reflection that is mind - is

a clear reflection of this

I speak of mind as reflection - as an operation

this is my preferred view -

the thing is beyond this what can we say?

what is the essence of it?

what is that point of unity of inside and outside?

what is behind it - if you like?

the answer here is empty

I don't want to say the question is not meaningful

just that there is nothing in the place where the answer should be

it is an open logical space


05/01/07
the search for truth


can be regarded as the blind imperative of consciousness

it is consciousness' response to the impenetrability of the world

it is relentless

and but for reflective metaphysics - without reason

it is strictly speaking an end that has no end

its origin

is the origin of consciousness

the conception that consciousness arrives at which it will regard as the truth

is from another point of view - another moment of consciousness - the illusion

that is to be pierced - or done away with

illusion is a conception of consciousness

it is consciousness knowing itself as it is

not what it might become

the becoming is always the aspiration for - the hope for truth

which is what?

the end of illusion - yes

but how to know?

when is the moment realized?

consciousness has no answer to this

it seeks but knows it can never identify the end of seeking

also it has no means of stopping the seeking

Indian philosophies have recognized this as the issue of living in consciousness

and have devised stratagems for resolution

the point is though

there can only be refuge in illusion

enlightenment or unenlightenment

logically speaking there is no difference

this is perhaps the great point - the great truth

it can only be a choice of illusion

and a choice of criterion

for the choice of illusion

there is no knowledge here

it is I think a matter of form

to find what nearly fits well

or the skin one can live within

laughter is the sound of God


05/01/07
the mind reflects


the mind reflects

it reflects on reflection

reflection of?

what I am suggesting is that the ground of reflection is unknown

so therefore?

our reflections on the unknown are

finally unknown

if so

what then is reflection about?

what is knowledge?

our reflections - the illusion of knowledge

yes

but still the question of knowledge

why knowledge?

on this view - if there is no knowledge - only the illusion of

what sense to speak of it?

knowledge as explanation

knowledge as underpinning to what is presented to consciousness

knowledge as description

there must be something there to be described

yes

but do we know what it is?

what would it be to know it?

this is the question

and I don't know how to answer it

how to address it

an account is a description

an ideal picture

perhaps any such picture is knowledge

and then for particular purposes we refine the issue

we are back to what is reflected

the relation of mind to its object

just is knowledge?

we can't step outside of this

knowledge is the mind in the world

the world reflected in mind

what then is the problem?

knowledge is reflection

what I am aware of is what I know

OK

awareness equals knowledge

or

awareness is the knower in the world

awareness is a feature of the natural world given entities that are aware

we - human beings - are aware of awareness

but we cannot say what awareness is -

only that it is the mind in the world

can we say what awareness is?

that it is an internal property of matter -

the inside of matter?

again we can say that such is the case

not why

knowledge as I am putting it - a feature within -

in the world -

it can only be a view

not the view

the view may be suggested - by the fact of a view -

but we cannot go there

the world cannot be contained in knowledge

it is rather that knowledge is contained by the world -

reflection on awareness is the attempt to explain - give a further description - provide
another account

awareness just is the mind in the world -

the mind translates the outside to itself - to the inside - and then goes to work on it -

it is a translation from material to ideal

this is the idea

there is no objective view of this - no independent test of this translation

what happens happens

and the truth is we don't know

we can't know

is it therefore a relevant issue?

yes

but only in the face of the claim of truth or certainty -

these concepts derive from the vanity of awareness

I see what I see therefore it must be

actually - it is - I see what I see

and no further claim can be made

what must be - cannot be decided

not to say that it is not an interesting question for speculation

and perhaps addressing this question - is the source of creativity

but only because what must be

cannot be seen


p.s.


perhaps what I was trying to say is

we begin with the fact of the mind in the world

awareness and awareness of

the mind sees

what this seeing is - is not seen

what is seen is only

what is seen

to describe what is - it to reflect on it

it being the awareness

we can only say of this awareness - what it is not

in the attempt to define

and what it is not - is just that -

strictly speaking it can only be described logically

x and ~x

that's it


06/01/07
the mind in the world


the mind in the world

translates?

this is rather a reflection - an attempt at explanation of the relation of mind and matter

the mind is in the world

it is the inside of the outside -

what is it - that has this inside and outside?

for Kant - the thing in itself

for Spinoza - substance

how do we describe mind in matter?

even the terms mind and matter are just labels for the unknown

we know an outside - an inside

this relation is given to us

in mind

and mind reflecting on itself sees itself as inside matter

therefore the outside -

what it is - is just that which has these dimensions

so it cannot be described in internal or external terms

mental or physical

at best it is neutral - yes

mind is a feature of neutrality

matter a feature of neutrality

to say we don't know is not to say enough

it goes beyond knowledge and its absence

the inside is a dimension of being

the outside a dimension of being

mind - knowledge is a dimension of being

matter a dimension of being

being as such

beyond description

the outside does not interact with the inside

the inside is not a spin-off of the outside

the outside is not the inside

the inside is not the outside

knowing is a way of being

just as not knowing is a way of being


p.s.


mind is in space

it is not extension

extension is a property of the outside

the mind is intentional - non-extended

in space

intentional space is the space of mind

space therefore has two attributes - internal - external

the unity cannot be conceived as extended or intentional

if it exists spatially - it must exist as / in a third dimension

for inside and outside are dimensions of the unity

the unity is over and above its attributes

they therefore cannot apply

but what does apply we cannot say


p.p.s.


for Spinoza the unity - its characteristic is absolute infinity

if this is to mean it cannot be defined - yes

as regards it being unlimited - as distinct from limited

it is to mistake an issue of substance for an issue of definition

the fact is we cannot say what the unity - the totality is

we cannot assume it is a substance - unlimited or not

that it is - yes

what it is - no

substance as existence?

OK

but why?

how can we so define it?


11/01/07
knowledge


the world as it appears

as it is in consciousness

is the world in awareness

is this knowledge?

it is data

consciousness reflects on this data

it is the reflection that is knowledge

the reflection occurs because awareness in itself

is without explanation

reflecting on it leads to knowledge

we reflect on it because - as it is

it is unknown

and our reflection

how do we know its status -

i.e. do we have knowledge here?

well first up

knowledge is what?

we might say it is a foundation to our experience

that it is an ideal underpinning of what is given

OK

still what this is

what this amounts to

why it is sought

are all reflective questions

the answers are not out there -

they are - if they are - in there

the point is

reflection may posit knowledge

but reflection -

of one kind or another is -

the only basis to this posit

to call for a foundation - to that which functions as foundation to what is given

is to ask for what?

we really don't know


12/01/07
inner experience


since Descartes at least

the argument on both sides of the river is that inner experience is privileged

in that it is my experience and direct

we begin with consciousness

and its relationship with the outside world

this - a primal reflection

(you don't have to start with this reflection

you can begin where and how you like

but as a starting point it is rather uncontraversial

it is where I start)

OK

but let's not get too excited

about inner experience

firstly it is not at all clear what it is

even from the inside

how do I describe my thoughts -

if that's the tag I'm going to give inner experience?

well with other - what?

thoughts

so - there is no explanation

x is x

perhaps in different clothes

at different times

we don't know what inner experience is

what experience is

we can describe it logically

i.e. - it is not - that which is not experienced

?

yes

you think I jest

experience - is what it is - whatever that is - and not what it is not

since we can reflect on the matter and come at it from different angles

different characterizations are possible

only characterizations of thought by thought

and we need also to ask -

just how inner - inner is?

I grant it is compelling at a primal level

but reflectively it is anything but -

or should I say does not have to be


perhaps inner experience - is only inner because it works best to divide reality so?

if you take the view - e.g. - that everything that exists is fundamentally of the same
status - whatever that may be

you might say - everything is objective - even the so called inner life

this I think is Spinoza's view of the matter

that it is just - another natural fact

a fact that has the same status -

as other objective states - i.e. the weather

and is therefore in no sense privileged

perhaps if you like - seen from an objective stand point -

to be just another - unremarkable - fact of the world

knowledge just another natural phenomenon

and so there are views -

and views - perspectives - perceptions -

are just like leaves on a tree

there is no privilege

inner experience

my sense of myself is what?

an inner experience?

how is this to be distinguished from the outside?

my body in the world -

isn't this all I know?

and is this inner experience?

of what - the outside?

how to distinguish inner from outer?

what separates?


12/01/07
metaphysical awakeness


what I am getting at is that yes - it makes sense to speak of an inner life and an outer
world

this is the reality as given - or one common description of it

however on reflection all categories of this argument are open to question

each reality as posited is on reflection not beyond reflection

you can dig in and take a stand

but really a stand on what?

the issue - these issues are always live - never put to bed

and so the only position finally that has any real logical integrity

is the position of no position

reflectively speaking

the plus here is an open mind

an awareness that is not contained - from the inside

it is to be in a perpetual state of metaphysical awakeness

and we can maintain such a position

even as we go about the very particular business of living

it is to say - yes the world demands and perhaps - I accept - but I do not accede

on the metaphysical level my judgement is in suspense


15/01/07
consciousness as a logical point


consciousness as a logical point

that has an internal and external

capacity

this is to give a purely operational definition of consciousness

operational as distinct from substantial definition

a substantial definition tells us what x is

a capacity / operational definition tells us what x does -

what it is capable of - how it operates

as to the substantial question -

we can't say what consciousness is

there is no outer consciousness view of consciousness

so we can never know what it is

that it is

is to say what about it substantially?

that it is - and its nature can only be ascertained dispositionally -

the contents of consciousness can be described and so defined

the objects - outside of consciousness - can be described and so defined -

the world can de defined

but consciousness - cannot be known in this way

but again for this to happen - consciousness would need to be its own object

consciousness is subjectivity

it is that which perceives / conceives object

therefore

subject

so perhaps we need to think of consciousness as an ideal point - a transcendent
category

transcendent that is to its functions

its functions of subjectivity -

and objectivity

in itself - it is unknowable

a Kantian noumenon?

as I see it

such a view avoids - both idealism and materialism

as these conceptions / realities

are functions of consciousness

and cannot therefore be characterizations of it

rather than noumenon I prefer the description / idea of a logical point

a point that transcends subjective and objective realities

and all we can say here is that it is

no further description is possible

a consequence of this I think is that therefore consciousness is not to be regarded as a
substance of any kind -

it is not substantial - it is substanceless

the question - what is the mind is therefore the wrong question

the mind as a what - does not exist


15/01/07
substance and function


so consciousness is what sees - the inside / the outside - it is not what is seen

so

do we leave it at that?

there is a clarity to this - if not substance

that which does the seeing I have suggested transcends that which is seen

so we can speak of consciousness as outside of subjectivity and objectivity

outside of mind and matter

not in any substantial sense

only in a functional sense

the function of consciousness - that is consciousness - is presupposed in the seeing of
(mind / matter - inside / outside)

it is the function of revelation


NB.


I guess the point here is that a function is not a substance

it is an action

and the attempt to reduce - or explain - or define a function substantially is wrong
headed

substance ontologies are very simple - and not that useful

yes the world is made of things

but also functions - actions

and an action / function - is not a thing


16/01/07
the accident of necessity?


awareness

as a relation

that is reflection

it is the positing of x by x

(how did this come about?)

all awareness

finally self-awareness

what are the options here?

it seems some profound metaphysical shift

from one dimensional reality

(non-aware reality)

to self-aware reality

it's the separating out of an entity

into the relation of subject and object

subject aware of the object

the subject aware of the subject

awareness itself is still the mystery

we can only approach it via self awareness

and here - all we are presented with is the fact of it

no reason for it

no account of its origin

nature took a turn

or had a turn

and found itself - in various forms

seeing - seeing itself - and even seeing its seeing

it is an unexplainable event

evolution - meta / natural suggests itself here

but it is finally just to say

there was this development

not how or why

Darwin spoke of genetic change as blind

perhaps this is the key

the straightest assessment

on a metaphysical level

blind change tells us what?

the accident of necessity?

life or death -


16/01/07
metaphysical nerve


beyond experience is what we do not know

beyond knowledge

it is pretty straightforward -

you can't further describe this state

it is by definition beyond description

nevertheless

even some great thinkers have lost their nerve and jumped

Plato into Forms
Descartes into God
Kant into the Noumenon
Schopenhaur into Will
Hegel into the Absolute

there is a moral point to the epistemology of radical (or common sense) skepticism

it is that there is a limit to human vanity

and that limit is the end of knowledge

the unknown is the end of vanity

the logic of it is straightforward - clear cut

what we cannot know we cannot know

nothing more to say
no need to say it

full stop

walk away with dignity


17/01/07
Spinoza's watch


Spinoza's argument begins with ultimate explanation

his work is a demonstration that the world is a demonstration of his definition

his definition of substance

Spinoza does not reach for the ultimate - he begins with it

his argument is that existence is all that there is

it is therefore without limit

his argument for infinity is an argument against limit

for if there is a limit there is something on the other side of it

and such a view could not function as a comprehensive view of what is

what is assumed here is that reality is a unity

could there be other realities?

not on Spinoza's watch

whatever exists - however it exists is an expression of existence

existence is the universal

hence on this view it makes no sense to speak of the absence of existence

there is no void - as in non-existence

this knowledge is not gained from the senses

rather from reasoning

from logic

it depends for its success on the argument that we can conceive oneness - that we can
conceive totality - limitlessness

and that this conception - corresponds to what is

so the logic of one - the conception of oneness

the flaw in this argument is that such a conception has no existential content

it is to conceive nothing

this is the great paradox of Spinoza's argument

his grand conception of existence

the totality - is a conception of no thing

this is the first point

the second point is this -

you begin with the concept of oneness

and then move to define it in terms of limitlessness - and hence totality

it is to universalize the concept of one - to take it out of all contexts

against this can be put

if the one - is not limited - as it is when defined for example as a member of a
sequence then it makes no sense to speak of one at all

one in relation to what?

therefore the universalization of one is to misconstrue it - to effectively to make it
meaningless - such an argument is to the destruction of the concept of one

this is to question the argument at the level of conception

the next move - the ontological argument is beyond the pale

it is to assume that we can say from our limited perspective - what the ultimate nature
of the world is - simply on the basis of our conception - what we conceive

that we can know that this conception corresponds to reality

it is the supreme argument for supreme vanity

and I say on meta / moral grounds it should be - must be rejected as rubbish


22/01/07
the conception of totality


the conception of the totality

is like the horizon

we see it - it is always there - as a frame of reference - we can approach it but never
reach it

it is strictly speaking an illusion

conception is always within a domain

and this means a concept is defined by what it includes - and what it does not include

everything - may appear to include - but it does not exclude -

the idea of a conception of everything

is just that - an idea

it is not a conception

it might then be thought - well we can approach everything?

it is true we can have larger conceptions

as in concept 3 includes the domains of concepts 1 and 2

but we cannot approach everything

for the reason that we cannot conceive it in the first place

despite all our efforts at comprehensiveness - and inclusion - we think always within
limitations

this is really to the nature of man

attempts to over throw this fact have destructive consequences

as any illogical pursuit will


23/01/07
logical space and what is made


we operate within a totality

we cannot define it

for we cannot say what it is not

the idea of this is absurd

so what can we say of it?

just that it is the ground of our conceptions

it is logical space

the domain we think in - and I mean this in a non-party political sense

it is indefinable

all definition is within

this domain

it is the ground we operate on

and it is just that which is unknown

has to be

must be

for conception is about knowledge

knowledge is the decisions within this domain

this space

we gain nothing by attempting to define it

it is to mistake it for what it is not

is to confuse the world with what is created or made within it

the world is no creation

it is the ground of creation

the space of it


02/01/07
morality as projection


the world as given
the world of facts

the outside

is one dimensional in the sense that it is present in space and time

what I should do

is to ask a projective question

it is to go beyond the given facts

to think beyond

the given facts cannot therefore provide an answer

they are the basis for the question

but it's the question

the asking

this is a feature of consciousness

(the tree does not ask - the stone is not concerned)

this pins morality as a concern of -

an act of consciousness

the thing is though -

the reason for morality is the world as given

the world of facts

(no facts - no such world - no question)

so any answer to the question - what should I do?

projects - a world of facts

projects a state of affairs

we can't say -

what is - the thing to do -

we say what is the right thing to do - the good thing to do

'right' and 'good'

are not magical terms - or terms with no meaning - they are not 'is' terms

- however they are not

and this is important - non-natural

they are projections

they are as natural as mind - as consciousness

and you will see this unless you want to regard mind as other worldly -

a ridiculous notion

the mind is in the natural world

therefore -

a fact of the world is the projection of consciousness

it - if you like - needs to project in order to function

projection is a purely natural function of consciousness

the language of morality is not language of the given

it is projective language


03/02/07
Einstein time and consciousness


Einstein held that in the absence of subjective experience time is tenseless

this is to say?

no time

for an eternal now is not tenseless

now is tenseful

tenselessness is quite simply absence

eternity is absence

time therefore as fullness

or at least busy-ness -

seriously -

perspectives - subjective experience

is not outside of the world

it is a feature of the world

a kind of event - at least

it is surely really an open question

whether the mind gives time to the world

or the world gives time to mind

- which is then reflected back

if you hold hard to your perspective

this is all you have

it really entrails nothing outside of itself

we must begin in the middle

consciousness - as the inside -

(I say of the world - and not meaning here to be mystical at all)

consciousness is the inside of the surface that is the outside of

consciousness

it is an inside / outside job

it is just logic

you don't need to worry about substance at all here

the kind of materialism of Alan Place and Jack Smart - is just - thin

it is surface materialism - surface metaphysics

it is only seeing the surface of things

I have great respect for Otto Neurath for saying

'everything is surface'

yes - everything that is seen - observed - empirical - is on the surface - is the surface

the mind is not there -

consciousness is not on or of the surface

the brain is - as with any other physical form - on the surface -

it is therefore not consciousness

and I'm not really taken with the idea that it is a surface representation

expression as it were

no more that is than anything else

consciousness is simply the inside - of the outside

call the outside matter if you will - OK

call the inside mind

it matters not

the key point to get is that

the world is two dimensional

inside / outside

so yes - everything is surface if you wish to discount mind -

I don't

but I don't say it is observable or empirical

these are categories for the surface

it is the inside of things - at least certain things

it is not outside of nature

it is inside

the categories of description appropriate are the categories it creates to describe itself -
in short the language of art -

art is the language of the inside

of the inner life

we look out and we look in

therefore space

inner / outer space

this is what we know

it is the reality

there are primarily and finally two instances of our looking

therefore time

inner time

outer time

again

our reality

is what we know


04/02/07
mind / body


the goal in all of this is to find some unified account

yes - it's all mind in the end - no - sorry it's matter

the real problem here is not one of substance - it rather one of perspective

people I think - often don't know where they are coming from - or where they are

from the inside an act will be regarded as intentional - mind directed - you might say

the same act from an observer's point of view will be a surface event

OK - this we know

consciousness sees out
consciousness see in

consciousness is thus at the centre

an internal perspective - an external perspective

it's how you look

now the question will be - OK - how then to characterize the act in itself?

putting aside perspective - is it a mental event - a physical event?

an internal act that expresses itself on the surface

a surface act that - you would think under normal circumstances has a mental co-relate

the point I wish to make here is that the act in itself - cannot be characterized

cannot be characterized as mental

cannot be characterized as physical

there is no 'in itself ' perspective

such a position is really - strictly speaking without perspective

or you may wish to go the way of Spinoza -

and postulate a sub specie aeternitatis point of view

yes - very well

but that there is no such point of view

no such perspective

the fact is the act in itself is without character

the human being - as a unified entity -

a person as Strawson put it - is in the same boat

my argument is that mental and physical predicates only apply - perspectively

that is from an internal point of view -

from a surface point of view -

the holistic vision is not possible

I mean it is a great argument for God

but that's what it is

it is to attempt to - or to believe one can - step out and look back

it's really a trick of consciousness

an undisciplined and misapplied use of the reflective operation

that is consciousness

from the point of view of no perspective - i.e. the thing in itself - an entity - any entity
is unknown

this is an analytic argument really

but it is not trivial

we see the inside of things (ourselves)

the surface of things - ourselves and the world

we look both ways

we do not see - cannot see from the top as it were

that is there is no such knowledge that can hold the inside and the outside of an entity
in one perspective

if we have grounds for unity - for holism - for oneness -

they are not based on seeing

our seeing is two dimensional

but once this is seen for what it is it

we may quite easily say - assume

that from whatever point of view

we are looking

at the unknown

that which is the object of the gaze

the gaze in

the gaze out

is in the first instance - what we do not know

be it the inner world or the outer world

our descriptions are descriptions of dimension

and are thus - dimension dependent

this is to say to understand mind and body

one must begin where one is

at the centre

the issue has been mistakenly regarded as one of substance

it is first and foremost a question of ontology

and this is to say a question of the dimensions of the world

you will fail if you think you can find a dimension free description

of the human being

perhaps you are inclined to say there is an essence beyond dimension

OK - but this is to refer to what you cannot know


070207
the question of the senses


our senses give consciousness access to the outside (outside of consciousness) world

to the outside

what is this?

this relationship between consciousness and sense experience?

the inside and the outside

consciousness and the physical world?

this is the question

it is the question of knowledge

the outside is a dimension of the entity

the human being has internal and external dimensions

the totality - the person - if you like or just x -

just is these dimensions

can only be described in terms of these dimensions

the entity as such is best regarded as non-conscious and non-physical - as - an
unknown

still the question of the relation of the dimensions

the inside to the outside -

clearly aspects of a logical unity

and this unity - exists in both realms - is both dimensions

is knowledge - knowledge of the outside - the physical world - and knowledge of the
inside - say awareness of ideas

best seen as the point of unity -

that which is - a description of the unity - as unity?

clearly it has - an external / physical aspect

and at the same time - an internal - mental aspect

two aspects to knowledge - of the world - in the world -

it is not a question of interaction

or of one becoming the other

the analysis must be double aspect if it is to be complete?

awareness I argue is an internal property -

we don't observe awareness

(we are aware)

but awareness is partly awareness of the outside

awareness internalizes the outside?

transforms it?

what is the outside - outside of awareness

we can't say

OK - so knowledge is the internal dimension

yes

alright

what of the internalization -

what do we say here?

consciousness and the senses again?

what do we say here?

for clearly the senses

the physical -
the outside -

play a crucial role here

what is it?

what is the relationship?

I want here a non-causal account

for the causal makes no sense

yet it is basically the empiricist and indeed the rationalist approach -

for me it is a question of how to see this matter in terms of an inside / outside
paradigm

there is a third world view - i.e. - Popper

but this again is an interactionist view?

perhaps another tac entirely -

the question - why can't this matter be settled?

the question of mind and body -

this would be to say the matter cannot be resolved - why?

the relation between the inside (consciousness) and the outside (non-consciousness)?

could it just be - that to see - to know the relationship - there would have to be a third
view?

the view of what the relation is -

and we have no third view -

we have only what?

the view from the inside

yes

even so -

we know the senses are integral to the possibility of consciousness

i.e. - with no outside - no inside

that is we cannot in the argument just retreat to the inside - and say that's it -

the inside is knowledge - the outside the object - the point of - knowledge -

that which is known (primarily)

the entity is physical and mental

physical and mental are just dimensions of the entity

we really can't separate the two dimensions - once they are recognized

the entity as a whole ceases to exist -

a body without consciousness is no longer - a person

a mind with no body - is no person

the two dimensions just are the entity

the fact of consciousness - is the source of the knowledge of this

the question I am asking in one sense is -

how does that knowledge come about?

it is to ask for an analysis of the relation of inside to outside

could it be there is nothing to analyze?

that the relation just is the fact of - the nature of the entity

and as to how the inside relates to the outside - and visa versa

if the question - does actually make sense - we can't know the answer

we can only know the relation not how or why

what is the relation between the inside of a box and the outside?


p.s.


we think in terms of the senses as that means by which the physical / outside is
revealed -

but the outside is the revelation in consciousness

any explanation is consciousness' reflection on the revelation

the actual experience occurs - without explanation

it occurs as an unknown

the experience is an experience of unity

reflection divides


07/02/07
what can we know here?


awareness is awareness of

I say the outside world -
(outside that is of consciousness)

and consciousness is aware of itself

therefore the inside world -

one point -

we are not aware of the relationship between consciousness and the external world

if I am right here it is worth some thought

we are - I am saying simply aware of - the objects of consciousness - internal and
external

the question of the relation emerges post event

in response to the reflective separating out and - or division of awareness into
dimensions and the question of their unity - how can different realities (mind and
matter) interact?

I say they are not different substances - so it is not a question of how does one
substance of a particular nature - relate to - connect to another - of a different nature

fair enough question - if the issue is substance

what we know is that mind is inside matter

a dimension of matter?

or matter is the outside of mind - a dimension of mind?

the whole - here the conscious human being - is not one dimension or the other -

the human being - the entity as a whole is unknown - non-classifiable -

except in the dimensions of its unity

the dimensions - or dimensional definition is not a substantial issue - rather it is
logical - formal

x has an inside and an outside -

we call the inside consciousness - the outside matter

so on this view - it does not make sense to speak of the inside of anything interacting
with the outside

the entity as a unity - a singularity - acts

we begin here

any division into - mental and physical

is analytical - and hence theoretical - reflective - removed from the realm of action -

and why go there?

for good reasons - practical reasons

given some of the difficulties we face as human beings

so I am saying human action is ontologically singular

we are aware of what we do

we reflect on this

but this after the act

reflecting on the relation between the internal and external will tell us what?

that the internal is inside - the external is outside

won't tell us much

if we are looking for a causal connection - one way or the other -

what we are asking for is - what we are presuming is that -

the inside causes the outside - the outside causes the inside

the inside an effect -

the outside an effect -

a misapplication - use of the idea - the category of cause

put simply - cause and effect is a surface category

tempting yes to say everything has a cause

the point is you have to choose your cause

not everything is related to everything else in terms of cause and effect

the inside does not cause the outside - or visa versa - of anything -


08/02/09
the human being as an unknown


I have argued that the human being as such is not to be described as either mental or
physical -

that these predicates are analytical

which is to say human events - human actions - in a holistic sense are without
definition

the human being as such is an unknown

analysis - or breakdown begins with categorization

how to relate consciousness and the material world

the realist answer here is that consciousness is an internal dimension of the entity

that physicality is (relative to consciousness) the outside or surface dimension

what can we know of the relation between the two?

only this - that the entity is two dimensional

that the whole has an inside and outside

not all entities are two dimensional - on the face of it

most of nature is just surface

consciousness - internality - is exceptional

consciousness is the appearance of internality in the world

how does the internal effect the external?

how does mind effect matter?

(or visa versa)

my view is that this is the wrong question

that cause and effect analysis is a one dimensional issue

that is that such applies to relations on the surface

that it makes no sense to speak of such between dimensions

it is true that we can analyze our actions - or events as such

but this is analysis - explanation

and the point of this - is not the discovery of some hidden dynamic

rather a means of organizing our actions - and stratagems for action

the idea of this is thus finally to the service of pragmatics

in a final sense we have no explanation for human events

but in practice we act as if we do


10/02/07
consciousness and the world


consciousness I would say recognizes itself as contained and within

there is from the individual consciousness no sense of universal consciousness

consciousness is localized

and it is not out there beyond my window next to the palm tree or over the fence in the
paddock

it is not of the surface of the world - of things

it is inside

and not inside every surface entity or event

only some

it is though by definition within the natural world

the natural world has internal centres - consciousness-es

thus the inside of the world is not co-extensive with the outside

some features of the world have insides

have consciousness

so consciousness is contained

I would say self-contained

it postulates itself within itself

and hence recognizes itself

consciousness is thus subjectivity

and a subjectivity that postulates - holds itself within this subjectivity - as objective -
as object-like - that is discrete - defined - contained

the human being as an entity exists inside the world and on its surface

it is two dimensional

metaphysically - two dimensional

and from consciousness the sense of unity - of oneness - of one entity - among others -
and other objects

consciousness defines

this is what differentiation is

metaphysically

we begin from the centre

a centre

in terms of which everything else is categorized

the action of the categorization -

is not indiscriminate

the world is not made by mind

I think it fair enough to put that our categorization of the world - corresponds - on its
own level - to the world

that the surface as it appears to consciousness - is how it is - to consciousness

the point of consciousness is to facilitate definition of the world -

to recognize the world for what it is

we may imagine - another form of consciousness - a higher consciousness if you like -
recognizing - seeing the world differently

this is just to say that beyond our conception the world is unknown

consciousness brings possibility to the world

consciousness brings possibility to the unknown


10/02/07
two dimensional unity


consciousness as the inside of a physical entity

will only understand the outside - know the outside - in terms of categorizing - of
understanding - of knowledge - that it generates

consciousness observes the outside - the surface

and consciousness observes through - the surface

how this occurs we cannot say - we have no awareness of the process - we do not
observe the connection - we do not see how this happens

the action is unitary

so we can regard knowing

as the act of this unity

that is - not just an inside operation - or an outside event

it is both - it is one

the human being is an entity - a two dimensional entity

its actions are expressed and echoed inside itself and outside itself

to understand a human action you must take into account its internal and external
dimensions

the human being sees itself as dimensional and knows itself as a unity

does the outside affect the inside - yes

does the inside affect the outside yes

the key to understanding this is the concept of impact

the world impacts on the mind

the mind impacts on the world

being in the physical world reverberates in consciousness

and consciousness - the inside affects the body - reverberates in the world

we are not talking about two substances here

rather two dimensions of the one

and the relation of the two is the action of the one - the unity -

impact from the outside will be felt inside

consciousness here is recognition of impact

impact on the outside - from the inside will affect the surface

here consciousness is the initiator of impact


11/02/07
the world as substanceless


consciousness recognizes itself and the non-conscious

this is the basic fact

consciousness - recognizes itself - describes itself - characteristically as what it is not -
i.e. - non-material - non-physical

and it recognizes the outside world - as what it (consciousness) is not - as material as
physical

these descriptions are hooks to hang your hat on

they are natural characterizations

they are not absolute

however description is necessary for practice

platforms need to be established or at least assumed

and then it goes on

the truth is though neither dimension has any characterization outside of what
consciousness creates

they are simply and primitively - dimensions of reality

substance and content come with description

pre-description these dimensions - are just dimensions - and as such contentless and
substanceless

thus I am putting that the world in itself - is without substance - without content


11/02/07
religious belief


religious belief is mythical representation of the unknown

given that the unknown

that which is beyond our conception and perception - is silent - and does not present

strictly speaking anything goes -

and for this reason it is the deep source of all creativity

it is where - it can be said we create out of nothing

the point is that the unknown - is objectivity - it is the only standard outside of
consciousness

so in a sense - any creation in it - or of it - is an objective creation

the unknown is objectivity

it does not discriminate - hence its universality

and so any picture fits - all pictures fit

the problem has been thinkers have not known where they are -

discrimination is a property of subjectivity -

and inter-subjective battles do not decide the nature of the unknown

in the unknown - all conceptions - all creations are equal


12/02/07
meditation I


the argument of the first meditation

one can be totally deceived

that is all one believes could be false

this argument assumes knowledge to begin with

but curiously as an unknown

if I don't know (and I don't) what is true

then yes I may well be deceived

but how would I know this?

unless I was already sure about what the standard of truth is

if I don't know this

I can't know that I am deceived

deception presupposes knowledge

Descartes' argument in the first meditation

leaves knowledge - truth assumed - but not stated

questioning this assumption - that there is indeed knowledge

destroys the argument of universal deception

we are left with doubt - not certainty of deception

doubt regarding the grounds of our belief

we have no grounds for the argument of universal deception

for we have at this stage no standard of universal truth

and doubt here should be for Descartes - not knowing with certainty

perhaps certainty is doubtful

does this mean that we do not know?

if it is the case that there is no certainty -

how can we know we are deceived?

Descartes argument operates with an unknown standard of knowledge

and he asks could everything be false -

relative to this unknown?

the fact is we can't say

we don't know

we can't know

we have I suggest no grounds for doubt - in the first meditation


12/02/07
meditation II


the mind conceives itself

therefore the mind exists

thinking is this awareness

awareness of awareness

and from this to self

self awareness

awareness defines recognizes awareness

this awareness is reflexive

it is self aware

but what do we have here?

awareness of awareness

what follows from this?

only awareness

and this is?

consciousness is what?

it defines itself as itself

again what follows?

awareness is what

- awareness

x is x

we can box it up and call it mind

this is just dressing

awareness is awareness

and self?

- awareness of awareness

is awareness of what?

nothing

in Descartes' argument the I is central - is the issue

and what is the I but awareness of awareness?

he defines himself as a thinking thing

an entity that thinks that knows that it thinks

is there not an argument to say that all he has established

is consciousness

awareness of awareness

and where is the individual identity in this?

the point being that the I that presupposes his argument - for mind - as awareness of
awareness - just is that - awareness of awareness

we can ask - do we have two concepts - an I and mind?

there is but one

and where is the I?

given that I is awareness of awareness

my point is that Descartes has established thinking - and thinking about thinking

but there is no particularity in this

he has not established his own existence

only thinking

awareness of awareness

consciousness

consciousness is awareness of awareness

surely it will be argued that this awareness must be had by something?

possessed

yes this is the given view

and I hold to it

but it doesn't seem to me that anything in Descartes' argument so far entails this view

perhaps consciousness exists as a universal form and particularity of mind is an
illusion?

Descartes' argument in the second meditation for the nature of mind undercuts his
argument for his own existence


12/02/07
imagination and intellect


for Descartes the possibility of an entity - a material entity - is not given in the senses

yet he wants to say it is not imagined

the possibility of an entity he regards as an intellectual apprehension

not a matter of image

granted a thing's possibility goes beyond its present - given reality

but is this anymore than to say

our imagination covers what is before us and what might be - could be - what is
possible

what is possible - is not what is - imagined - rather what can be imagined

do we need a further faculty of intellectual apprehension - why can't imagination do
the job?

could it not be argued that the presentation of different images at different times -
leads naturally to the notion of possibility

that imagination just is consciousness of possibility - and that this in turn is based on
awareness of reality?

and images are just this awareness?


15/02/07
meditation III


Descartes says -

'I am certain I am a thinking thing. But do I thereby know also what is required to
render me thus certain of anything? In the first knowledge there is indeed nothing save
the clear and distinct apprehension of what I am affirming: yet this would not suffice
to render me certain of its truth, if it could ever happen that anything that I apprehend
thus clearly and distinctly should yet prove false; and accordingly I would now seem
able to adopt as a general rule that everything I apprehend in a genuinely clear and
distinct manner is true'


this is a very poor argument

Descartes asks - what makes me certain of anything?

he then acknowledges his criterion of truth - clarity and distinctness of idea

but makes the point - that if it could happen that a clear and distinct apprehension
proved false - then clarity and distinctness 'would not suffice'

for a moment it seems as though he is distinguishing between clear apprehension and
truth - and is aware that a clear and distinct idea - could well be false

and if so truth is another matter

he goes on to say -

'and accordingly I would now seem to be able to adopt as a general rule that
everything I apprehend in a genuinely clear and distinct manner is true'

he is saying if any clear and distinct idea turned out to be false - then he would not
regard clarity and distinctness as the criteria of truth

but as this has not happened (at least I think this is his point) then he will continue to
operate with this criteria

how could it ever happen if by definition a clear and distinct idea is true

this is a circular argument

he defines clarity and distinctness as truth

and truth as clarity and distinctness

why should we regard a clear and distinct idea as true?
(and not just as clear and distinct)

as Descartes has already acknowledged - we can have clear and distinct hallucinations
- and clear and distinct perceptions that are not true?

the fact is we have no theory of truth from Descartes

clarity and distinctness may well be desirable properties of thought

but - even if so - all we are talking about here are features of idea construction and
presentation

there is no necessary connection to the world

we could imagine a man with clear and distinct ideas - in a world that is without
clarity or distinctness

that is no correspondence

Descartes in saying 'if it could ever happen that anything I apprehended thus...yet
prove false' seems to be suggesting that there is at least the possibility that a clear and
distinct idea is false

as a mater of experience - possible experience

but he goes on to suggest he has not had this experience

but the thing is - he would not be able to identify it if he did

as again - he has no criterion of truth

there is a second matter here

the assumption it seems that certainty and truth are one in the same

there is no argument from Descartes for this view

and at the very least it seems unreasonable

empirical science - of course does not operate with such a standard

such a standard would bring science to an end

actually I think it fair to say certainty has nothing to do with the growth of knowledge

certainty has nothing to do with knowledge

Descartes here is importing theological concepts - into the epistemological realm

anyway

from Descartes we have no definition of certainty - apart from - again - the clear and
distinct argument

which at best is an argument about psychological style

and it is a style that we can see would be attractive to mathematicians and logicians
perhaps craftsmen too

some artists maybe - but certainly not all

sensualists might well be repelled by the notion

be that as it may

truth hasn't come down the catwalk


15/02/07
perception and truth


if perception is all we have to go on

how can it be other than - what we perceive - is true

there is no other approach

just different angles of perception

and different ways of interpreting what is perceived

OK

but are we to equate awareness with truth?

I am aware of x

where does truth come into the picture?

I suggest when I state x

assert x

make the claim - that x -

we are then dealing not with awareness or perception

but rather assertion

and then the matter is a question of the conditions under which the assertion is true

which is to say - under what conditions do I give my assent to the assertion?

so in short truth is always a claim

about what is

at a simple level of discourse we begin by determining if the claim has a basis in
perceptual awareness

this is not a bad place to start


17/02/07
the open statement


we begin with consciousness

consciousness recognizes itself and that which it is not

so can we conceive a totality - the totality?

yes - it seems

but how does this work?

I can conceive my table - totally?

it's an object outside of consciousness

the totality - is not like this -

yes it is outside of consciousness -

but consciousness is inside it

so the conception of the totality

is that conception that includes consciousness and what it is not

consciousness in conceiving itself - conceives itself as in the world

in the totality

so the notion of the totality comes with consciousness' awareness of itself

in fact it is crucial to it

for consciousness to conceive itself - it must conceive itself as within -

within what it is not

what it is not -

is not the totality

the totality is consciousness and what it is not -

the conception of the totality - is - what - a dualism?

it is a conjunction

c and -c

which in my terms is not a statement of what the world is made of

that is - it is not a statement of substance

rather a statement of dimension

we know the world as an inside (consciousness) and as an outside - non-consciousness

what we can speak of is the world's dimensions

but here we are speaking of the world

and what is the status of this?

it is something like a necessary conception

necessary to conception

a platform for conception

an architectural feature of it -

a feature without which consciousness - it could be argued is not possible

self-consciousness that is

still how to categorize it?

a - necessary conception - might be the best we can do

even so

clearly - what we are talking about here

is -

the machinery of consciousness

consciousness being aware of this machinery

as reality

or is it - rather that the idea of the totality refers beyond consciousness?

beyond consciousness and what it is not?
but it is not a referral to a third reality -

it is a description - a shorthand -

for the reality of consciousness and non-consciousness

this is what?

if we don't analyze it -

it is for us - just what is -

whatever that is -

it is strictly speaking - an open statement

the open statement


17/02/07
ground


the ground of the concept of the totality - of the world

is the world

we conceive consciousness

and we conceive that which is not consciousness

consciousness and non-consciousness

is the totality

the world is two dimensional

the concept of the totality

is necessary for consciousness' being

its awareness of itself

what is not itself

- that which is not itself - is that which is outside of it -

surrounds it

consciousness conceives itself as within

when we speak of the world - we are speaking of the outside of consciousness

consciousness includes itself as - within the world

the totality - is neither in nor out

neither the inside nor the outside

it is that which is inside and outside

that - is that

it cannot be spoken of - thought of -

except in terms of its dimensions

the totality as such is unknown

it is the ground of consciousness

the ground of that which is not conscious

it is necessity

and necessity is existence


18/02/07
meditation III (ii)


Descartes I would argue mistakes the awareness of non-conscious reality -

as an argument for God -

he asks quite rightly where does the idea of the outside come from - or strictly
speaking he doesn't ask this rather - where do our ideas of outside things come from?

as if there must a cause to the effect

but I argue it is not a question of cause and effect

it is awareness

perhaps he would term it - direct apprehension

(which he quickly dismisses)

my argument is that it is awareness of - the outside

awareness - that is consciousness - to be self-conscious - aware of itself - is by
definition - in its self awareness - aware of what it is not -

the world outside itself

awareness is not caused by the outside world

the outside world is not caused by consciousness -

these dimensions - simply exist -

the outside reflects on the inside

the inside on the outside

it is a dynamic relationship

consciousness impacts on the non-conscious

and the non-conscious impacts on consciousness

we are not talking here about substances

rather dimensions

dimensional analysis

gives us a way of organizing reality

explaining its basic structure and action

for conscious - self-conscious beings

what occurs for human beings has an internal dimension and an external dimension

we are aware of this - in fact this is awareness

an event in itself - an action in itself

is without description - unless described dimensionally

Descartes' argument of perfection

is really no more than the awareness that I a conscious entity exist in the world

that the world - the domain of my existence

is an ontological space I am in

it is not a question of greater and lesser - let alone perfection and imperfection

it is rather just the fact of an existent in a domain

the space of its actions

perfection is despite Descartes' attempt to mask it - a theological notion

that has more to do with his education by the Jesuits than sound philosophical
thinking about the nature of reality


18/02/07
an internal reading


awareness of the outside world

how are we to understand this?

the outside world is given in consciousness

it is what is given

given in the sense of reflected in - consciousness

consciousness is the ground of reflection here

consciousness is in this sense a mirror for the outside world

the outside is mirrored in the inside

the relation is symmetrical

are we to say the relation is causal?

the outside world causes - the awareness

does the outside of anything cause its inside?

the outside - the surface is not the cause of the inside

the outside of consciousness - given consciousness - is reflected in consciousness

awareness is this reflection - (and awareness of it)

it is the showing of the world

the world - the outside world as presentation

presentation is only possible given consciousness

the world is not altered by the fact of consciousness - it is shown

its showing is not on the surface

its showing is inside

consciousness brings an inside the world

and here I favour a kind of Liebnitzian view

internal monads - centres of consciousness

these monads are all identical

their character is given in their surface reflections

here is where difference occurs

and this difference is unique

no two bodies occupy the same space -

have the same view

and consequently -

or the same history

time gives us simultaneity

reflection is the world internalized

a mode of being

non-reflective reality is - the non-conscious

non-reflective reality has no centre

consciousness centres the world

gives it focus if you like

this fact has no bearing on the outside - the surface

it is an internality

an internal reading


19/02/07
image


what is an image?

that which is imagined?

it is an internal characterization of what is presented in consciousness

that is a reflection on the presentation of consciousness

a description

a description of a particular in the presentation

a making of a particular in presentation

a categorization

that is a way of organizing - what is given in consciousness

images

are not out there

that's clear

the question is though - are they in there?

are there such things as images?

Descartes and the Empiricists certainly talk as if this is so

I am suggesting there is no such thing per se

that an image is an idea

an organizing principle

this categorization - or the fact of categorization - I suggest is necessary

for though the world presents

what it presents is always a question

that is - in a primary sense we don't know

it is only on reflection that some light is shone

and reflection here is about how to handle - organize - operate - with what is presented

where do we get these notions from?

consciousness categorizes being

initial categorization is objective - object-like

consciousness objectifies

image is an internal description

its logic is based on the logic - the ontology of objectivism

what I see is a box

what I have is an image of the box

that notion of image is a theoretical characterization of the given

it is a stratagem employed to avoid the problem of not knowing -
- of speechlessness

image talk is thus meta talk


21/02/07
functioning consciousness


what I have been putting is that consciousness is the inside dimension of reality

I don't think all of the surface reality has an underlying consciousness

only life forms I think have this possibility

and within this group only complex forms

I think all consciousness is self-consciousness

that is that any form that has consciousness

recognizes - at least at a very primitive level - non-conscious reality

this recognition distinguishes

the distinguishing is the fact - of self

self as I am defining it is essentially a logical fact

the fact of differentiation

all right

so my basic position is that the mind-body problem is dimensional

not substantial

we are talking about two dimensions - not two substances

awareness is the inside of things - that have an inside

this is what the mind is

non-awareness is the outside

the outside is not aware

the brain on this view is squarely part of the surface of the world

therefore the brain - as a surface category - is not aware

if you want to characterize the outside world as physical

the physical is not aware

the brain is not the mind

OK

so the question - what is the relation between the inside (of a human being) and the
outside?

we are aware of the outside - that awareness is internal

it is in the broadest sense - knowing

thus when we observe the brain - scientifically that is - our awareness - in the form of
neurological conceptions is what?

the mind's picture of the brain

now the question - can we jump to -

the mind's picture of itself

no

the mind is awareness

we are self-awareness

therefore aware of awareness

that is the mind's picture of itself

it is really quite contentless

if I say the mind is the brain what am I doing?

on my thinking I am saying the inside is - the outside - or a particular location of it

the inside is the outside?

such an argument is to destroy the essential distinction of my argument

it is to go against what I see to be the basic reality we face

such would not be a move forward

the mind has a picture of the outside

the outside of itself - yes

the mind cannot be identified with any particular feature or region of the outside

it can only equate to the whole of the outside - of a human being

is this so?

earlier I suggested a monad model of consciousness

that the outside of the world - has mind points in it

could the same argument be made in relation to the body

that the inside is not co-extensive with the outside - is rather a point - within?

OK

how would this relate to the brain

the mind is the inside of the brain

the brain as two dimensional -

I understand this is getting closer to the common view

(if there is such a thing)

but for me the question why?

why take such a view?

the obvious argument

brain damage effects directly the functioning of consciousness

OK

but perhaps this is an unexpected clue -

the functioning of consciousness

the idea being that the brain is consciousness as a function

that awareness requires the brain - for its functioning

the brain is awareness functioning

awareness - out there?


22/02/07
picture and function


for me the mind / body problem is the question of the relation between the inside and
the outside

inside - as consciousness

the outside - the body

and our particular focus is the brain -

can we regard the brain as the outside of the mind?

yes - we can put up this hypothesis

always understanding that the mind - awareness - is never observed -

it is not out there - on the surface - to be observed

awareness can only be known reflectively

or awareness is - whatever else it is - awareness of awareness - in the first instance

so two kinds of knowledge - knowledge of the inside (awareness of awareness) and -
observational - knowledge - knowledge of the outside -

the outside provides its own knowledge via the senses

still for me the question of how awareness relates to non-awareness

how consciousness relates to the non-conscious

inside / outside - that is a dimensional analysis - is a start

the entity - the person - is two dimensional

the whole here - is two dimensional

the unity is expressed in two dimensions -

in mind - in matter

and this unity - can only be understood dimensionally

can only be successfully described in these terms

this may have been Spinoza's intuition and he then took it to the universe - to reality -
as such - as a whole

that which is - here - let us say the person - for Spinoza substance or a mode there of

is in itself unknown

this I think is unavoidable

for Spinoza the one thing expressed in two attributes

for me - two dimensions of the one -

and the dimensions are inner and outer

I am not convinced that - for Spinoza there is any internality

and this I think is a major defect of his argument

so - inner and outer

I argue is a real division

that some things in this world - have an inner dimension - that this is consciousness

can we know how the inner relates to the outer - or visa versa?

they must be two aspects of the one thing -

otherwise there is no unity - no thing to speak of -

is this to argue that inner is co-extensive with outer

perhaps

consciousness - though seems to be a non-extended - point

a focus

a focal point

perhaps awareness here is the tip of the iceberg?

the body as the outside of the mind

the mind as the inside of the body

simple as that

nothing more to it?

the point being that knowledge of the inside - cannot be observed

that knowledge of the outside is not a matter of reflection

my gut feeling is that the relation -

inside and outside - is not something we ever see

it is unknown

or perhaps it is not a question that makes any sense

how does the inside relate to the outside?

they are two dimensions of the one unity

and really it's only the mind-brain identity theorists who want to deny the internal -
and argue for one dimension

at least I think they are committed to such a view

the Cartesians on the other hand mistook dimension for substance

the mind-brain identity theory is - in my terms - an hypothesis of what?

location -

the mind is the brain

this is where you will find it

in my terms it would be to say - the brain is the outside of the mind

still an argument about the location of consciousness

OK

but is consciousness relevant to a theory of how the brain works?

brain theory is really just theory about how the organism functions

is the inside - consciousness - relevant to this?

I wonder -

perhaps the behaviourists are right here

functioning is about how the outside works

how the surface - operates

the fact of the inside - of awareness is just the realm of knowing -

it is awareness of function

the brain is all that it is - does all that it does

awareness is another matter

brain function is a surface function - awareness is an internal property - the internal
property - internality

therefore awareness is not function and furthermore - function is not awareness

however awareness and function go together -

how?

function is what to awareness?

it is really the primary object of awareness

the surface - that is - is what the mind is aware of

and awareness?

awareness - shows the surface - pictures the function


23/02/07
the irrelevance of the identity thesis


the brain as function
the mind as awareness

we think of the brain - on the basis of what science tells us -

and we want to or are tempted to

equate the brain with awareness

the brain is the mind

when we do this what are we doing?

given my dimensional analysis -

we are not saying the inside - consciousness is the outside - the brain

we are saying what?

the brain is - a description of the mind

the physiology of the brain - is a description of awareness

is an account of awareness - as - an observable thing

is this really no more than - a pragmatic decision - to see things in such a way -

a pragmatic decision to avoid metaphysics and its problems?

it is to say - we can assume such - and it's useful to assume such -

I think there is something in this - as an account of what can happen in this debate

it's like a decision to avoid the issue - and proceed as if it is not there - and go for
whatever results can be found - given such an approach

so - a pragmatic-heuristic argument?

or just plain lazy or bad thinking?

my point on the last post was that

really awareness - is irrelevant to function qua function

awareness is how we know - functioning is what we know

nothing is added or subtracted from the operation of the brain - by saying it is the
mind

it's irrelevant - might be comforting - but it's irrelevant


24/02/07
can a dead man reflect?


that awareness - is function

that what we observe in relation to brain function is mind - is awareness

the argument - we do not observe awareness - but what we do observe - is - must be
awareness

there the mind is a brain state -

the argument must finally be - that if the brain dies - so does consciousness

no brain function - no consciousness

therefore

consciousness is brain function

brain death is brain death - is death -

yes - but do we know that brain death equals no consciousness?

I certainly believe this to be the case

but on what is this belief based?

observation

the dead man exhibits no sign of consciousness

yes

but this is to suggest that consciousness - is observable - if only indirectly

and we know such an argument - in life - as well as in death - is a stretch

observation cannot be an argument for or against consciousness

we know consciousness - via reflection - not observation

can the dead man reflect?

who is to know?


p.s.


hope this is not my last post


25/02/07
a different approach


the mind on my analysis just simply is awareness

the body function

part of its function is this awareness

much of its function is not

awareness as a function of the body

the mind as a function of the body

if all is function

what is different - distinctive about this function of awareness?

what is distinctive is how it is known

it is not known via observation

it is known reflectively

it is not to be observed

it is not outside - of the outside world

it is internal - it is inside

an internal function - the internal function

function?

yes - let's say so

so - on such a view the mind and the body are distinguished - by how 'they' are known

I say functions

and how these functions are known

OK

not a question primarily of ontologies - but of epistemologies

ontologies follow

and in this case - dimensions - not substances

if you want to go there -

but the main point is that the mind and body are different ways of knowing -

now these different ways of knowing - are characteristics of the mind

how it functions -

so -

we have the mind primarily as a function of the body

a function that distinguishes mind and body -

via modes of knowing

the mind is aware

it recognizes -

what it is via reflection

what it is not via observation

the body is what is observed -

the mind is what is reflected -

what is observed - is reflected


25/02/07
different dimensions of what?


how we know distinguishes mind and body

and with this comes the idea of dimensions

as to the nature of the whole we have no view

we know what we observe
we know what we reflect

there is thus no one way of knowing

knowing is two dimensional

we understand by logic - these dimensions are dimensions of a unity

the unity is presupposed

it is a presupposition

it cannot be directly known

it can only be known via its dimensions -

we observe - from the inside out

the inside is known reflectively

the outside observationally

what we reflect on is what we are aware of

finally awareness itself

awareness - is the inside

that which is outside is that which is not aware

it is the object of awareness

we can describe the outside as physical - the inside as mental -

we have no reason to hold that we are dealing with different substances

only different dimensions

of what?

strictly - I don't think we can say


25/02/07
meditation IV


Descartes here argues that error is possible when judgment is not confined to clear and
distinct matters

so the criterion of truth is clear and distinct ideas

the point is - isn't it - yes you can have clear and distinct ideas

but if there is no possibility of a clear and distinct idea being anything other than true -
that is if it is not possible that it could be false -

in fact you have no theory of truth -

clear and distinct ideas are true

why?

because clarity and distinctness are the criteria of truth

it is a circular argument

clarity and distinctness

are what?

characteristics of how an idea is held

how it is defined

is this anymore than definition?

isn't it the case that I may hold an entirely false idea - clearly and distinctly?

truth or falsity are not characteristics of definition

a statement is true or false depending on - not how it is formulated or held - but rather
on whether what it asserts is or is not the case -

that is the conditions under which it does or does not correspond to how the world is

a statement can be true if asserted under one set of conditions -

false under another

its clarity and distinctness is not the issue -

such issues are to do with presentation - not truth

a statement can only be true if it can be false

we have no theory of truth from Descartes


25/02/07
meditation V


Descartes regards himself as limited and imperfect

his conception of himself entails its negation - limitlessness and perfection

but he regards himself as an existing thing -

existence it would seem is a characteristic of limited imperfect entities -

it would seem to follow

that a limitless perfect entity - God

on Descartes' argument does not exist

for existence is not to be associated with perfection -


26/02/07
the unity is a presupposition


the body is the outside of the entity - the mind - consciousness - its inside -

the entity as a whole cannot be described

for that we would require a perspective - that is neither inside or outside - but one that
encapsulates both - that is a third view - and this is what?

so what happens to the unity - is manifested on the surface - the body - and inside - in
consciousness

the happening event is both physical and mental - in terms of its reading - its end
points

in itself it has no characterization

as a surface event it is to be read causally -

as an internal event - it is an awareness

the surface occurrence does not cause the internal occurrence

the external / internal occurrences are simultaneous occurrences

the one event impressed in / on two dimensions

what is the connection between the physical the body the surface - and consciousness
the mind the inside?

there is no connection

the unity - is just that

we distinguish the two dimensions as a consequence - of how we know -

we observe the outside
we reflect the inside

observation and reflection entail - that observed - that reflected

consciousness is not out there to be observed

the body - not inside - to be reflected

the unity is a presupposition

it underlies observation and reflection

it is logically necessary - but not known directly

strictly speaking - the unity is unknown


27/02/07
meditation VI


'For should some cause, not in the foot, but in another part of the nerves that extend
from the foot to the brain, or even in the brain itself, give rise to the motion ordinarily
excited when the foot is injuriously affected, pain will be felt as though it were in the
foot, and thus naturally the sense will be deceived;....'

the pain is what?

firstly an awareness - the experience of pain as such

felt in a specific space / time region - in this case my leg at 2.00 p.m. today

the actual expression of the pain - is to be described as what?

in itself -

isn't it really without description?

it is what it is

if we reflect on it we can use synonyms

or we can say what it is not

strictly it is primitive and undefined

(this may have more to do with the question of description than with the event itself)

relative to other experiences we call it - name it - pain

we can go on to give a comprehensive account in terms of the science of the event

but this is not what I mean here -

just the experience itself

can any experience - in itself - be defined - as anything other than an unknown?

I don't think so

an experience to be defined must be seen in the context of other experiences

an awareness?

the same applies

I experience the pain - as my pain - in my foot

my body is the outside of my awareness

the fact that it has occurred in my leg is incidental to the awareness

could I have a pain that is not located in my body?

no

that there is a location is necessary

where is not

how do I identify location?

does it come with awareness (even if it turns out to be a false location?)

yes

so actual location of pain - is really a question for science

the pain itself is never in question

it is located somewhere - in / on my body

OK

still the experience locates pain specifically - even if observation suggests this is
wrong -

consciousness identifies the event in space / time

even though observation - science might challenge this identification

Descartes wants to say the experience is not reliable

that the consciousness is not reliable

in relation to space / time

again the pain itself is not in question

immediate awareness

the identification - of consciousness is immediate

the analysis of science is not

the analysis of science is non-immediate - it is reflective - analytical

(immediate) awareness is not analytical - or reflective

it is immediate

is this not the difference between the explanans and the explanandum?

between experience and explanation

yes

my awareness qua awareness is valid

direct awareness is entirely guileless -

in terms of my surface (my body) I can observe a causal relation from foot to brain

such an account is not about awareness -

it is about the surface dimensions of the event

and it is essentially indirect - and of course unaware

also such an analysis is not event specific -

it could apply to any pain in any foot

my immediate awareness (consciousness) is event specific -

could you say such analysis (surface analysis) has no bearing on the conscious event?

yes

not on the event

but on the class of events

OK


27/02/07
simultaneity


an event occurs - on the surface - it has a physical (i.e. observational) effect -

can we say that the same event occurs - as awareness - on the inside -

the same event - two manifestations?

on what basis do we say this?

and do we want to say this?

to say this we assume an objectivity

the view - that sees the body - the outside - and the mind - the inside

in terms of such a view - a single event - could be 'watched' as a physical
manifestation and as a mental manifestation

perhaps as you might see light through a prism

this is a picture - but what sort of a picture?

an analytical picture
a theoretical picture

an explanatory picture

OK

but - this must be the reality - if

if what?

my dimensional theory of mind / body

is so

yes

the question is though - how would you know this happens?

one event two expressions?

so there is no simultaneity possible

because there is no 'extra' dimensional view

there is only the view from the inside - out

and beyond this theory


27/02/07
consciousness is revelation


I am aware

of what is outside of me
this awareness is inside me

the outside is given in consciousness

awareness and its object

only known in awareness

we divide up the event
the awareness event

as being inside and out

the event in itself is neither in nor out?

no it is both

?

I am aware of -

I am aware

we say this is direct
yes

but - of -

this is to reflect on awareness

and - I - is such a reflection

direct awareness is - a neutral event

it can on reflection be regarded - subjectively - objectively -

subject and object - constructions - reflections on - the raw fact -

I - comes with the reflection

reflectivity is the making of I

out of this comes the possibility of object

that which is object to the subject - I

these categories - subject / object -

descriptions of the dimensions

references to -

the dimensional reality

consciousness reveals this -

it is the essence of consciousness to reveal

consciousness is revelation

revelation of itself

we are aware of awareness

and thus

aware of what awareness is not

the non-conscious - surface reality


27/02/07
consciousness and brain theory


brain activity - consciousness' explanation of the functioning of the body - of the
surface -

explanation based on observation - empirical theory

how could such an hypothesis - conception be an explanation of something else?

- of consciousness -

it is a conception of consciousness

here you would need to assume that in observing brain activity - you are observing
consciousness

what could this mean?

perhaps you would also need to assume that what you are observing is the outside of
consciousness -

its surface

that consciousness is in there

alright but this is not physics


28/02/07
awareness is not function


we don't know what awareness is

just that it is

we do not know what the surface is -

we operate with it yes

but what can we say of its nature?

but that it - is out there

relative to awareness

on what do we base the idea of unity upon?

the person - you might say - the unity of body and soul - mind and body -

I have said previously that it is a presupposition

a necessary notion

and too - that seems real - is real

we have the idea of it

the human body is - while a part of a unified physical system - a discreet entity

we perceive it as so

ideas and perception

I argue that the unity is logical - dimensional

two meta dimensions of the one - entity - the one thing - the one - what?

the one undefined - the one primitive - the one unknown

yes - not an easy idea - still -

our most fundamental notions really have no foundation -

anyway -

with consciousness

direct awareness

we do not have knowledge

knowledge is not direct awareness

knowledge is reflective awareness

we can posit a relation between the conscious and the non-conscious

we are not aware of the relationship

we begin with the reflective idea that there is one

the self demands it

it is a meta imperative and I think psychologically unassailable - given veridical
conditions

any account of the relation is reflective

the options are -

there is no distinction between mind and body - the idea that there is - is false

there is a distinction - but a point of contact - an underlying unity -

and variations on these themes

reflectively we are not presented with any one option

it's basically either / or

now why can't this matter be resolved?

observation only settles what can be observed

consciousness is not observed

it is - the observing

consciousness knows itself - not on the basis of observation

rather on the basis of reflection

reflection can't determine matters outside of consciousness

two ways of knowing

entail two realities

I say two dimensions of reality

and what it is that underlies the inside / the outside cannot be apprehended

Spinoza would say - substance

I say the unknown

that mind and body are expressions of -

the unknown

that the unknown is the unity

that the unity is unknown

so - if the question is

what 'connects' mind and body -

the answer is - unknown

- and unknowable

either - in terms of observation and reflection

my two dimensional idea -

is an attempt to avoid Descartes problem of interaction

(it makes no sense to speak of an inside and outside - interacting)

and to avoid the 'flat earth' theory of the mind-body identity theorists

to restore mind to where it is - and should be thought to be - on the inside

brain theory gives us account of the functioning of the surface

there is no such account for the inside

awareness is not function

what underlies awareness and function - if this is a question - is not known -

might we not give the unknown a name?

existence


02/03/07
ascribing states of consciousness


what is going here?

I a conscious entity - reflecting on my conscious states refer to them - the totality -
actual and possible - as what - a thing - consciousness - as an existent - that has all
these states?

I don't know that this works

what is it these states are states of - inhere in?

Descartes was clear - a substance -

and if you want to take this view - problem solved at one level

the question what this substance is - next issue -

a different substance to the physical -

again - not satisfactory in itself - without theological trappings - vestments you might
say -

however if you don't go the substance route - where are you?

conscious states

and being conscious of conscious states

the latter presumably - a meta state -

and state?

an event -

what kind of event - a conscious event -

perhaps - an event that exists - or can exist within - the same kind of an event

existing within - here meaning - self-consciousness

however you might say the same can be said of physical events

that they are within a system of physical events

if so - the 'being within' does not uniquely characterize conscious events

the elephant in the room is awareness

and the question - how can awareness - explicate itself?

how can I by being aware elucidate awareness - say what it is?

except negatively - a conscious event - is not a non-conscious event

an analytical argument -

which just seem to confirm that - awareness cannot be elucidated -

but then as to elucidation -

is it not the case - that the physical - the material world - is only given any sharpness -
relative to - an idea of the non-material

elucidation is really the issue of consciousness

elucidation is only possible given consciousness

in reflecting on my conscious states

I objectify

I categorize them as conscious

consciousness per se is a construction

therefore - a conscious event?

that is meant to signify all events

what could this mean - how could this happen?

putting that aside for a moment -

consciousness is a construction

a reflection - of consciousness

the subject regarding itself as object -

but strictly speaking isn't this impossible?

the subject creating a false object?

in a way - yes - if you mean by object that outside of consciousness

but the thing is - isn't this just what awareness is

consciousness aware of itself

now just here - you could easily go to the idea that awareness - consciousness is -
what - an illusion?

the idea of the subject making itself object

the argument being that this can't happen

therefore self-consciousness - self awareness - a logical illusion

it happens - but it is all wrong

so this would be to say

consciousness can't ascribe itself - there is no itself

and therefore can't be ascribed - at all

I was reading the first part of Peter Strawson's 'Persons' - and he starts in discussing
the idea of ascribing conscious states with Wittgenstein's view that 'In an important
sense there is no subject' - and much to my surprise that is where I have ended up


02/03/07
a person of interest


for Strawson the concept of person - just is that which we can refer consciousness and
non-conscious states to

it is primitive

OK

the thing is - the concept of a person is a construction of consciousness

an attempt by consciousness (Peter Strawson's in this case) to explain

the conscious and non-consciousness dimensions of - what?

this is the question -

well the answer is - the person

of which he Peter Strawson regards himself as an instance thereof -

it's argument - of consciousness -

is the idea of objectifying consciousness - (the person)

and then - regarding it as that which the subject refers to

is anything gained here?

so subject - postulates subject as object -

then regards subject as referring to object

itself

kind of what we call - self - consciousness - would you say?

Strawson begins without being very clear about the nature of self-consciousness

is it something other than consciousness?

could it be said -

that he begins with consciousness - and the problem of ascribing it

and solves the problem - by introducing self-consciousness - via the person argument -
(for this is what I say it amounts to)

as if this is a solution to the question of consciousness -

when in fact it is the question - to begin with?

the point being consciousness refers to itself -

how?


02/03/07
false objectivity


another way to put it might be like this -

it is consciousness that ascribes

if consciousness is to ascribe itself

consciousness must always be prior to what it ascribes itself to

anything - be it a person - a substance - whatever - is a construction of consciousness

this is consciousness taking a view of itself

reflecting on itself - its place if you like

we are dealing here with theory of consciousness - by consciousness

to think that the correct question is rather - what is consciousness ascribed to?

is to believe - isn't it - that you can speak from a position outside of consciousness?

view consciousness - from the outside of it

and see what it might connect to

this is a false objectivity

there is no such position - in relation to consciousness

any such position is one formulated in consciousness

and for this reason Wittgenstein might be right - consciousness cannot be ascribed

OK

you might think here the next step is solipsism -

against this I argue that consciousness - not only sees itself - but for this to happen
- that is to define itself - recognizes - what it is not - that is recognizes the non-
conscious

this is self consciousness we are talking about here

and the point being though we begin in consciousness - for this to occur - for us to be
aware - self aware - we recognize that which we are not - whatever that is

therefore we begin as conscious entities in the world

so ascribing consciousness

look I think with Wittgenstein - this is not what it is about

consciousness is the internal dimension - of reality

it is the inside

I regard the physical world as the outside

the outside dimension

these are - metaphysical - ontological dimensions

we can only understand our world - its reality if we recognize its internality
and its externality

any one dimensional view is just not philosophically possible

be that solipsism or its external equivalent one dimensional physicalism

still I have a lot of time for Strawson's person argument

it is brilliant

a modern day version really of Spinoza's double aspect theory

without the problem of substance

the point is though

it is really about description of the whole

that which is two dimensional - body and soul

and yes there is a unity

and yes - what to call it?

person is as good as it gets

but person here is just a window to the vast unknown beyond

beyond our perception / conception of particularity


04/03/07
so what I am saying is


consciousness is a dimension - of a two dimensional entity

the mind is the internal dimension of a physical entity

this world is two dimensional

that I know myself - is just to say consciousness reflects - reflects on itself

I think therefore I am - is a mistaken characterization of the operation of reflection

awareness is this reflection -

(awareness in this entity

by this entity I mean a point in space time - from the point of view of this point -

a point of view that has objectivity - space-time position - given other points of view

and also given in general other positions in space-time -

space-time entails the possibility - of such -

without this possibility - no space-time

which is absurd - therefore the conclusion

that is we can conceive space-time without points of view

without consciousness

and if so - we can conceive non-observed positions of space-time)

or this reflection is the basis of all reflection -

the outside is the limit of consciousness

the physical world is the limit of the mind

that is the mind is within - within the physical

but I am not suggesting that it is physical -

the physical is the external dimension

or the outside is physical - we describe it so

but the outside of what?

of that which the mind is the internal dimension of

and this is?

what can you say here?

is there a description of the unity?

this unity that is two dimensional

mind and matter - as they are referred to in substance theories - are dimension of

existence

of what is

existence therefore is two dimensional

(and I see no reason at all to go the way of Spinoza here - and call for an infinity of
dimensions - there is nothing to be gained by this)

so the mind is what happens internally - we can further characterize this by saying it is
awareness

the body - what happens on the outside - non-awareness

this entity

faces the world as a unity

not as distinct dimensions

the world affects this unity - as a unity

and the surface of the body affects the world - the physical outside of itself

and consciousness here?

is the world outside the body - just more of the same - a physical expanse and nothing
more?

the answer is no

within the physical dimension - this outside (of the outside of body) - are centres of
consciousness - physical forms -

other conscious entities - other animals

we see a connection between outside entities and states

they are of the same kind - they are connected -

we can i.e. - describe the dynamic in terms of cause and effect -

what though of the inside?

and inside entities -

or the insides of entities?

could they be connected in a similar way to the way external forms are connected in
the external dimension?

directly?

what has to be the case for this to be the case?

that is for consciousnesses to be aware directly of other consciousnesses?

that is - not as is commonly thought - via the body - and thus indirectly?

my recognition of another consciousness is direct isn't it?

do I infer - I wonder?

you tend to be forced into an inference argument because of the body - the idea that
we know consciousness via the body -

the inside known via the outside

I think not

I run with Descartes at least on this point

that the inside is aware of the inside - directly

OK

so why not just universalize this argument?

that is I am not just talking about myself here

forget self

the question is rather of dimensions -

the inside - recognizes the inside - directly?

lots of issues here

one - I have been thinking of consciousness - as monad like

centres within -

an outside - that is without centre - that is simply extended

that is the idea that not all of the outside has an inside

can we speak here of an inside -

or is it rather insides?

it's a bit lopsided I know - some what skew-whiff

might be of interest to quantum physicists

on the other hand - the co-extensive version -

that there is an inside that is co-extensive with the outside

a sort of Spinozistic position

does seem to commit to pan-consciousness

perhaps not pan-self-consciousness - but consciousness of some kind

logically neat - but do we want to go there?

so

what's my argument against such a view?

that it doesn't seem to me that rocks have consciousness?

yes - this is so

but on what do I base this view?

observation?

yes - finally

how do I know that I have consciousness?

observation?

no

my knowledge of consciousness is?

- given in consciousness

consciousness is self asserting -

so do we have to give the rock the benefit of the doubt?

is consciousness sleeping out there?

and this what - some evolutionary theory?

I think Daniel Dennett goes down this path


04/03/07
awareness


awareness is luminous

pretty poor I know

but how do you describe awareness?

that is - self - awareness

awareness of awareness

awareness postulates itself

yes

but this tells us nothing

how does this happen?

we can't say

it just happens -

and I hate saying that

awareness - can't be explained

except as what it is not

and this is no help

what is non-awareness?

not aware -

awareness as an inexplicable feature of this world -

perhaps because - it is not out there - not observable

- it is the observing -

how is it known in other entities?

we see signs of it?

it recognizes itself?

how?

the inner dimension - of one entity -

connects with the inner dimension of another

how?

what could this connection be?

the idea of a universal consciousness -

an inner dimension of everything

that knows itself


05/03/07
logic and type recognition


in relation to the problem of other minds I don't think the path of universal
consciousness - is the way to go

we must begin not with consciousness - but rather with the unity - the person - as
Strawson puts it

the person recognizes other persons

they are - whatever their attributes (i.e. consciousness) out there -

and as such primarily surface entities relative to my consciousness

I recognize persons are more than this

on the basis of what?

my understanding of myself

and my understanding of myself as a member of a class of existents -

a recognition of similarity

so the knowing is deeper than observation

I know myself as having an internal dimension

others of my kind - if they are of my kind - are so attributed

it's a logical argument

the recognition of logical type

this is the directness

the directness of consciousness to consciousness - logical

logical directness

yes


05/03/07
dimensions and substance


I have been arguing what I call a dimensional theory of mind - of reality - that human
reality is two dimensional - that human beings are two dimensional - that the two
dimensions are internality and externality - that the internal dimension just is
consciousness - is mind - therefore mind is a dimension - that the external dimension
is body - the outside of mind - the entity as a whole - is not - to be described in mental
or physical terms - that the entity as whole is beyond description - there is no non-
physical / non-mental language - and so for reasons of simplicity and practice we are
best to say with Strawson - 'person'

that the human body is distinguished from the physical world (it is a part of) -
metaphysically - in terms of consciousness - consciousness as the centre of a physical
body - or more correctly of a person - that there are other such forms - other such
persons (I am not the only one) and we recognize - a conscious determination - the
fact of other persons - on the basis of logical - ontological type

I don't think we have grounds to say internality is co-extensive with externality - I
favour a monad notion of internality - therefore not everything that has an outside has
an inside

consciousness is discrete and not universal - consciousness is particular

must we assume it is a development out of externality - out of the surface?

this is to ask how did it come about?

either it emerged from the physical - the surface - the (what was to then become)
outside - or it didn't

if it did - yes it was to be of the same nature - of the same essence - but here I suggest
we are not saying it is therefore physical

the fundamental nature - is not physical - physical is out there - is observable

the physical - the outside - the surface - I am suggesting is not fundamental -

the fundamental if it is to produce - both the physical and consciousness - is other than
either

the physical and the mental on this view are expressions of something - deeper - more
basic

Spinoza - would have said - substance

substance - as the name of the fundamental

now I have been arguing against substance - against the idea that the question of the
mind / body relation is a question of substance

my argument has been that the issue is dimensional

so the question - can you successfully speak of dimensions without substance?

what is a dimensional view?
what are dimensions?

are they not dimensions - that is of something - of substance?

my point is this - that we cannot say - what it is reality is made of - in any final sense -
therefore any account is a substitute for the absence of knowledge

we can say that - but not what

how do we describe consciousness?

what do we say it is?

it is what it is

the rest is poetry - metaphor

as too with the non-conscious

the world outside of consciousness

non-conscious - is the most accurate description - and this - is without content - it is
not a positive account of external reality

it is a logical definition

we know though that this unknown reality - unknown in a substantial sense - has
dimensions

this much we can say

our characterization is logical

mathematical if you like


05/03/07
pictures


pictures are what?

reflections of -

but for a reflection to be a picture it must be recognized

seen as

what it is - a reflection -

so - a seen reflection

which is what?

a reflected - reflection

this is - consciousness

the contents of consciousness

picturing is what consciousness does

it is the act of consciousness

and language to this?

language is publication

pictures made public

pictures shared - or at least out there - for access

thus language is a mode of transference

an act of transference

here we are viewing it as process

the interior to the exterior

consciousness to the outside - in the outside

language is thus where consciousness meets the non-conscious

this meeting place is logical space

that is to say

logical space is the meeting of the conscious and non-conscious

a unity that is in itself neither conscious or non-conscious

and therefore

is without definition

language - natural artificial or artistic

is its expression

language is the unity expressed


06/03/07
drawing limits


Wittgenstein in the preface to the Tractatus says -

'Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather - not to thought, but
to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to a thought, we
should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to
think what cannot be thought)

It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the
other side will simply be non-sense.'

a limit to thought as the aim of the book -

firstly it is assumed that it makes some sense to speak of thought having a limit

OK - but why - what is the point here - even if this makes sense?

the idea that you draw in thought - a limit - and this cannot be done - for it would be
to think both sides of the limit - hence what cannot be thought

so what cannot be thought cannot be thought -

therefore what?

no limit to thought -

so - take up architecture?

if the problem is as stated - the question of the limit of thought - then problem solved -
no problem - thought has no limit - thought is limitless -

but no reason to break out the booze -

my question - if there is no limit - what sense limitlessness?

is not the question itself doubtful?

OK

thought setting limits to thought -

(in one way it seems pedagogical to me - and yet the Tractatus is written before his
stint as a primary school teacher - perhaps the question is can I be a good teacher if I
am not a good logician - or - can you set limits to children?)

what goes on here?

thinking about - proposing a theory of what is not thought -

yes

well what is wrong with saying - that which does not think - cannot think -

i.e. - the non-conscious world -

if so the limit of thought is non-thought

it is not that one has to think non-thought

simply to recognize that thought ends where consciousness ends -

(I argue the external world - is indeed non-conscious - and thus - the limit of
consciousness)

I fail to see how else you can view it

Wittgenstein's argument is that for there to be a limit to thought -

you must invoke an absurdity - thinking what cannot be thought

when really it is just a question of basic metaphysical topography -

what regions exist - in the world -

and this is actually different to Wittgenstein's pedagogical approach -

what you can and cannot think

a strange idea

on the other side of thought is non-thought

but the question is the limit - the line of demarcation

it is simply isn't it a matter of logic?

x and ~x

x is limited by ~x

no contradiction here - a perfectly logical thought - perhaps the most fundamental

having stated his aim and just as quickly saying it can't be achieved

(and still we wonder why you would want to go there anyway)

the fall back position is in relation to language

sense and non-sense

OK

Wittgenstein is here declaring himself -

setting up the program

sense and non-sense

again - we could ask why?

perhaps perceived non-sense is really just a lack of understanding from the person
who so identifies it?

anyway

'It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn'

what is this to say?

in language I put up a criterion of sense and non-sense

a statement which then divides language into sense and non-sense

what then is the status of this statement - of this criterion?

quite a question -

I think Wittgenstein argued somewhere latter down the track -

that the verifiability criterion - was not itself verifiable

OK

the situation here seems even more far reaching than that -

a line dividing sense and non-sense

a statement - a criterion - so doing

is what - is where?

is it on the sense side or the non-sense side?

on the face of it neither -

and so - how to characterize it?

a meta statement that is neither?

yes you could play around here with meta statements - and higher criteria

but really doesn't this point - call into question - the enterprise of drawing limits

and in the present context of drawing a limit to sense and non-sense in language

if language is either sensible or non-sensible - which seems to be Wittgenstein's idea

the criteria of this cannot be either

and is therefore - outside of language -

non-language -

and I don't think Wittgenstein wants to go there

perhaps this is where St. Augustine makes an entrance


06/03/07
self awareness


self awareness
self consciousness

is consciousness positing itself - as object of consciousness

the subject positing itself as object -

what can we say of this?

something underlies it

consciousness - is in a primal sense -

neither subject or object

the posits are the possibility of consciousness

consciousness can be either or both

so in itself it is neither

subject and object as states of consciousness

categories of consciousness

consciousness is this fluidity

does this idea - rough as it is - help us with self-consciousness?

firstly is self consciousness - as I suggested

this subject seeing itself as object?

yes I think so

it is the subject looking in on itself -

but the question - can it really see itself?

or is this largely an illusion?

it posits itself

is this seeing itself?

on the face of it - it seems this is not logically possible -

what of the idea that the self can only see within

and within by definition is not the whole

this is tricky here -

if the within is not the whole - rather an aspect of the whole

what is the whole?

we can't say -

so awareness of the self is not that - is not total - all embracing

seems obvious once you say it

awareness of the self is what?

I think perception of internality

an awareness of dimension

so consciousness looks in - looks out

looks in on itself - and what it sees is internality

looking out - externality - the non-conscious world

still consciousness - apart from these - functions - is what?

awareness

and this we cannot define - except negatively - as what it is not

here though is just logic -

and in so far as it applies to everything

it is a definition of nothing


07/03/06
necessary illusion


consciousness within

consciousness within the without

the relation of dimensions

the point of unity is logical

the unity that is the person

the unity that is the world

the unity that is the person is characterized by one point of consciousness

the unity that is the world is characterized by many points of awareness

the outside of this unity (person or world) is extension

the nature of this unity is beyond consciousness

it is beyond knowing

everything is this fact

everything follows from this fact

everything is undefined

nothing follows from this

therefore

reality is without explanation

explanation is failure to see

(the loss of existential nerve

the wish to be covered

everything is exposed)

explanation is demanded by consciousness

consciousness the necessary illusion

illusion necessary to action


08/03/07


In what follows Wittegenstein's propositions will be stated and my comments will
follow.


Tractatus I


1. The world is all that is the case.


for this to be so - all that is the case - for it to be the case - must distinguish from all
that is not the case

the world is this - all that is the case and all that is not the case

all that is the case and all that is not the case is the ground of possibility

the world is the ground of possibility

the world is logical possibility


1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not things.


facts are possibles
things are possibles

the world is what is possible

there is no totality

totality is the end of possibility


1.11. The world is determined by the facts, and by there being all the facts.


facts do not determine

there is nothing to determine

the world is indeterminate

facts are indeterminate

the world is determined by no fact


1.12. For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also what is not the
case.


what is the case and what is not the case is not determined

there is no totality of facts

(the totality of facts is one fact

one fact determines nothing

the world is not one fact)


1.13. The facts in logical space are the world.


logical space does not require facts

the world does not require facts

the world is logical space

logical space is the ground of possibility

facts are possible


1.2. The world divides into facts.


the world is not divisible

facts express the world


1.21. Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the
same.


possibility is not fixed

no item can remain the same

everything is not the same


10/03/07
Tractatus 2


2. What is the case - a fact - is the existence of states of affairs.


a fact is a description of what is

a fact is not a state

a state is a description of a fact


2.01. A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).


a combination of objects is a conception of what is

a state of affairs may or may not be a conception of objects


2.011. It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of
affairs.


there is nothing essential to things

(essence is a description
there are no necessary descriptions
only possible descriptions)

a thing may or may not be a constituent of a state of affairs

that is a thing may or may not be described

(may or may not be an element of an explanation)


2.012. In logic nothing is accidental; if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the
possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing.


a state of affairs is a description

a description of a thing is not the thing

a thing is not necessarily described

a thing can exist without description


2.0121. It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit a thing that
could already exist entirely on its own.

If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the
beginning.

(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities are its
facts.)


Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space or temporal
objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from
the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded
from the possibility of such combinations.


(a) It would seem to be a sort of accident, that a situation would fit a thing that could
already exist entirely on its own.


a thing is a conception

a situation is a conception of a thing in relation to other things

a conception is always within a conception

no thing exists on its own

there is no necessity in things


(b) If things can occur in states of affairs, the possibility must be in them from the
beginning.


it is a question of conception and depth and range of conception

possible descriptions define a thing

a thing can be defined as the totality of possible descriptions

this is to say nothing of a thing

(a thing is a description)

beyond description there is nothing to say

there is no beginning


(c) Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible and all possibilities are its
facts.


logic is the theory of possibility

every possibility is not conceivable

possibility is not restricted

facts are possible descriptions

logic is the ground of description


(d) Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside of space or temporal
objects outside of time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from
the possibility of combining with others.


descriptions (objects) can be conjoined with descriptions

this is to say nothing about that which is described


(e) If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them
excluded from the possibility of such combinations.


descriptions can be included in descriptions or not

the point of any description simple or complex is action

descriptions provide a basis (to the baseless) in order to facilitate action

description is the only base to action


2.0122. Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations,
but this form of independence is a form of connection with states of affairs, a form of
dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves
and in propositions.)


all possible situations cannot be conceived

a thing can be conceived as independent - it can be conceived in relation to

a thing in itself is indeterminate

we cannot know what is independent of conception

conception defines

definition is decision

all decisions are finally arbitrary

a word is not an appearance

a word can be used in an ostensive definition

(it can be the sound of a signification

the sound of that pointed to)

a proposition signifies

a word can be analyzed within a proposition

an analyzed word must be regarded as independent for its relation to be seen (argued)

(a proposition proposes

a proposition proposes a world

the world of a proposition is always within

there is no proposition that contains all propositions

the world is never exhausted)


2.0123. If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs.

(Everyone of these must be part of the nature of an object).

A new possibility cannot be discovered later.


if to know an object is to know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs I cannot
know an object

one's conception of an object - what descriptions apply is a question of circumstance

there is no necessity here

the nature of an object is an open question)

objects exist in space and time
(descriptions are contingent)

discovery is thinking in a different manner

possibilities are conceived in circumstance

the world is fluid


2.0123. If I am to know an object I need not know all its external properties, I must
know all its internal properties.


an object is always an open question

there is no definite description

a description of internal properties is a description of the thing in itself

there is nothing fixed here

an object's external properties are its possibilities in the world

the world is not definable therefore it is not knowable in any final sense

there is no complete knowledge

a thing's external properties are not fixed

'the world' is a description of what we do not know


2.0124. If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states are also given.


all objects are not given

conceptions are made not given

possible descriptions are only the possibility of a different conception

possibility cannot be determined in advance

possibility exists because we do not know


2.013. Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can
imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space.


a space of possible states - is ascribing different descriptions to a thing (a thing here
an initial description - so a thing is never determined except by fiat - or a decision to
leave it alone)

I can't conceive a thing as having no description

space is the ground of description

the absence of complete description is what defines the world

the world is always more than all possible descriptions


2.0131. A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an
argument place).

A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour; it is, so
to speak, surrounded by colour space. Notes must have some pitch, objects of the
same touch, must have some degree of hardness, and so.


there is no fixed description of an object

a spatial point is an argument place

infinite space is the argument

perceptual events have a natural description

a natural description is non-reflective
(what you might call a given description)

non-natural descriptions are explanations of natural phenomena

an object can be described naturally or non-naturally

all well formed descriptions are true

an object can be variously described

(the idea of 'object' is itself a description - a base description that all other descriptions
refer to -

the idea itself is finally without content

we describe it to give it content -

not because it has content but because we need it to have content so as it manipulate
it)


2.014. Objects contain the possibilities of all situations.


objects contain nothing

possibilities are given

situations arise - i.e. - descriptions are made

descriptions reflect time

time is not still

time means nothing


2.0141. The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.


the occurrence of an object is its perception

the possibility of an object is outside of it

it's possibility is its conception and use

the form of an object is its natural history

it's natural history is what is said of it

or

the form of an object is always a mistake

a necessary starting point of action

it is never true but is regarded as so

here is the origin of exhilaration and also dread


2.02. Objects are simple.


simple or complex is a matter of regard

an object may be regarded as simple

(this is a pragmatic decision

it is always ontologically short sighted

to say something is simple is to choose not to think about it further

here is the origin of clarity and distinctness

it is also the first step of withdrawal from the world)


2.0201. Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their
constituents and into the propositions that describe complexes completely.


complexity is a view of - i.e. an object

it is a way of knowing

a possible way of seeing

the decision to resolve a statement about a complex into its constituents is to explore
the complex - to look into it

if an entity (i.e. a complex) is held to be closed exploration stops

this can only be for a purpose of use (or lack of interest)

(there is no epistemological basis to closing down exploration)

and any proposition (describing such an entity) is held to be closed to view

(even given this view completion does suggest itself

completion has more to do with the wish that consciousness did not exist

that the world is object without question

such a world cannot be known therefore it makes no sense

completion is about the end of desire - not the nature of the world)

if an entity (i.e. a complex) is regarded as open - so too its description

here there is no resolution

any proposition regarding it is held to be open to review

(how you hold a proposition is a decision about the world)


2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world that is why they cannot be
composite.


if so - the substance of the world cannot be composite - whence objects?

objects exist in the outside of the world (the inside is consciousness)

substance is that which is inside and out

substance per se is unknowable

the world is two dimensional

the point of unity (the world itself) cannot be seen


2.0211. If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition is true.


a proposition asserts

it is an assertion of what is the case or what is not the case or what could be the case

a proposition invites assent or dissent

if a proposition can be assented to it has sense

if a proposition can be dissented from it has sense

sensibility is a question of intelligibility


2.0212. In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world.


if there was no substance there would be no assertion

if no proposition - no proposition could be dependent on another


2.022. It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real
one, must have something - a form - in common with it.


imagination is consciousness over reaching known reality

imagination is creativity and the ground of creativity

what is real is the starting point for the imagination

whatever is created is created from - the given reality is contained in any imagined
reality


2.023. Objects are what constitutes this unalterable form.


consciousness objectifies


2.0231.The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material
properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are
represented - only by the configuration of objects that they are produced.


forms of knowing are given in consciousness

the material world is outside of consciousness

(consciousness is the inside of the world)

propositions represent consciousness in the world

the external world - the surface of the world exists in another dimension to
consciousness

its properties are reflected in consciousness

it is only known given consciousness

(consciousness impacts on the material world

the material world impacts on consciousness

this is a way of describing the dynamic of the unity)


2.0232. In a manner of speaking objects are colourless.


objectification is a function of consciousness

functions are colourless

colour is a property of the outside world

an object is a unity

it can be analyzed as colourless or colourful


2.00233. If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them,
apart from their external properties, is that they are different.


their difference is a function of space / time position (only if this is not regarded as an
external property - if it is they are so distinguished)

difference is contingency

the world distinguishes itself


2.02331. Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can
immediately use a description to distinguish it from the others and refer to it; or, on
the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of properties in
common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them.

For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it
would be distinguished after all.


distinction is a question of knowledge

(separate entities are distinguished by spatial position this at least)

what I know of a thing is what distinguishes it

if it cannot be distinguished - this is a property of me - not the thing

distinction is separateness

if there is no separation there are no things

if things are separate they are distinguished


2.024. Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.


what is independent of what is the case is what is not known

substance is the unknown


2.025. It is form and content.


form and content are categories of knowledge

what is beyond knowledge is unknown


2.0251. Space, time and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects.


objects are expressed in space and time

thought is expressed in space and time

space and time are expressions of the world

the world here - in itself so to speak - is unknown

the world (again so to speak) is known through its expressions

colour is a point of unity of mind and matter

the unity of the world cannot be seen

colour is a sign


2.026. There must be objects if the world is to have an unaltered form.


there is no necessity to objects

objects could well not exist

the world would not thus cease to exist

the world is necessary

(necessity is without description)

if the world has an unalterable form we could never know what this is

to imagine such is to suggest the unknown is known

this is the origin of idolatry

(the absence of knowledge beyond consciousness is unalterable)

consciousness is not necessary


2.027 Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one in the same.


objects are presentations to consciousness

consciousness objectifies

(there is no basis to appearance - that is there is nothing that appearance is that does
not appear

beyond appearance - beyond phenomena is what does not appear - is noumena

noumena is the unknown

thought is action that is not visible

there is no basis to thought - that is there is nothing that thought is that is visible)

the idea of unalterability is either the idea to form a basis for argument that is to stand
as premise or it is the wish for the end of desire which is no more than fear of
consciousness itself

the surface is guileless

consciousness reflects the surface

nothing subsists

you can decide to view everything as being indistinguishable

if so everything is unknown

here is the axis of joy and despair

(the question then is either embrace or shed)


2.0271. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is
changing and unstable


the object is neither unalterable or unstable

consciousness objectifies and then reflects

consciousness is petulant

here is the source of innocence (playfulness) and wickedness

the descriptive possibilities of anything are either /or

this shows the space of consciousness in any description

this is the space of possibility

this space is never exhausted

the logic of either / or is applicable to any description of an object

that is it is not a fixed analysis - rather a tool of analysis

a means of setting up ground for thought

logic is not about the nature of things

logic is a set of tools

tools are tools if they fit the task

this suggests the world corresponds to these tools

that the world is so configured

this is where the idea of form comes from - the use of logic

natural history is comforting

it is not necessary

and you cannot predict the next fact


2.0272. The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.


the object as such is what it is

any configuration is a conceptualization

that is it is meant either as an explanation or as an artistic representation

the configuration of objects is at the phenomenal (as distinct from the conceptual)
level a question of relation

the relations of objects is like a board game - it is at the simplest level a question of
placement and position

we then describe from various (different) points of view

this is always a matter of physicality and ideality

where you are - and the metaphysics you bring to place

objects produce nothing beyond themselves

a state of affairs is a conception


2.03. In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain.


in a relational conception anything can be related to anything

if the object of conception is more than one - the conception is relational


2.031 In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another.


relational conceptions determine however there are no fixed relations

things can be conceived in any number of ways

relations - kinds of relations can be created

how things are related depends on what questions are asked

the reason for seeing things in any particular way is not necessarily clear

the reason for anything at all is the point of all our endeavours

it is the eternal focus

the fact of not-knowing is the driving force - the conatus aware

not-knowing is the reason for conscious life

it is the source of anxiety


2.032. The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the
structure of the state of affairs.


how objects are conceived is a state of affairs

the structure of a state of affairs is a theory of conception

that is a reflection on the original conception

there is theoretically no end to reflection on reflection

if a state of affairs is determinate - its determination is never reached

structure is ephemeral


2.033. Form is the possibility of structure.


the possibility of thought (conception) is not knowable

(here is the true zest of life)

the conception of structure is the conception of how a thing stands

the limit of a thing is defined by its structure - i.e. a different structure a different thing

a different thing has a different conception

form is an open concept

structure is a picture of form


2.034. The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs.


the structure of a fact is internal logic - why it is what it is and not another fact

the structure of states of affairs is external logic - the logic of relations - this has no
bearing on the (internal) nature of individual things


2.04. The totality of existing states of affairs is the world.


therefore the world is the state of affairs
therefore the world is one state

the concept of one here cannot be defined

it cannot be a closed concept unless there is something outside the world

if one is an open concept - there is nothing outside of the world

and one here (i.e. the world) is by definition without definition

a totality if closed is such that it has a limited number of members

(such a world is fixed)

a totality if open has an unlimited number of members

such a concept can never be stated

(such a world is not fixed)

we can speak here only of what is not known

as such it is without logical characterization

if so we should give up speaking of the world


2.05. The totality of existing states of affairs also determines which states of affairs do
not exist.


a totality does not entail non-existence

an existing state of affairs does not determine what does not exist

x may exist or not exist

not x is the boundary of x


2.06.The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is a reality.

(We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a
negative fact.)


consciousness always reaches beyond the given

logical possibility is a deeper understanding than the factual world

(the deeper - or wider you go in thinking - the less substance there is in the world

finally you see there is no substance)

the existence of states of affairs is only the necessity (natural) of focus
(the entity is so structured)

reflection - a step back from the immediate - transforms the world to idea

thought is sublime

the purity of touch of sense is exquisite

positive skepticism is to see the absence of knowledge as the ground of being

where you begin and end

negative skepticism is the view that the illusion of knowledge should be true

it is metaphysical denial - an understandable lack of nerve

(for all intents and purposes illusion is necessary for human survival)

you don't have to abandon everything to live in truth and dignity

it is rather the understanding behind the understanding

freedom is at the heart of not-knowing


2.061. States of affairs are independent of each other.


this is a question of conception

when we conceive we determine what is to be included and what is not

(you can think in such a way that all states of affairs are expressions instances of the
one state of affairs - therefore there is no independence)

focus is always where we start

perception is objective (in that it determines what is in and what is not)

reflection - conception is without this necessity

its propensity is the lack of focus

it moves to the point of no focus

what I am saying here is about pure thought

it is nevertheless true of very practical thinking

the absence of knowing demands that we explore

dilemmas initially set limits to thinking

problems can require the isolation of one matter from another

this is not to do with the nature of things -

rather it is about the nature of action


2.062. From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to
infer the existence or non-existence of another.


if so science is impossible or it is without any logical foundation - and thus is
mythology

mythology is a form of necessary illusion

knowledge is the necessary illusion

(the world is not altered)


2.063. The sum total of reality is the world.


reality is not a quantity


2.1. We picture facts to ourselves.


we may so describe consciousness

such is an attempt to give explanation to thought

it is a reflection on the fact

given that we don't know -

really any sensible metaphor will function as well as the next

picturing has the advantage of being childlike

the focus of consciousness captures what is before it

the metaphor is simple and straightforward

in reality though a picture is always outside of consciousness

facts are definitions

decisions in logical space

what is there to picture?

logical space is blank without feature

the drawing of boundaries is ideal

it has no imprint

a picture theory of consciousness conceals the truth


2.11. A picture resents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of
states of affairs.


a picture presents a situation in logical space -

a picture is a presentation

in presenting a situation in logical space

it is a picture presenting a picture (a situation)

in a picture (logical space)

so

a picture presents a picture which presents a picture

what we are talking about here is reflection

reflection of reflection of reflection

this is consciousness

this is how consciousness works

reflection on reflection on reflection

logical space -

is the space of unity

the point of contact between the inner and the outer dimensions

logical space as the space of unity is the space of both dimensions

from the point of view as it were of unity

logical space is necessarily a construction

but nevertheless we regard it as reality

a reality that exists but must be made in order to be known

consciousness posits logical space and then recognizes it as the reality it participates
in

consciousness that is defers to its construction

logical space thus reflects both inner and outer dimensions

it is the resolution of inner and outer

(it is known only from the inside - exists only given that reality is two dimensional
and therefore is a unity

we can well imagine reality as one dimensional - there is no question of unity and
therefore in a world without consciousness - no space of unity - no logical space)

a picture presents a situation in logical space

a picture presents a picture

the existence and non-existence of states of affairs

this is just to say logical space is the space of possibility


2.12. A picture is a model of reality.


a picture is a picture

actually the external reality - the surface reality is reflected in consciousness

and this reflection can then be subject to further reflection

the relationship is two way

consciousness reflects out to the (external) physical world

reality as such is never pictured

we never step out of it to picture it

we are in it

it reflects - and more than this we are its reflections

reflections that reflect


2.13. In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.


in a reflection of an object the object is reflected


2.131. In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects


a reflection reflects what is reflected

a reflection in this context is an inside view of an outside event

(it can also be an inside view of an inside event)

why do we say a picture represents?

that is why don't we say the landscape represents the picture?

what it is about is that consciousness is in the world

that which is outside of consciousness - the physical world

is the object of consciousness

the object is surface - the surface is revealed

the subject (consciousness) is inside - the inside is not revealed

the inside is a reflection of - the outside

we step back and say one represents the other

because one is a reflection of the other

in fact both are dimensions - and thus finally - reflections of a unity

consciousness and the physical world thus both represent a unity

that which is reflected is only known in terms of its reflection

beyond reflection there is no knowledge

representation is thus a way of characterizing the relationship between consciousness
and its object - the external (physical) surface

it is thus a reflection on this relationship

a way of seeing it

it could also be put that a picture only represents if it is made to

that is the representation is not a characteristic of the picture rather of the viewer

it is thus a view of the picture that the picture represents

representation as such has nothing to do with the picture

it is a way of seeing the world - a way of relating things

one could though take another view and say there is no representation

it is just the one reality that has two dimensions

i.e. - the inside of a box does not represent the outside of a box

and the outside of the box is not a representation of the inside

representation does not come into the picture

this view has the advantage of elegance


2.14.What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a
determinate way.


here you could well say that what constitutes the world is that its elements are related
in a determinate way

if so how would you then distinguish a picture from the world?

one would think this necessary for a picture to be a picture


2.141. A picture is a fact.


what is not a fact?

if a fact is to have any logical significance it must be distinguished from what it is
not?

either that or we are dealing with a form of speech

'it is a fact that it is Tuesday at 5.07 p.m.'

is what kind of a statement?

it is an assertion that asserts that what is asserted is true

it is a statement within the statement

the statement within refers to the statement without

it is thus self-serving

statements of this kind should be regarded as rhetorical rather than logical

to say a picture is a fact is really advertising - albeit of the no frills variety


2.15. The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate
way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.

Let us call this connection of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call
the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture.


a picture represents - it does not determine how the world is

the picture may function let us say on a veridical level - but be of no use on an
empirical theoretical level - i.e. that is of no value to science

here it is a question of the use of the picture - as to whether it represents how things
are

how things are will be represented conceptually

but again the representation - the conceptual picture is representative - relative to use

the world is conceived differently - different conceptions reflect different needs
and differing metaphysical histories

conceptualizations (pictures) are tools for dealing with the world

let us say every concept represents

the problem of knowledge is not the problem of representation

the question is how to understand that an infinity of different pictures can represent
the one state of affairs

either there is in an infinity of falsehood and one picture applies or things are not
related in a determinate manner

and the possibility of different picture represents this - dare I say - fact

the possibility of a thing's structure - is really the possibility of structuring - a form of
picturing

which does not of course exhaust the possibilities of representation

the fact of it is that the object of knowledge is the unknown

the unknown is silent - it does not determine

the infinite possibility of representation is only possible given that the object of
consciousness - that which is outside of itself - is unknown

the unknown is silent - it does not determine - therefore anything is possible

rather consciousness' capacity to reflect and reflect on its reflection is the source of all
representation


2.151. Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the
same way as the elements of a picture.


yes it is possible that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements
of picture

this is all that can be asserted


2.1511. That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.


consciousness does indeed have as its primary object that which is outside of itself

it makes no sense really to speak of the inside being attached to the outside

the inside can affect the outside - can impose itself - consciousness can and does
transform the physical world - alter its elements - configure them - if you like

this is a reaching out I suppose

this though is always based on the outside's reflection on the inside

this is the reaching in


2.1512. It is laid against reality like a measure.


the picture is reality reflected

this is just what happens in the natural world (given conscious animals)

it is unremarkable

unless you think the rain falling the wind blowing and the sun shinning is
extraordinary

yes we have concepts of measurement

but again - reality is not a quantity

or to say that it is - leaves too much out


2.15121. Only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to
be measured.


the measurement of the object by the picture is a relationship between the picture and
the object

the act of measurement is an act of consciousness - it is the relating of the picture to
the object in a certain way

this is the making of a relational picture

the relata are the object and the original picture

do we want to say that the relating of the concept (picture) to object is picturing the
picture in a relation (another picture)?

the point is pictures contain pictures

here there are pictures of objects and pictures of the relationship of pictures to objects

a picture does not touch the object pictured it reflects it

the object reflected is held to be complete within its conception

but this is to say what is conceived is always an object (and beyond this the relations
of objects)

we understand that that which is objectified is never known

this is clear given the possibility (and actuality) of diverse conceptions of the object

picturing finally tells us nothing of the nature of the thing pictured

it is about absorbing details into the bigger picture

and the bigger picture is never the big picture

(the big picture is actually blank)


2.1513. So a picture conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship,
which makes it into the picture.


this is not so

the picture as such has no necessary relationship to the object pictured

what makes a picture of x - a picture of x?

a decision to relate the two

in the natural course of things this is done without thinking

in the case of non-veridical (natural) conceptions it is obvious that bridging
conceptions are made

the point is the pictorial relationship is separate from the original picture

it is another matter - a conception of picture and object


2.1514. The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture's elements
with things.


this is not a naive matter

not all of a picture's elements will be obvious to the naked eye

not all of the object's possibilities will be included in the picture

the pictorial relationship will therefore not be determinate

every picture is unfinished


2.1515. The correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with
which the picture touches reality.


yes the picture is always uncertain


2.16. If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it
depicts.


this is a minimal view of facts

what if a fact didn't have something in common with what it depicts?

then it wouldn't depict what it depicts -

therefore it would be a fact that is not a fact

(a most interesting fact)

so any fact is a picture?

if it is a fact

the only way out of this is to say there are non-depicting facts

that facts are something other than pictures?


2.161. There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable
the one to be a picture after all.


this something is what?

is it an axiom?

x' is identical to x?

that is a conception of identity

interposed between picture and object

a conception of logical identity

identity by the way is just short sightedness

nevertheless very useful -

and indeed necessary (in a contingent sense)

so

we employ identity relations to pictures and their objects

for otherwise they would not be pictures of

identity is something other than a picture placed against an object


2.17. What a picture must have common with reality, in order to be able to depict it -
correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form.


this suggests there is something in the picture which makes it a picture of

this is how we tend to think of pictures

but it is only after the connection has been made

and the connection is the conception of relation

this again is independent of the picture and the object


2.171. A picture can depict any reality whose form it has.

A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.


the metaphor of picture - or indeed just the idea of picture is no substitute for
consciousness - if this is the idea -

pictures are observed - they are out there

this will not do as a theory of mind

mind is not out there - a public theory of mind is not clever it is absurd

consciousness cannot be characterized empirically

consciousness is the internal dimension of persons

it can only be characterized by what it does - and that is reflect

if indeed we have knowledge of the mind it is reflective knowledge

the function of mind is reflection

reflection is internal - it is non-empirical

space and colour are features of the surface

of the external world

our conceptions - our reflections recognize these attributes

this is not to say my reflection is coloured

or my reflection is spatial

recognition is an act without content

it is what is recognized that has content


2.172. A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.


its pictorial form - its relation to the object is not depicted or displayed

the relation is not in the picture

the relation is outside the picture outside the object

what the picture displays is a question for the observer

what it depicts is a question for the observer

it is the observer who depicts what is displayed

the picture itself - in itself is unknown


2.173. A picture represents its subject from a position outside of it. (Its standpoint is
representational form). That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or
incorrectly.


the fact that a picture is outside of its subject - does not bear on its correctness or not

a picture is always correct - it is just a question of what it is a picture of


2.174. A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.


the representational form is outside the picture

the picture is not a self - it does not place


2.18. What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order
to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e.
the form of reality.


the outside dimension (of reality) is reflected in the inside dimension (of reality)

this is not a must have - it is just the way it happens


2.181. A picture whose pictorial form is logical is called a logical picture.


a statement of logic defines possibility - that is logical space


2.182. Every picture is at the same time a logical one. (On the other hand, not every
picture is, for example, a spatial one)


every picture may be pictured logically - that is as a statement of what is possible

however the same picture may just be seen as a statement of what is


2.19. Logical pictures can depict the world.


logical pictures state what is possible - that is express possibility

the world can be so regarded - as what is possible - as possibility

such a view determines the world as free of determination


2.2. A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts.


logic is substanceless it asserts possibility

a logical picture has nothing in it


2.201. A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-
existence of states of affairs.


there is nothing depicted in a statement of possibility


2.202. A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.


a picture can be regarded in this way

but if so the picture is merely the stepping stone for the consideration of possibility

again a picture represents nothing unless it is held to be in a relation of representation

representation is an idea of relation

logical space is blank


2.203. A picture contains the possibility of the situation that it represents.


a picture per se represents what is

possibility cannot be represented it can only be stated


2.21. A picture agrees with reality or it fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or
false.


reality is

it doesn't agree or disagree

there is nothing for it to agree or disagree with

a picture is a focus within

it is a feature that is held to represent another feature

reality is silent

it does not say yea or nay

the status of relationships is a matter for those in relationships

you have the picture you have the object

the relation is a third party affair

a decision


2.22. What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by
means of its pictorial form.


truth is a separate consideration to representation

the issue of truth is one that must be defined on each occasion

that is what is to count here as truth?

e.g. naive correspondence or indeed its absence


2.221. What a picture represents is its sense.


a picture does not represent itself

a picture represents something else

a picture is a form - and so long as it is this - it has sense

a picture that is not a picture is something that makes no sense

the sense of a thing is its logical form

a picture does not represent sense - a picture has sense

recognition of logical form is sensibility

the world is sensible

the question of sensibility arises in language

it is a statement that is sensible or not

a grammatically well formed statement is sensible


2.222. The agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or
falsity.


a picture if it is a picture makes sense as a picture

its agreement or disagreement with reality is matter of correct placement


2.223. In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with
reality.


in order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must decide where to put it


2.224. It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.


truth is only one possibility of the significance of a picture - it is the least important


2.225. There are no pictures that are true a priori.

A logical picture of facts is a thought.


(a) true a priori


the conditions of experience are prior to it in a logical sense

this is to think outside of experience about experience

therefore any statement of these conditions has a priori status

if however you are thinking within experience and not outside it

any theory about experience emerges from within it

here there is no a priori

a priori is thus a question of thought positions - outside or in?

it is a matter of meta place - perspective

(we adopt positions only because there is no position)


(b) a logical picture of facts is a thought


a logical picture of facts is a theory of thought

thought can only be addressed by thought

that is we can only look at it from the inside - in thought

pictures within pictures

thought outside its picturing is an unknown

so thought in relation to the non-conscious world?

a thought reflects

a thought is reflection

a reflection of thought is a fact?

yes

if it is understood that 'fact' here is a theory of what is reflected

thought is reflection -

this tells us only that thought is one element of a relation - that reflected - the other
element - that which is reflected (non-thought)

I don't think anymore can really be said here

mind and matter


17/03/07
Tractatus 3


3.01. The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.


a thought is a picture - let us say

all pictures are pictures of the world?

(everything pictured is in the world)

the notion of the totality of thoughts is not sensible

for the idea of the totality - is a thought that is outside of it

therefore the totality is always incomplete

let us say a true picture is a picture of the world

in so far as there is no comprehensive view

that is you can't step out and hold the world as object

then a thought is a picture - is as good as it gets


3.02. A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought.
What is thinkable is possible too.


in the first place a thought as a reflection of what is outside itself

in the second place the initial thought can be the subject of thought - of further
reflection

so in the first case - a thought reflects what is -

what is possible is a further reflection on what is

it is to think outside of what is actual - to go beyond it - to imagine

a thought in the first place contains the actuality of the situation of which it is the
thought

what I suggest is that what is possible in thought depends on what is actual

possibility does not begin from nothing

what is thinkable is possible too - because what is thinkable has its basis in actuality

possibility is a reflection of actuality


3.03. Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to
think illogically.


thought as reflection

is neither logical or illogical -

these notions are decisions - reflections on the functioning of thought

i.e. how it is to function - square circles is a dead end - not a road forward

thought in itself has no defining characteristics - but for those characteristics thought
gives itself on reflection

remember - a reflection is a reflection of - it is not without bounds

(logic is not some sacred site of eternal significance and truth - it is - itself a thought
- a thought about how and when thought - fits

therefore - it is open to review - can be reflected upon - )


3.031. It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary
to the laws of logic. - The truth is that we could not say what an 'illogical' world
would look like.


it would be like this world - unknown


3.032. It is impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts logic' as it is
in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space,
or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist.


language is the point of contact of consciousness and the non-conscious articulated

it is the space of articulation

an articulation that is only possible given how the world is - a two dimensional reality
(consciousness and non-consciousness - the inside the outside)

language is thus the articulation of the unity

what this unity is - amounts to - is always open to question - it is the project of
consciousness - it is the point at which language is speechless

language does represent

what is represented though is always a question to be answered

logic is a theory of the limit to sense

for the limit to be drawn - the other side of sense must have significance

that is that which does not make sense - must be conceivable

and if conceivable it is already represented

the important thing to see here is that sense is never in question

any limit - theory of sense - is made - sensibly -

therefore it is a case of sense defining itself - or more to the point - defining itself for a
specific task

given consciousness there is sense

logic is thus a template applied and reapplied - wherever required for whatever
purpose - within sensibility - it is a conceptual tool


3.0321.Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be
represented by us spatially, one that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot.


geometry is the theory of spatial form - it is revisable


3.04. If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility
ensured its truth.


experience is the ground of contact of the conscious and the non-conscious

it is the real world - it is the domain of thought - there is no thought outside of this -


3.05. A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth
were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with).


every thought is true a priori - in that every thought is a reflection of

the question - what? - is resolved by correct placement - it is a question of location

therefore a thought is true a priori and it is true a posteriori

it is a matter of where you look -

a thought in itself can never be false


3.1. In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the
senses.


this is true on the level of non-reflective awareness

reflective knowledge puts the senses in question

there are propositions in which a thought does not even look for an expression that
can be perceived by the senses - i.e. this proposition


3.11. We use the perceptible sign of the proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a
projection of a possible situation.

The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.


the perceptible sign of the proposition is no more than what the proposition reflects

it is the sign of that reflected

the issue is reflection not projection

in so far as a proposition is an act - yes it is a projection - but this is just to say it is an
act in the world

the sense of a well formed proposition - i.e. a linguistic statement - a non-linguistic
expression - i.e. - painting - dance - music - is given if it is well formed within its type

we do not have to think of the sense of a proposition - except where we may not
immediately see where it is placed - where it fits - this is really just a matter of
organizing the shop


3.12. I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. - And a
proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.


this is only to say a proposition has a relation to the world - but even this is imprecise

in fact a proposition is a relation of the conscious and non-conscious dimensions -
expressed -

it is thus the world expressed


3.13. A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected.

Therefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is.

A proposition therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the
possibility of expressing it.

('The content of the proposition' means the contents of a proposition that has sense).

A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

sense is given form and practice in a proposition - it is defined - for reason (purpose)

and with a view to practice

in this sense a proposition contains sense - encircles it - embraces it

the world of sense is the domain of the proposition - propositions are the templates
(flexible) hanging in the shed

a proposition is expression

without sense (not that this is possible) a proposition is empty - it is just a form
without content - and in that case - it doesn't express

this though is never the case

there is no content to sense -

a proposition is the form of sense


3.14. What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand
in a determinate relation to one another.

A propositional sign is a fact.


the propositional sign here is broken down to elements

it is put that the determinate relation of the elements - of the words - to one another is
what makes a propositional sign - presumably what it is -

in what does the determinate relation of elements amount to?

where is the determination - words can be placed relative to one another - is this then
determination?

one would think not

the determination - that gives significance - does so because it makes sense

you see we begin with this - and can then go to some explanation of it - a theory of
sense - and to this end is developed theories of grammar - and even theories of use

theories of determination

the real determination any theory attempts to account for is just the fact of sense put in
a particular form

in a proposal - that is in a proposition

we can understand sense metaphysically - as that which is the point of contact of the
conscious and the unconscious - consciousness in relation to

consciousness makes sense

awareness is sensibility

a propositional sign is a fact - yes - this though leaves the matter open

to say of anything that it is a fact is to propose it as worthy of particular attention or
focus - it has to do with advertising


3.141. A proposition is not a blend of words. - (Just as a theme in music is not a blend
of notes).

A proposition is articulate.


a proposition in a sense has nothing to do with words

words are - language is - a means of delivery

a proposition articulates - when it is articulated


3.142. Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.


facts are constructions - constructions of sense

if I say 'Michael, Lisa, Judy, Molly' - pointing at these people and a cat -
this set of names express a sense

sense is not contained by language - sense is identified by it


3.143. Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obstructed by the usual form of
expression in writing or print.

For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between
a propositional sign and a word.

(That is what made for Frege to call a proposition a composite name).


yes in that every proposition refers - it may do more than this but at least this -


3.1431. The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one
composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs

The spatial arrangements of these things will express the sense of a proposition


yes - a spatial arrangement of objects - can be (always is?) a proposal?

what is being said here though will not be expressed by the arrangement - the
arrangement points to it - suggests

the reality may be that there has been no proposal made - that the physical
arrangement is quite accidental - and has no significance in itself -

nevertheless - the arrangement will suggest if identified as an arrangement

significance here is clearly given prior to the proposition's statement

sense is a room - a proposition walks in


3.1432. Instead of, the complex sign "aRb" says a stands in relation to b in the relation
R', we ought to put, 'That "a" stands to "b" in a certain relation says that aRb'.


the difference is between a complex sign and a proposition

between representation and assertion

there is nothing in a proposition that decides if it is an expression or an assertion

a proposition is given its form in its act -

its act is identified (rightly or wrongly) by an actor


3.144. Situations can be described but not given names.

(Names are like points; propositions like arrows - they have sense.)


a proposition may function as an arrow - it may also be the drawing of the bow

it is not that anything can or cannot be done - it's rather a matter of practice - and
practice recognized by a community of practitioners

language is like geology - the crevices on a mountain side - are made by the constant
impact of the elements -

what happens is what we then theorize about

what happens though has no deeper meaning than its occurrence

its explanation - any explanation per se - has no reality - that is it adds nothing to the
real event - it is just a way of seeing that gives the illusion of reason - of foundation -

explanation is just one response to fear


3.2. In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the
propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought.


a proposition just is the unity of thought and object expressed

the event of the proposition - or the action of it - is in the act - without epistemological
value

it is only on reflection - in reflection that value is found - is given -


3.201. I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition 'completely
analyzed'.


a complete analysis of anything is just a matter of definition - what is complete?

if you think this question can be answered - away you go

if you have doubt regarding complete analysis - you will either drop the whole project
- or suspend judgement

a proposition is a proposal - its analysis is a proposal - the analysis of the analysis etc.

do you ever get to the proposition as a subject of analysis -

perhaps it is not this kind of thing

we need to ask to what purpose this idea of analysis - simple signs - completely
analyzed?


3.202. The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.


OK - name here - a description of - an act - the act of naming - and this is what?

the act of language - and then its archiving of the event in another form - i.e. - a
written form

in a written form - e.g. - it can then become an object - and its parts if you will -
are given - names

in this case the parts are refereed to as names

so the act of naming is translated to a form - and then described as naming

it seems as though strictly speaking - naming cannot be analyzed

it is a blind act?


3.203. A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)


the act of naming - the event of it has meaning - but we say this after the act - on
reflection - that is meaning is not shown - in the event - meaning is known

the object is its meaning - rather I think the object is given meaning in the act of
naming - and really the giving of meaning is really just an act (as in on the stage) - but
necessary really - given that's where we are


3.21. The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of
simple signs in the propositional sign.


this is an arrangement that is designed to cover anxiety -

it is to say - everything is as it should be - there is no gulf

this is the given state of affairs anyway

it is only on reflection that there seems no basis to it - and to the theory

this is anxiety


3.22. In a proposition a name is the representative of an object.


in a proposition the name and the object are one in the same

name and object are divisions of the unity - into conscious and non-conscious
dimensions

the unity - and here I mean the whole proposition is undivided

it is without definition as it is

(if you were to see it from the outside - you would not know what it is - though you
would recognize that it is)

the relation subject to object

is a description of the unity

the unity is what subject and object come out of

the relation of the conscious and non-conscious we can say is beneath the reality - we
can conceive it this way -

what this means is that substance is above - not below


3.221. Objects can only be named. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak
about them: I cannot put them into words. Propositions can only say how things are,
not what they are.


objects can be thought out - apart from straight recognition - this is the point of
objects - to be reflectively discussed -

in this sense they are only held to be what they appear as - for the purpose of
reflection - the nature of objects is an open question

the sign and that signified are distinguishable only in analysis - the point of analysis is
to provide space for theories of action - that is ways to proceed

an object is that - what it is - is a question of substance theory

substance theory has no foundation it is simply a way of unifying - after analysis has
diversified

the state of affairs remains impervious to these workings

it is always above the fray - and is in fact never touched - and despite all such
theoretical thrashings about stays as it was to begin - unknown

this is not despair it is rather to give blood reason to flow - the beat to the heart


3.23. The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be
determinate.


yes it is a requirement - a requirement of use - of action - action is determinate - action
determines -

sense is essentially indeterminate - just as awareness has no given limit

it is the distinction between essence and act


3.24. A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition
about a constituent of the complex.

A complex can be given by its description, which will be right or wrong. A
proposition that mentions a complex will not be non-sensical if the complex does not
exist, but simply false.

When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an
indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such case we know that
the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for generality
contains a prototype.)

The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in a
definition.


a proposition determines nothing - it is proposal for consideration

its truth is a decision about the world - which can never be determined

therefore we decide - if needs be - and justify (argue) afterwards - this can be the
origin of creative metaphysics - or indeed the refuge of a closed mind - if the former
we can have true rationality - if the latter the result is war on one scale or another

it is in any case the origin of excuse


3.25. A proposition has one and only one complete analysis.


to think like this is to be deceived by the form of a proposition -

it is to think that a definite proposal can only have a definite analysis

a proposition sets up a space for discussion

it is a diamond of possibility - in which you can find possible worlds - including the
best of


3.251. What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can
be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate.


we can say of anything that it expresses - the point of expression is the fact - the
existence of consciousness

it is not that the world expresses -

it is that given consciousness - the world expresses to - consciousness

to bring it all together - that is not to imagine one without the other - which is indeed
the human reality

yes - a proposition which is an expression of the unity of the conscious and non-
conscious dimensions - and always expresses the world - as is - i.e. not deconstructed

(deconstructing a matter is just tinkering with ideas of how it functions - it will
function regardless of theory - analysis is always outside of action)

what we make of the proposition - is the same question - what do we make of the
world?

the issue of knowledge is never resolved

the proposition becomes the subject of reflection

(the end point is never reached)

a statement of reflection is a proposition

it too can be the subject of reflection

the necessity of action - a very practical necessity - which is always a cutting off of
reason - determines the status of whatever proposition - i.e. - that it is to be a
foundation of others - this is just a denial of logic - a decision for action

man is therefore never rational in action only in reflection

and therefore rationality has only contemplative value


3.26. A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive
sign.


the point of naming is to make a primitive sign


3.261. Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it;
and the definitions point the way.

Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other is
defined by means of primitive signs. Names cannot be anatomized by means of
definitions.

(Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.)


the question really is what is primitive?

we say a name is primitive - that this means it cannot be further analyzed - anatomized

OK - but this is metaphysics by fiat -

I would put that there is no primitive - or rather that we do not know what primitive is
- or is to amount to - except pragmatically - and so there is no sign of it -

the idea of the primitive is perhaps all that is primitive

it underlies human behaviour

it is the reaching to I would suggest and not the point arrived at -

it is a heuristic endeavour

and it may indeed have a biological basis

nevertheless metaphysically speaking it is not to be found

though I grant a primitive - a fundamental is assumed - in any human endeavour

the point I guess is that we operate always in self deception

the truth is indeed possible and conceivable but not endurable


3.262. What signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs slur over, their
application says clearly.


what a sign refers to is always indeterminate

what a sign refers to is a question of definition

the matter is really never settled

we assume a meaning - without ever knowing what that is

application becomes significant - because of application

we are always insisting on meaning

it is the insistence that for all intents and purposes becomes the meaning

language is a means

theories of its structure (grammar) are arguments for significance

structure can give the illusion of substance


3.263. The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations.
Elucidations are propositions that contain primitive signs. So they can only be
understood if the meanings of those signs are already known.


a primitive sign if it is such - has meaning - that is if it is a sign

(a sign if it is a sign - is a sign of)

what that meaning is though - is a matter independent of the sign

we sometimes embrace the unknown in order to explain - surround it - give it place
within

this connects a sign to other signs - it gives the impression of elucidation

impression is what we run with

and everyone knows this is not something that bears too much looking into

everyone has a go

propositions - arrows are shot at meaning

illusions connect or they don't

what is already known is just firmly held belief

this is the epistemological basis of prejudice

language is competing prejudices

to speak is to covet


3.3. Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name
have meaning.


meaning is the ground of propositions

any proposition has meaning

(otherwise there would be no reason for the proposal)


a proposition - is not all propositions - therefore the proposition is defined by what it
does not propose - this is just what the meaning of a proposition amounts to

a proposition is thus a definition of meaning - a specifying of reality for attention


3.31. I call any part of the proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (a
symbol).

(A proposition is itself an expression.)

Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one
another is an expression.

An expression is the mark of form and content.


a symbol identifies the act of meaning

an expression shows

an expression shows that meaning is in definition - that it is in a specific play

it is like cutting out - or drawing a figure on a piece of paper

meaning is both sides of the line

the focus though is that space contained by the line

propositions focus

so it is not so much that a proposition expresses - it is rather that it focuses

form and content are what is being proposed

so yes form and content are the mark of a proposition

a proposition though is more than just an expression

a proposition is a focus - within focus


3.311. An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can
occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions.


do we need to speak of an expression at all?

an expression as the basis for a proposition -

that which is common to propositions may well be that which is expressed

but that which is expressed is surely a proposition?


3.312. It is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions that
it characterizes.

In fact, in this form the expression will be constant and everything else variable.


A proposition is the making of an expression

the focus of a proposition is its definitiveness

a proposition is not so much a proposal to halt variability

it is more that it is a decision to hold


3.313. Thus an expression is presented by means of a variable whose values are the
propositions that contain the expression.

(in the limiting case the variable becomes a constant, the expression becomes a
proposition.)

I call such a variable a 'propositional variable'.


the idea that what is expressed in a proposition is a constant and the propositions in
which it is expressed are the variables

the variable in this case then is the actual proposition - this is the propositional
variable

propositions on this view are casings

and the expression is what - substance?

what is expressed - content - the proposition - form?

is this not 'a ghost in the proposition' theory?

either that or - we say a proposition - is always the subject of further propositions

that the question of content is not resolved - only reflected upon -

and that this is not an exercise in a form of infinite regress - but rather a study of
possibility?

a proposition as a focus - but the focus itself is variable - it is not fixed


3.314. An expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables can be
constructed as propositional variables.

(Even variable names)


an expression here is what - does it have any substance to it - or is it an open concept -
that expressed - as in an event - an action?

and what is a proposition as distinct from an expression?

is it being suggested that there are such things as propositions that are empty - waiting
to be loaded up - with an expression?

a proposition as a shell - an expression as the powder

(they say Wittgenstein wrote the Tractatus while on the front in the war)


3.315. If we turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable, there is a class of
propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition. In general,
this class too will be dependent on the meaning that our arbitrary conventions have
given to parts of the original proposition. But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily
determined meanings are turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind.
This one, however, is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the
proposition. It corresponds to a logical form - logical prototype.


the meaning of a variable proposition - the signs of which are all variables - is
dependent not on convention - but on form

this is to make the point that conventional meaning is not arbitrary but finally founded
in logical form

it is to say that logical form is at the basis of the generation of variables

yes this sounds good

the question though is to do with logical form - logical prototype -

do we have such - or is it rather an assumption made after the fact - to explain the
fact?

could it be that the logical form of the proposition just is the proposition?

that each proposition displays form -

as a shadow is reflected in light?


3.316. What values a propositional variable may take is something that is stipulated.

The stipulation of values is the variable.


the variable is just the stipulation of values

stipulation?

isn't it rather that values are created in a propositional variable - not I suggest from
nothing - but rather from looking in a different place - which is just what a variable
does

the form of the variable (as variable) is direction


3.317. To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the propositions
whose common characteristic the variable is.

The stipulation is the description of those propositions.

The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not with their
meaning.

And the only thing essential to the stipulation is that it is merely a description of
symbols and states nothing about what is signified.

How the description of propositions is produced is not essential.


(a)


this is to say that to stipulate values is to show - display the variable - in propositions
that are instances of it

this is a definition of stipulation

and this showing (stipulation) is the description of the propositions -

so the display is the description?

the point being a display is self explanatory - and thus complete?

you can of course define description in such a way

the world - as is - as displayed - is (its) description

this works I think as it were from the point of view of the world - without
consciousness

consciousness reflects - this is what it does - just as the rain falls and the sun shines

display is just the object of reflection

presentation is not enough for consciousness - it is just the beginning

the idea that we can see things - one dimensional - i.e. Neurath 'everything is surface' -
I understand as quite a brilliant solution to the problem of metaphysics - the problem
that is that we have metaphysics -

the point is it doesn't work - its very formulation requires what it denies - reflection


(b)


the description will be concerned only with symbols - not their meaning

yes you can focus just on symbols - and not on what is signified

so the question then has to do with the relations - thus logical relations of symbols

OK -

however for a symbol to have sense it need be distinguishable from other symbols -
how is this to be if what is signified is not in question?

without some basis for the symbol - other than its presentation - it has no significance

you cannot separate a sign from meaning

always the question is one of meaning - symbolism - is a merely a propositional
variation with hidden values

in art the artist constructs and organizes symbols

logicians do just this

propositional logic is the basis of art


3.318. Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions
contained in it.


yes a bottom up approach - (very British I would think)

the top down idea is that the expressions have significance in so far as they are
propositioned -

that is their inclusion in a proposition is the what makes for their value

it is always a question isn't it of where you begin - do you start with a stone or begin
with a mountain?


3.32. A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol.


a sign is thus syntax


3.321. So the one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common to two
different symbols - in which case they will signify in different ways.


the same syntax common to two different - propositions e.g.

if the symbols are unique - separate - they have different signification (though the
same signage)


3.322. Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never indicate a
common characteristic of the two, if we use it with two different modes of
signification. For the sign, of course is arbitrary. So we could choose two different
signs in stead, and then what would be left in common on the signifying side?


signs do not determine substance


3.323. In every day language it very frequently happens that the same word has
different modes of signification - and so belongs to different symbols - or that two
words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what
is superficially the same way.

Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for
existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective;
we speak of something, but also of something's happening.

(In the proposition, 'Green is green' - where the first word is the proper name of a
person and the last an adjective - these words do not merely have different meanings:
they are different symbols)


the point is isn't that appearance demands scrutiny -

or that language as practiced on let us say a veridical level challenges us to think?


3.324. In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of
philosophy is full of them).


perhaps there is no pristine surface to begin with

that to think this is the mistake

the fact of different symbols for identical signs - is the fact of beauty

and the world is such an intrigue

here is the struggle of art

the origin of delight


3.325. In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign-language that
excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a
superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say
a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar - by logical syntax.

(The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though it is true, it
fails to exclude all mistakes.)


it is the assumption of error that bothers me here

indeed we can think more clearly when this is required

the way the world is - is not an error though - unless you are of a Platonic bent

the notation of logical syntax - if adopted as the language of thought will knock out -
in one foul swoop the dramas of semantics

and there is indeed a clarity in syntax - ask any artist

the point always with clarity though is what is left out?

what is left out is the world


3.326. In order to recognize a symbol with its sign we must observe how it is used
with a sense.


is this anymore than acknowledging that we can't really speak of a sign outside of a
working knowledge of its actual application -

that it is the application that gives a sign its meaning -

that the matter is not decided in some quasi a priori way?

the fact is we understand the indeterminateness of signs from practice - we can indeed
- develop variations in the syntax - but by why - if the semantics in practice is clear
enough?


3.327. A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its
logico-syntactical employment.


true - it is a question of use


3.328. If a sign is useless, it is meaningless. That is the point of Oakam's maxim.

(If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning.)


yes there is a test of utility - but it is never finished - we create new signs for new
pathways

(once a sign has been used it is useful - even if the original use is forgotten or lost)


3.33. In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a role. It must be
possible to establish a logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: only
the description of expressions may be presupposed.


this is to ask too much and for why?

either a sign has meaning or it does not - if not - we are saying it cannot be used -

if it does - then it may be used - where is the problem?

just as the meaning of a word is not a syntactical issue - nevertheless the presence of
syntax is acknowledged -

so too with syntax - though the issue of meaning is not being worked - it is
nevertheless in the yard -

it is really just a question of what is being done - and effectiveness usually
presupposes a division of labour


3.331. From this observation we turn to Russell's 'theory of types'. It can be seen that
Russell must be wrong, because he had to mention the meaning of signs when
establishing the rules for them.


the meaning of sign is its use - a rule stipulates correct use

3.332. No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign
cannot be contained in itself.


my argument here would be that in a proposition there is nothing to refer to
as the proposition itself has no content - it is a pointing to


3.333. The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a
function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself.

For let us suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument: in that case there
would be a proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F and the inner function
F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form f(fx) and the outer
one has the form ø(f(fx)). Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the
letter by itself signifies nothing.

This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)' we write '($f):F(fu).fu = Fu'.

That disposes of Russell's paradox.


a proposition that refers to itself must contain itself - thus another proposition - same
proposition? - how can this be? - anyway - the second proposition presumably points
to the first - and the first points wherever

clearly two different propositions - they do not have - cannot have the same referent

Russell's paradox can occur if you regard a proposition as the same kind of thing that
it points to - as Russell correctly saw

a proposition points to - picks out - cuts out - what it refers to - (if we want to keep
using the idea of reference) - ideally

the domain of a proposition is not the proposition

a proposition can never be in the domain of a proposition

just as the domain of consciousness - that outside of consciousness is not
consciousness

consciousness can never be in its domain

(and yes - something of an argument against the mind-brain identity theory)


ps.

self reference -

the self?

a proposition can refer to the referent or that which refers

it can refer both ways -

so the self as a propositional function?

just a thought


3.334. The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each
individual sign signifies.


how a sign signifies is not without question


3.34. A proposition possess essential and accidental features.

Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the
propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the
proposition could not express its sense.


a proposition does not express anything

a proposition is that which is expressed

a proposition is a tool of awareness

consciousness proposes a view of the world

the view - the proposition - defines focus

the propositional sign has objective status

therefore it can be referred to

it can be the subject of other propositions

secondary propositions are reflective


3.341. So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express
the same sense have in common.

And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can
serve the same purpose have in common


there is nothing essential in a proposition

the natural history of a language creates structure - use creates structure

this is not essence -

how would you ever identify essence?

what is it supposed to be?

sense as I think of it is logical space

it is a function of awareness

that a proposition opens up and gives form to logical space is we can say what a
proposition does

the form of logical space here is the domain of possibility

the propositional sign defines the domain

to say this is to reflect on the fact of propositions

it is to offer a theory of reason and structure

such a proposal is we shall say a meta proposition

bear in mind this too is not immune from discussion and focus

finally we only ever have a working theory

in this case - of propositions

there is no essential definition

every definition is open


3.3411. So one could say that the real name of an object was what all symbols that
signified it have in common. Thus, one by one, all kinds of composition would prove
to be unessential to a name.


names are empty forms - they are given content in application

there is of course a history of application - that is common usage

yes you can match symbols with objects - this is linguistics

saying what symbols have in common is an exercise in contingency

it can be of interest for a specific purpose -

it is about usage patterns


3.342. Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this much is not
arbitrary - that when we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is
necessarily the case. (This derives from the essence of notation.)


it can be that one thing so defined entails something else - this is a matter of definition
and definition is always a matter of argument

there is no essence to notation - to think this is to dream a language that would by
definition have no application - would not thus be a language


3.3421. A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important
that it is a possible mode of signifying. And it is generally so in philosophy: again and
again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each case
discloses something about the essence of the world.


anything can be of significance depending on how you look

essence is an argument - the idea of a base that is common to all

it can be a useful notion given certain purposes

mainly it has to do with conception to the service of unity - and the point of this?

metaphysical security - intellectual and finally emotional

circumstance can lead us to seek out conceptions of this kind

circumstances though can just as easily lead us to throw it off and seek out the non-
essential


3.343. Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another. Any
correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such
rules; it is this they all have in common.


natural languages are existing languages -

translation is the establishing of correspondence rules

the assumption therefore is that there is correspondence

which is to say - the assumption is - common meaning

artificial languages are created in response to perceived functional deficiencies of
natural languages

the meaning of terms in an artificial language is thus not a matter of correspondence
but revision

artificial languages may also have terms that are unique to that language and thus
defined by it

the meaning of an artificial language is determined by the task it is being designed to
fulfill

translatability of natural to artificial and artificial to artificial is not determinate

translatability is not determinate

it is this that they all have in common -

the indeterminacy of translation

(for determinate translation - you would need to assume the existence of a set of fixed
meanings that all languages express - that they all refer to -

you would then have the question - why not just one language?

different languages have different histories - they come form different points in space
and time - the common feature of all is that they are a means of expression

the need to express is at the core of it

the meaning of a term is the history of its use)


3.344. What signifies a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the rules of
logical syntax allow us to substitute for it.


what is common to a symbol is what is common to all symbols - and that is the rules
of logical syntax - for they allow us to substitute symbols - without changing what is
signified


3.3441. For instance, we can express what is common to all notations for truth
functions in the following way: they have in common that, for example, the notation
that uses '~p' ('not p') and 'pvq' ('p or q') can be substitutes for any of them.

(This serves to characterize the way in which something general can be disclosed by
the possibility of a specific notion.)


all notations for truth functions have in common the rules of logical syntax


3.3442. Nor does analysis resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way, so that it
would have a different resolution every time that it was incorporated in a different
proposition.


the sign for a complex is resolved definitively regardless of the proposition it is
incorporated in


3.4. A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical
space is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents - by the existence of the
proposition with sense.


logical space is revealed by the proposition - and logical space is determined by the
proposition

logical space is thus contained by the proposition and at the same time the proposition
is contained in logical space

it is like a proposition brackets logical space - ( )

it is this bracketing (the proposition) that brings logical space into focus - what is
inside the bracket (of the proposition) and therefore - what is outside

the act of the proposition reveals logical space


3.41 The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates - that is the logical place.


yes this is what I mean by the bracketing - the making of logical place


3.411. In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility; something can exist in it.


yes - logical space is conceived

it is a particular conception - the conception as it were without an object of conception

in this sense - a meta conception - in that it is the ground of conception

it is to conceive the space of all conception

logical place is the space of a particular proposition


3.42. A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the
whole of logical space must already be given by it.

(Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc., would introduce more and
more elements - in co-ordination.)

(The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of a
proposition reaches through logical space.)


yes a proposition determines only one place in logical space

the implication of logical space in the determination of place tells us what?

I said above that logical space is revealed -

it is revealed - that is as a matter of logic - it is a logical function

it is the space not determined by the proposition

if so it is a function inherent in all propositions

logical space a first order function - of a proposition?


3.5. A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought.


do we think only in propositions?

a proposition - in its least technical form is a proposal

the proposal comes out of what?

thought

thought here as the origin of the proposition

the thing is - if this is so - the proposition makes the thought out of which it comes

that is prior to the proposal thought is unknown - unrevealed - it is characterless

the proposition as it were - a light turned on in the darkness

thought is both the darkness and the light

the proposition is thus the possibility of thought revealed


22/02/07.
Tractaus 4


4. A thought is a proposition with sense.


sense is given in propositions - a proposition is sense proposed -

do we need to mention sense here at all?

which is to say a thought is a proposition?

this would be to say a thought just is a proposition

and that a thought to be a thought must be propositional

yes - I think so

this however is not to put that thought (as distinct from a thought) is a proposition

a proposition as a proposal of thought

thought proposed

and I think this is kind of theoretical - the thought / a thought distinction

that is what can we say of thought per se - outside of propositional logic?

it's an unformed resource - an unknown

a thought brings thought into being for all intents and purposes


4.001. The totality of propositions is language.


the totality of propositions is the totality of thought - is thought


4.002. Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every
sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is -
just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.

Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it
is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it; because the outward form of
the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different
purposes.

The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are
enormously complicated.


(a)


the logic of language is a reflective question - that is language becomes an object of
reflection - it can for this reason never be resolved in a final manner - (there is no
natural end to reflection - or reflective possibilities) -
272.


the logic of language - one's theory - like language itself - is a matter of design for
purpose -

as purpose - is a fluid concept - so one's language - or one's theory of language
- is not a fixed affair

but if - purposes - tasks are decided - one's logic can obtain a pragmatic stability -


(b) language is a means of expression - what do we express if not thought?


language does not disguise thought

thought as expressed in natural languages is a raw immediate response to the world

when put to specific tasks natural language (natural thought) requires refinement
and reflection -

this ultimately entails a metaphysical framework

so language reveals thought


(c) it is not that we infer from language the form of the thought beneath it


language reveals it

that we may not know what it is (i.e. its form) that is revealed - takes nothing away
from the revelation

it may be a revelation of clarity but mostly it is a revelation of intrigue

so much so that it is normal to inquire further -

and to think about it

language is hard to explain - just because it is the thing to be explained

it is the unity of the conscious and non-conscious dimensions

it is the unity

we begin to explain when we divide the unity - see it as a whole with parts -

and the natural division is the dimensional one - internal (consciousness) - external
(non-conscious) - subject / object

so I would say it is not that thought reveals - what is underneath

rather what is revealed is the unity of the inside and the outside

it is the known world

the known world in representation

now you can go one of two ways here

you can with Kant say the world as such - beyond what is known - is unknown

or say what is - is what is - language is the world in representation

and there is nothing beyond this

the result oddly enough is the same

for in the latter view - what we have is not in fact known

the nature of language - the logic of language is a question for reflection

and here too there is no certainty - only strategies

(there is a view of things which follows from what I have said which is at least worth
stating - if the world is language - if we begin as it were on this platform - then one
could argue that consciousness and the non-conscious are simply categories of
explanation of this reality - that the inner world and the outer world are theoretical
posits that are useful in the explanation of the unity - that the expressed reality is all
there is - beyond this the unknown


4.003. Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are
not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of
this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions
and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our
language.

(They belong to the same class of question whether the good is more or less identical
than the beautiful.)

And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are not in fact not problems at all.


a philosophical proposition is a stance -

to assert a philosophical proposition is to make a stand in the unknown

philosophical propositions are foundational statements

their function is to provide a basis for thought

thought asserting its basis - in a proposition - of thought

the logic of this does not bear too much scrutiny

to appreciate the value of such propositions you need to see the point of them

the purpose - the need they satisfy - or at least address

and it is in its most general sense the need for security -

that is it is designed to satisfy an emotional need

in my terms it is when consciousness asserts an end to itself - an end to reflection

now such an assertion is without logical foundation - but it is necessary for action

its basis in this sense is pragmatic

a proposition such as 'the world is all that is the case' - actually is - I would argue
without content

it is a proposition that asserts the unknown - and is held as a foundation statement

it is an empty statement

it is the end of all propositions

its point is not its content - if it appears to have content - this is illusory - a temporary
illusion - its point is rather the assertion of end point

this is emotional and pragmatic

but I would argue - all such propositions - propositions of this class - are assertions of
the unknown

assertions of the empty proposition

what else can everything else be based on - but that which has no basis itself?

the various and different formulations of such propositions - point to the rich character
of possibility

the different colours of the world -

the different ways it may be seen


4.0031. All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It
was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a
proposition need not be its real one.


Mauthner argued there can be no knowledge without language but also that language
is a veil which presents access to reality - so genuine knowledge cannot be gained
through language

his idea is that language can only reflect our subjective experiences - and that it is
determined by social function

therefore linguistic structures do not reflect ontological structures - although they
appear to

he went on to combine his scepticism with a theory of mystical intuition

there is much of interest in Mautner's perspective

language expresses the possibility of knowledge

and within this possibility we make choices and decisions

language is then used as a means of delivering these decisions - this is where
propositions come into their own - where assertions are made

language reflects theories - conceptions of ontological structure - it is the marketplace
- and it is an open market

what the world is made up of is always an open question

we have possibilities - this is life

(the end of these possibilities is the end of life)

Mauthner argues that language reflects subjective experience and is determined by
social function

against this I would put that language reflects not just subjective experience but
objective reality

that language is the reflection of this unity

language practice is indeed governed by social practice - this though is not a complete
theory of language

Mauthner's scepticism is on the right track

it is just that it was not comprehensive enough

as with Descartes Mauthner holds that there is genuine knowledge

(his scepticism is about how to find this knowledge)

and what is to count as 'genuine' knowledge?

surely any such proposal is the just the attempt to give a particular form to thought
(presumably for a particular end)

and to argue that such a form is superior?

all such claims have been shown to be groundless

invariably they cannot satisfy their own criteria for genuineness

knowledge is just the description of what we do and the world we operate in

there can be no 'genuine description' -

only various accounts

Russell's showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real
one points to the question of logical form - and whether it can ever really be settled

logical form is an open question - and decisions need to be made - as Russell showed
decisions though are just that


4.01. A proposition is a picture of reality.

A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.


(a)


a proposition is a picture of reality -

a proposition is a definition - the picture is already there - it requires form

the proposition gives the picture form

why not just say the proposition gives reality form?

yes - I don't really see the necessity of the picture here -

the proposition as a frame - but really the question what is in it?

and the true answer to this is - that in a final sense we don't know

the picture in essence is without (any fixed) content

the actual content of the picture depends where the frame is put

and given that the frame is never stable - the content is never stable

so if the proposition is a picture - it is an empty picture


(b)


a proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.

this does sound a bit like Mauthner's argument - or indeed Kant's

that reality is beyond language -

look reality is an undefined - it is in itself if you like unknown

this might sound like the Kantian view -

my view is different and is that the unity is unknown but its dimensions are not

so yes we can speak of conscious and non-conscious dimensions

and as to the character of the whole we cannot say

a proposition is the meeting of dimensions - or an expression of the unity

so the proposition functions as reality - not as a model of reality

reality if you like is a propositional function

reality is what is expressed in all propositions

so for all intents and purposes reality is the proposition

a proposition is always a proposal within a domain

the domain is possibility

reality is a definition of this possibility


(c)


imagination

a proposition asserts a state of affairs

imagination as the conscious ground of possibility is the basis for any proposal

a proposal is not what is given - it is what is proposed

given that what is given is unknown - any proposal by its nature will be a posit

you can call this a product of the imagination

it is really just a propositional assertion based on reflection

and reflection is the conscious exercise of possibility

possibility is given in the fact of reflection

in the fact of consciousness


4.011. At first sight a proposition - one set out on the printed page, for example - does
not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do
written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music, nor our phonetic
notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech.

And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what
they represent.


if you distinguish between a proposition and a propositional sign - and this is not a
straightforward matter - i.e. - what is a proposition but the propositional sign? - but if
you make this distinction - it by no means follows that we are talking about the same
picture - that is the picture of the proposition and the picture of the propositional sign

yes you can say a propositional sign is a picture in the ordinary sense

but what is it a picture of ?

the proposition or the object of the proposition?

this is a fair question

my answer is that if you are going down this path - the propositional sign is a picture
of the propositional reality - the proposal and that proposed - it is to use a technical
ontological term - smack in the middle

it represents both and you might ask what is it that is thus represented in this
propositional reality -

outside of the proposition / propositional sign - there is no answer

the propositional sign is the answer - it is all we can say of the proposition - it is the
only reality / representation

one can speculate as much as one likes beyond this - but that is the point of the
propositional sign

yes it is a picture and it is a picture of the unknown


4.012. It is obvious that a proposition of the form 'aRb' strikes us as a picture. In this
case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified.


would it matter if the sign was not a likeness of what is signified?

that is how relevant is the notion of picture?

it seems that really the only sense of picture that is relevant is the naive argument that
a propositional sign can be regarded as a picture

you could ask is any sign therefore a proposition?

if all signs have sense - then what distinguishes a proposition from any marking of any
kind?

and it might sound a little out there - far fetched - but is the impression of the wind or
water on a rock face - a picture?

certainly to some indigenous people the answer could be yes

if so do we then say nature is a complex of propositions?

and thus that propositions do not necessarily have anything to with human kind

a dreamtime argument


4.013. And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character, we see that it is
not impaired by apparent irregularities (such as the use of # and b in musical
notation).

For even these irregularities depict what they are intended to express; only they do it
in a particular way.


the point is isn't it that the propositional sign is arbitrary

once signed the proposition is expressed and expressed in physical form - that is in a
public manner

it my terms it has an external dimension

that is the proposition then has a physical form

can we speak of the proposition independently of its signage?

if not how are different signs substituted?

i.e. there must be a basis other than the sign for deciding substitution

if not - if the proposition just is the propositional sign - and this has the advantage of
not presupposing another reality to the proposition - how do we explain equivalence
in propositional signs?

could it be that the propositional sign gives a meaning - which is then approximated
by other signs - other sign languages

that is to say meaning is an outcome of the sign an effect if you like - not a
presupposition to it

the approximation by other signs -

or is it indeed that a different sign is a different proposition - one based as it happens
on the original propositional sign?

the advantage of this view is that we do away with synonymy


4.014. A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the soundwaves,
all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between
language and the world.

They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.

Like the two youths in the fairy tale, their two horses, and their lilies. They are in a
certain sense one.


here again the idea of the proposition as an underlying unity that propositional signs
represent perhaps reflect

the proposition as something other than its signs

this is OK here - but is the position being put a radical scepticism?

i.e. that the proposition is unknown -

that it is real - independent of its signs - and unknown?

I don't see how this position can be avoided

except to say that there is no distinction between a proposition and its sign

the sign is the proposition

the argument is that the record the musical idea the sound waves the written notes
stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between
language and the world

the musical event is just all the elements given - these elements make the event

and so the logical elements of a proposition make up the picture of the world given in
the proposition

'They are all in a certain sense one'


you can argue that any multiplicity is in a certain sense one if you assume what you
are talking about - the series you are considering is an expression of a deeper unity

it is the argument for essence

and of course it follows once essence is assumed

Wittgenstein I think wants to say here there is an essence to propositions

the problem with such an idea is that it means nothing unless you can say what this
essence is

in this context you need to propose a propositional form that is essential to any
proposition

the proposal of such amounts to what?

a proposition

is this proposition this essential proposition an instance of itself?

what could we make of such an idea?

that a proposition can make a statement about itself?

re: 3.332


4.0141. There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the
symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from
the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score
again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to
be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that law is the law of projection
which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for
translating this language into the language of gramophone records.


what is the symphony here?

the law of projection enables us to project the symphony into the language of musical
notation and to translate this language into the language of gramophone records

the symphony can be described in various ways

and the different languages - i.e. the notation of the score or the notation of the
physics of the gramophone recording

there are other possibilities here i.e. could not the symphony be described in terms of
the neutral patterns of those hearing it - perhaps so -

these are interchangeable languages - one can be translated into the other

again it seems as if the idea of an essence is at the back of this

that essence is what is being translated

anyway the point is really isn't that any language will be in its own terms complete

but no language will completely describe the phenomenon

that no phenomenon is ever exhausted by description or even multiple descriptions

even if we drop talk of essence - we still face the fact that what is being described is in
a final sense - unknown

this is not to say it is unreal - just that it can never be uniquely determined by
description - by language

whatever picture we have is only a picture - not the picture

the individual picture may well be adequate within its own terms -

but this is to say adequacy is particular and not universal

the law of projectibility is a bit of a stretch

the symphony is not projected by this law into musical notation

the symphony is described - it is what humans do

the symphony itself we can say is a description in music

we then reflect on this and give further account

again the phenomenon is never exhausted by reflection

we never reach an end point - an essence

the symphony finally is beyond description


4.015. The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is
contained in the logic of depiction.


the logic of depiction is just another description - another language

the possibility of imagery can be so described

the possibility of imagery though is not the only description


4.016. In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider
the hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes.

And alphabetic script developed out of it without losing what was essential to
depiction.


what is it to depict?

well it is to reflect upon and to propose on the basis of the reflection - it is to propose
the reflection in a sensible form (a form that can be made sense of)


4.02. We can see this from the fact that we understand the sense of a propositional
sign without its having been explained to us.


the capacity to understand is given in the relation of consciousness to the non-
conscious reality

a propositional sign represents this relation

why this should be the case is not something we can determine - it is simply the fact
of it - the reality of consciousness in the world.

consciousness expresses itself in the non-conscious dimension

this expression is language

sense is identified in markings

the possible range of propositional sign language is defined by the action of the
organism


4.021. A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know
the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had
its sense explained to me.


sense is not explained - sense is identified

the explanation of the meaning of a proposition is a matter of placing it in a
propositional context

what is known is the propositional fact

the propositional fact is a proposal for knowledge

as such it is open to question - further reflection - propositional refinement

knowledge is the imagined end point of propositional endeavour

knowledge as a basis for action is decided by need and circumstance


4.022. A proposition shows its sense.

A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.


A proposition represents the relation of the consciousness and the non-conscious

it represents it specifically

a proposition does not show this relation

on an apparent level - the proposition shows how things stand and says that they do so
stand

this however is the appearance of the proposition - it is what is seen

the nature of the proposition is deeper than it appears


4.023. A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no.

In order to do that, it must describe reality completely.

A proposition is a description of a state of affairs.

Just as a description of an object describes it by giving its external properties, so a
proposition describes reality by its internal properties.

A proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding, so that one can
actually see from the proposition how everything stands logically if it is true.

One can draw inferences from a false proposition.


a proposition has an internal an external dimension

the internal dimension is its logic - the external its sign

just as we can analyze the world dimensionally - i.e. conscious and non-conscious -
internal and external

so too the proposition is analyzable in terms of its dimensions

the proposition as such is the world represented

the world here as the unity of dimensions - as a unity

the sign of a proposition is its physicality

the logic of a proposition is its consciousness


NB.


I think the position I am coming to is that we need to drop talk of 'the' proposition in
the sense of something that exists independently of its signs

the proposition just is the propositional sign

as a consequence of this view there is no translation

a so called translated proposition is a separate proposition

it comes about as a result of reflection on the initial propositional sign

the fact of different languages is a reflection of the indeterminacy of consciousness

we speak with many tongues

different languages serve different purposes

a proposition (propositional sign) can become an object for consciousness

it's interpretation - if that is needed - is a question of utility - the need to use it in a
different context

that context determines that another proposition - based on the initial proposition is
needed -

in short the context - the task - determines the language to be used

the relation between the two propositions will be the subject of a third proposition

the two may be seen to be connected in any number of ways - as indeed any two
things can be if so conceived

the issue then even here at this level of the argument is not one of synonymy

it is the issue of connectedness - if it is an issue at all


p.s.


logic is the theory of sign patterns in languages

a logical language - a theory of logical signs - is a notation that displays any such
theory

and the general point is that logic - like any other language is a response to whatever
need - it has no special status at all

where logic is the response to the need for patterns that relate different sign languages
- logic functions as a meta language

there is no fundamental language - out of which all languages come

the capacity to generate languages is an open capacity

it is a direct consequence of consciousness' indeterminacy -

different languages for different purposes


4.024. To understand the proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.

(One can understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.)

It is understood by anyone who understands its constituents.


(a)


to understand the proposition is to see the possibility of its truth

a proposition can never be finally known to be true

its truth is always a matter of speculation

we have established modes of speculation i.e. - science - in which truth is decided as a
matter of necessity for action - and so the decision to proceed is made - truth is
assumed

this is action in the absence of knowledge -

in the context of the proposition and whatever understandings have been decided on


(b)


a proposition proposes a state of affairs or indeed what is not a state of affairs

the truth or falsity of it depends on how the world is and whether we can in fact
determine how the world is relative to the proposition

the proposal of the proposition is based on reflective consciousness - that is the
proposition is (before its proposal) a reflection -

the understanding is given at this level - the level of reflection

the putting of the reflection in a public form - a physical form is to reflect back to the
world

understanding on a basic level is consciousness active

analysis of the constituents of the proposition is the breaking down of the proposition
to it components

the proposition as a whole is what is understood - if you then analyze it into its parts -
what you will see is your understanding in parts

the proposition gives meaning to its constituents

the correct relation is deductive not inductive


4.025. When translating one language into another, we do not proceed by translating
each proposition of the one into the other, but merely by translating the constituents of
propositions.

(And the dictionary translates not only substantives, but also verbs, adjectives and
conjunctions, etc.; and it treats then all the same way.)


yes the business of translation does require that one understand what each constituent
of a proposition means - this is presumed

how one translates really depends on one's facility with the languages in question -
that is a fluent user may well translate proposition to proposition


4.026. The meanings of simple signs (words) must be explained to us if we are to
understand them.

With propositions, however, we make ourselves understood.


a proposition is a constructed expression

it cannot be assumed that we make ourselves understood with propositions

a proposition can present a possibility for understanding

understanding is not the only use of propositions i.e. a proposition may be deigned to
confuse or deceive

the purpose a proposition is not necessarily revealed

we infer from propositions to intentions


4.027. It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate
a new sense to us.


a new sense comes with a new propositional presentation

that is the new sense is relative to whatever the old sense was - relative to other
propositional presentations - presentations that have preceded it

sense is thus here - propositional relative


4.03. A proposition must use old expressions to communicate a new sense.

A proposition communicates a sense to us, and so it must be essentially connected
with the situation.

And connection is precisely that it is its logical picture.

A proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture.


(a)


what is put in a proposition is a logical picture and the proposal of the picture (i.e. that
it represents a situation)

therefore the proposition is more than a logical picture - it is also a proposal of
relation

the connection is the proposal of relation - the connection is said to exist if the relation
proposed actually holds - otherwise no connection

the relation is not essential it is contingent

so there are two elements to a proposition - its picture and its proposal

the adequacy of it's picture is tied up with whether or not its proposal is correct

the question of relation of the picture to the situation is rarely clear cut and is therefore
usually the subject of supplementary propositions

truth or falsity here has to do with adequacy

adequacy in turn is tied to practice - the use of the proposition

a proposition may be adequate on one level of view - and not on others

again it depends on what purpose it is put to

also the idea of a proposition's use - the task it is to be put to the service of - is not
always as clear as one may initially think -

e.g. - we may begin with a vague notion and in light of the proposition and the
question of its relation realize that the initial idea needs to be clarified

the proposal of a proposition depends on the adequacy of the picture for its truth


(b)


what a proposition states is actually a proposal of relation - it is that a relation exists
between its picture and a situation

are we then to say the proposal of the proposition includes itself (its picture)?

yes

the proposition proposes a relation between itself and a situation

if so a proposition is thus not simply a statement

Wittgenstein I think wants to say the picture of the proposition is both its simple
picture and the picture of the relation between the simple picture and that pictured

so a picture of a state of affairs and a picture of the relation of that picture and the
state of affairs

clearly if the proposition is to relate to the world - it must be related

now is this done by the proposition itself - i.e. - it relates itself?

or might it be that the relation of picture to situation is in fact a separate proposition
that has as its relata the initial proposition and the situation?

if so this would mean that any bone fide proposition is not just a simple statement -
but is rather a complex of propositions

the complex proposition is one that relates the simple proposition to the world -

and a relational proposition must contain the basic proposition to be related?

so what do we say here?

that a proposition is a function -

and that the function is that it relates a basic statement to a state of affairs?


4.031. In a proposition a situation is, as it were, constructed by way of experiment.

Instead of, 'This proposition has such and such a sense', we can say simply, 'This
proposition represents such and such a situation'.


if a proposition is a function that relates a basic statement and a situation - then the
proposition does more than represent such and such a situation

(such and such a situation here may be a trap - it could mean anything)

what I am getting at is the proposition represents the relation between the basic
statement and the situation

in this sense what it represents is over and above either the basic statement or the
situation

it represents a third reality - that which is the relation between


4.0311. One name stands for one thing, another for another thing, and they are
combined with one another. In this way the whole group - like a tableau vivant -
presents a state of affairs.


yes we can analyze a proposition into signs and that signified - but the proposition is
more than this - it is to propose a relation between the statement and that signified

the state of affairs is not just a simple picture of that pictured

the state of affairs - if we are to still use this phrase is the relation between sign and
signified

the fact of the proposition is this proposal - proposal of relation

if the proposition is true - we say that the relation holds

and this relation is like the relation of the conscious and the non-conscious - a state of
affairs that is over and above both dimensions

it is to acknowledge the fact of unity

we do not there by describe the unity

we can only point to it

it is that which transcends both the subjective and objective dimensions

it is not thereby out of this world

to think so is to make the mistake that leads to non-natural realities

it is an easy mistake to make

a slip on the ice

and with a fall into spiritualism

any fall of this nature really comes from holding too tight to the rails

strictly speaking reality has no definition - if you imagine it does and invest fully in
this idea you are likely to come unstuck

best to regard whatever it is as all that it is

to start proposing alternative realities solves no problems - it just clutters up the room

it's like having to do whatever you have to do - again and again and again

Oakum could be said to have seen the futility of this


4.0312 The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs
as their representatives.

My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there
can be no representatives of the logic of facts.


in the unified as distinct from the analyzed reality yes objects have signs as their
representative

(in a non-conscious world this would not be so)

in the external reality there is no possibility

possibility is given to it in consciousness

the unified field of the conscious and non conscious is logical space

it is where possibility engages with the actual (the non-possible)

it is the space that allows for negation - conjunction - disjunction - particularity and
universality -

these possibilities are possibilities in the unified field

this is the reason why there is no representatives of logical facts

in the unified reality there is nothing to be represented

it is not representational

it is strictly speaking purely a logical construct

this is not to say that it is not real - it is very real

but it cannot be represented as such -

therefore not known representationally

it can be analyzed - and its dimensions represented - but not the unified field

we have to understand the unified field as essentially functional

logical constants are as it were the inhabitants of this world

the action of this world is their function


4.032. It is only in so far as a proposition is logically articulated that it is a picture of a
situation.

(Even the proposition, 'Ambulo', is composite: for its stem with a different ending
yields a different sense, and so does its ending with a different stem)


to understand the possibilities of the proposition 'Ambulo' is to articulate its logic

the picture of a situation is its logic

this suggests that a logical picture is not a picture at all - in the sense of a
representation - that it is rather something like a statement of possibility - or
possibilities - given in a proposition

image I think would be irrelevant to such a picture - it would be like the colouring in
of a figure in a colouring book

or do we say the image is there in outline - as what is not in the logical picture?


4.04 In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the
situation it represents.

The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) multiplicity. (Compare Hertz's
Mechanics on dynamical models.)


is it that there are these parts and a correlation or that on reflection we view the
situation in this way - we make it like this - i.e. we create a grammar - a logic - that
reflects this principle - makes it so?


4.041. This mathematical multiplicity, of course, cannot itself be the subject of
depiction. One cannot get away from it when depicting.


what we depict is already defined mathematically - the mathematics underlies the
depiction


4.0411. If, for example, we wanted to express what we now write as '(x).fx' by putting
an affix in front of 'fx' - for instance by writing 'Gen. fx' - it would not be adequate: we
should not know what was being generalized. If we wanted to signalize it with an
affix 'g' - for instance by writing 'f(xg)' - that would not be adequate either: we should
not know the scope of the generality sign.

If we were to try to do it by introducing a mark into the argument places - for instance
by writing

'G, G). F(G,G)'

- it would not be adequate: we should not be able to establish the identity of variables.
And so on.

All these modes of signifying are inadequate because they lack the necessary
mathematical multiplicity.

OK the point is that a notation without the capacity to represent mathematical
multiplicity is not adequate to the task of signifying


4.0412. For the same reason the idealist's appeal to 'spatial spectacles' is inadequate to
explain the seeing of spatial relations, because it cannot explain the multiplicity of
these relations


a one dimensional sign language will not recognize the multiplicity of relations


4.05. Reality is compared with propositions.


the idea that we compare reality with propositions in the way you might put a picture
of a bowl of fruit beside a bowl of fruit is quite naive

a proposition is a construction of reality as well as a representation of it

the reality of the proposition defines what you look for outside of the proposition

the proposition is true if what it pictures is what is pictured

the 'what is pictured' I suggest is a function of the proposition - that is it is determined
by the proposition

the point being a proposition relates - the basic statement and the situation

it states that one reflects the other

how are we to decide if this is so?

it is finally a question of looking

of looking to see if the proposition adequately states what is observed

it is not the event that is in question it is the proposition - its adequacy

this is to take up a position of judgement

it is as it were to step outside -

to review the proposition and the event - and the proposed relation

the question of the relation is thus the subject of a further propositional analysis

the initial proposition - is only resolved in subsequent propositions

where you stop this project is not a matter of logic - rather practice


4.06. A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.


any valid (well formed) proposition will be a picture of reality.

any proposition can be true - it's a question of fit

it is a question of where and when the proposition is put

a proposition can be true in one set of circumstances and false one step latter

so to get your proposition right you need to have the world organized first


4.061. It must not be overlooked that a proposition has a sense that is independent of
the facts: otherwise one can easily suppose that true and false are relations of equal
status between signs and what they signify.

In that case one could say, for example, that 'p' signified in the true way what '~p'
signified in a false way, etc.


the sense of a proposition is just the possibility of its truth or falsity

that is 'p' and can be affirmed or denied - it is the case that 'p' - it is not the case that
'p'

~p is the denial of p - it is not to assert a false state of affairs


4.062. Can we not make ourselves understood with false propositions just as we have
done up to now with true ones? - So long as it is known that they are meant to be
false. - No! For a proposition is true if we use it to say that things stand in a certain
way, and they do; and if by 'p' we mean ~p and things stand as we mean that they do,
then, constructed in the new way, 'p' is true and not false.


if p = ~p then p is true and not false


4.0621. But it is important that the signs 'p' and '~p' can say the same thing. For it
shows that nothing in reality corresponds to the sign '~'.

The occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characterize its sense
(~~p = p).

The propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one
and the same reality.


p asserts that 'p' '~p' denies 'p'

p asserts a state of affairs ~p assets that p is false

-p does not assert that the state of affairs asserted by 'p' does not exist

so yes the propositions 'p' and '~p' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them
one and the same reality


4.063. An analogy to illustrate the concept of truth: imagine a black spot on white
paper: you can describe the shape of the spot by saying, for each point on the sheet,
whether it is black or white. To the fact that a point is black there corresponds a
positive fact, and to the fact that a point is white (not black), a negative fact. If I
designate a point on a sheet (a truth value according to Frege) then this corresponds to
the supposition that is put forward for judgement, etc. etc.

But in order to be able to say a point is black or white, I must first know when a point
is called black, when white: in order to be able to say. "'p" is true (or false)', I must
have determined in what circumstances I call 'p' true, and in so doing I determine the
sense of the proposition.

Now the point where the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate a point on the
paper even if we do not know what black or white are, but if a proposition has no
sense, nothing corresponds to it, since it does not designate a thing (a truth value)
which might have properties called 'false' or 'true'. The verb of a proposition is not 'is
true' or 'is false', as Frege thought: rather that which 'is true' must already contain the
verb.


a black spot on a white paper - you can't actually refer to white spots - so there is no
basis to the idea of a negative fact

to say 'p' is true is not to make an ontological claim - it is to decide whether a
proposition is to function as a basis for going forward either in thought or action

a false proposition is a dead end to thought and action

there is the view that - knowing 'when the point is called black' - that is when the
proposition applies - and thus when you may call the proposition true - determines its
sense

this is to confuse sense with truth value

the conditions under which a proposition applies or is true or false say nothing about
its sense

the proposition must have sense to begin with in order to be true or false

the second point is 'is true' is not the verb of a proposition as Frege argued but rather
that the assertion of the proposition is the assertion of its truth


4.064. Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be given a sense by
affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is affirmed. And the same applies to
negation. etc.

yes - there is no bedrock of truth or abyss of falsity - that a proposition refers to

the world is neither true nor false -

we make assertions and we have to decide whether these assertion have value

(how we decide that is up for grabs really)

if we decide yes - then the assertion is held to be true - if no - false

if yes - it is usable - if no - it is not of use


4.0641. One could say that negation must be related to the logical place determined by
the negated proposition.

The negating proposition determines a logical place different from that of the negated
proposition.

The negating proposition determines a logical place with the help of the logical place
of the negated proposition. For it describes it as lying outside the latter's logical place.

The negated proposition can be negated again, and this in itself shows that what is
negated is already a proposition, and not merely something that is preliminary to a
proposition.


negation is an action (performed on propositions) - not the name of a logical place

that is negation - does not refer


4.1. Propositions represent the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.


in a general sense the proposition is any proposal about how the world is -
this can include proposals about the relation of propositions to propositions

it can also include statements about the nature of propositions

the status we give to our intellectual endeavours is as much a part of how the world is
as the laws of physics

the fact that we reflect is a fact of the world -

propositions are our most robust form of reflection

they are and can be subjects of this reflective capacity -

this is to give an open definition of 'states of affairs' - to include what ever occurs and
wherever it occurs

a proposition can indeed be a reflection of the existence or non-existence of a state of
affairs

this is the simplest form of proposition


4.11. The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole
corpus of the natural sciences).


the propositions of natural science are propositions that reflect the non-conscious
dimension of reality

truth is not a one dimensional issue

that is it is not just an issue of observable reality

the question of truth also applies in the domain of the non-observable

meta propositions or propositions designed to form the basis of our thinking about the
empirical world - are also subject to the question of truth

truth needs to understood for what it is - the decision to proceed

we make this decision not only in regard to empirical propositions

but also in relation to non-empirical propositions


4.111. Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.

(The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the
natural sciences, not beside them)


it is a question really of where you draw the line between natural and non-natural

if by natural you mean only that which can be observed - you have a one dimensional
view of nature

this is to equate natural with observable

does it not make more sense to say everything that occurs - observable and non-
observable alike falls within the parameters of the natural world?

if so then the issue is not that philosophy is not within the parameters of the natural -
it is rather how does the activity of philosophy relates to the activity of so called
natural science?

the answer is simple - wherever there is critical thinking there is philosophy

philosophy would thus be seen to be at the heart of science - as it is at the heart of any
human endeavour

those who engage in philosophy as a separate study - are just intensively engaged in
the activity

the conceptions that they put forward - the metaphysical systems - are developed and
comprehensive visions of the world

everyone inherits this wealth


4.112. Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.


Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

A philosophical work consists of elucidations.

Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the
clarification of propositions.

Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were cloudy and indistinct; its task is to make
them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.


philosophy is not a body of doctrine - nor for that matter is science - doctrine is the
standard for non-critical forms of thought

when is an elucidation a verb and when is it a noun - and does it matter?

philosophical theories are generally the results of critical analyses

philosophical propositions are proposals for rational thought in whatever area of
human endeavour is being examined

the clarification that philosophy offers human activities is never value free - that is it
comes from within metaphysical systems - and these clarifications are never without
question - they too may be the subject of clarifications

a thought does not exist in some meta vacuum - philosophical analysis - is about the
nature scope and foundation of thought

all this is brought to bear when a proposition is as it were made clear and given sharp
boundaries -

philosophy is not a surface activity - it is not like cleaning a window - it is rather like
understanding the structure substance and foundation of the whole building -

the desire to see philosophy as a surface activity - to present it as a study of the surface
of things is metaphysically perverse

it is based on the false assumption that the surface is epistemologically clear - and also
it comes from a failure of nerve in regard to the problem of consciousness

ultimately it has to do with the fear of scepticism


4.121. Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural
science.

Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.

Does not my study of sign language correspond to the study of thought process, which
philosophers used to consider so essential to the philosophy of logic? Only in most
cases they got entangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my
method too there is an analogous risk.


the question of the nature of knowledge - is central to any claim to knowledge

epistemology is not the study of thought processes

epistemology is the inquiry into the nature of any claim to knowledge

an epistemological claim can be discussed without any reference to thought processes


4.1122. Darwin's theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis
in natural science.


it has been argued by Popper that Darwin's theory is not an empirical theory -
therefore not an hypothesis in natural science

be that as it may it is clear that given such a dispute philosophical analysis has a
crucial bearing on just how we are to regard Darwin's theory i.e. is it a theory of
science - or rather a non-empirical theory masquerading as science - is it science or is
it myth?


4.113. Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of the natural science.


in philosophy we have various proposals - various propositions - if you will - for how
to view the world - these are designed to be comprehensive world views

this is the idea central to metaphysics

the very fact of this diversity suggests that no one view decides the issue (if indeed the
issue can be stated uncontraversially in the first place)

what philosophical work illustrates is the possibility of different views of the one
reality

that there is no one view of reality entitles us to question the basis of any proposal

we can regard this state of affairs as reason for despair - but only if we hold to the idea
that there is one resolution to the problem of reality

to accept in a positive manner the sceptical conclusion is to understand and embrace a
metaphysical freedom

this is the origin of courage


4.114. It must set limits to what can be thought; and in doing so, what cannot be
thought.

It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be
thought.


what cannot be thought is what is not thought

as to the status of what is thought (whatever that is) that is a matter for thought

thought thinking itself

this is thought working inwards through what is thought


4.115. It will signify what cannot be said, by presenting clearly what can be said.


what can be said is what is said - what cannot be said is what is not said

philosophy does not signify either

philosophical analysis may provide any number of theories about what is said

i.e. it may put forward a theory of the logic of what is said or indeed a theory of the
epistemology of what is said - or many such theories -

philosophers may categorize what is said and try to argue that some things said make
no sense - and that indeed some forms of saying are meaningless

the point of such theories is to be found in their history


4.116. Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can
be put into words can be put clearly.


if this was so there would be no philosophy

and secondly who has a clear incontrovertible theory of clarity?

surely we must be clear about clarity if we are to assume it is universally applicable?

thirdly who is to say that clarity is always desirable?


4.12. Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what
they must have is common with reality in order to able to represent it - logical form.

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station
ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.


what propositions have in common with reality is reality

propositions express reality - reality is expressed by propositions

expression is not something separate from reality

expression is reality reflected - therefore a mode of reality

(what we are talking about here is human reality)

if you like reality reflected in consciousness

and this same reality reflected in a propositional form

we can describe the proposition in terms of logical form -

logical form is a way of expressing the proposition - it is a theory of the proposition

what is common to reality and its modes?

this is to ask a question like what is common to a man and his actions?

whatever we say here is manufactured - some kind of essentialist argument

what you need to ask is - is there any need to ask such a question?


4.121. Propositions cannot represent logical form; it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.

What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.

Propositions show the logical form of reality.

They display it.


what is the difference between a mirror image and a representation?

what language reflects is what it represents - what this is may well be finally unknown

what is in language just is what is expressed by it

propositions express logical form

how logical form is further described is another matter

the external dimension of reality is reality displayed - displayed to consciousness


4.1211. Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occupies in its sense, two
propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is mentioned in both of them.

If two propositions contradict one another, then their structure shows it; the same is
true if one of them follows from the other. And so on.


the signs of propositional logic show the structure of propositions


4.1212. What can be shown, cannot be said.


what is at stake here is the limits of language - the limits of saying

no a priori argument will settle it - what can be said is what is said -

and furthermore saying is indeed a form of showing - so the contradistinction fails


4.1213. Now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a sign-language in
which everything is all right, we already have a correct logical point of view.


in the end a correct logical point of view may just be a decision to take a particular
view and hold to it

it is finally really a question of the point of the sign language - what services it will
perform


4.122. In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of
affairs, or in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about
formal relations and structural relations.

(Instead of 'structural property' I also say 'internal property'; instead of 'structural
relation', 'internal relation'.

I introduce these expressions in order to indicate the source of the confusion between
internal relations and relations proper (external relations), which is very widespread
among philosophers.)

It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal
properties and relations obtain; rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions
that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.


propositions only assert external properties and relations - that is they only refer to the
surface characteristics of states of affairs and objects

internal relations are manifest in the propositions that represent the external features

internal relations are characteristics of propositions - the internal characteristics of
propositions

another way of putting this is to say what is essential to a thing is not asserted in a
proposition about that thing (only its external properties and relations are asserted)
however its essential properties and relations (internal properties and relations) can be
shown or displayed in the logic of any proposition about that thing

the assertion of a proposition refers to its external dimensions - it's logic refers to in
internal dimension

the proposition is in this sense what I would call two dimensional

and so a proposition can be said to represent the world -

and by this is meant the unified field of the conscious and the non-conscious - the
internal reality and the external reality

the proposition reflects this unity


4.1221. An internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that fact (in the
sense in which we speak of facial features, for example).


a characteristic that is of the nature of an object - one you might say is suggested by
what is observed as being in the object


4.123. A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it.

(This shade of blue and that one stand, eo ipso, in the internal relation of lighter to
darker. It is unthinkable that these two should not stand in this relation)

(Here the shifting use of the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use of the words
'property' and 'relation'.)


it is clear here that 'internal property' is meant to be an essential characteristic of a
thing

this is all very well but such an idea depends on the notion of an essential view of the
thing - and this in turn on the view that we can or do view from an essential position

isn't the point of science just that no such position can be held?

that the characteristics of an object are never finally determined - that all
characteristics are non-essential - that what an object is - that what we ascribe to it is
determined by i.e. what place it has in what conceptual scheme and by what we are
doing with it - that is how it is to function - given how it is conceived?

we can extract properties from objects and speak of them in absolute terms - but this
is not to say anything about how things actually are


NB.


my basic idea is that the world can be understood in terms of its dimensions - the
internal dimension of consciousness the external dimension of the non-conscious - the
physical - and that the unity of these dimensions the unified field - is unknown
as I have interpreted Wittgenstein idea of the proposition - the proposition can be said
to represent the world - the unified field - and yes the proposition like the world it
represents can be seen to have an external and an internal dimension - that which is
asserted is the proposition's external dimension - its internal dimension as that which
is shown - these descriptions - assertion and display are Wittgenstein's terms - this all
fits rather well - but the crucial point that I wish to make is that the proposition as
such is like the world (the unified field) it represents and is an expression of - it is an
unknown - what we are talking about when we refer to the assertion of the proposition
and the display or showing of the proposition are dimensional characteristics - the
proposition as a unified entity is not characterizable - in this connection I would with
apologies to Wittgenstein - rewrite the second paragraph of 4.12. as - 'Inorder to
know - to see the proposition as a unified entity, we should have to be able to station
ourselves outside the world.'


4.124. the existence of an internal property of a possible situation is not expressed by
means of a proposition: rather it expresses itself in the proposition representing the
situation, by means of an internal property of that proposition.

It would be just as non-sensical to assert that a proposition had a formal property as to
deny it.


the internal property of a situation is expressed by means of an internal property of the
proposition -

OK - what is internal to a situation in a logical sense is expressed internally

the internal property - that expresses itself?

is it put this way because the argument is that the proposition doesn't express the
internal property?

the question being then - how is the internal property expressed? -

an internal property expressing itself - isn't this really to say the property is not
expressed -

perhaps it is shown to be there - or is it that it can be seen to be there?

expressing itself -


and then the view that to assert that a proposition has a formal property is as non-
sensical as to claim it doesn't - the point being propositions are not the kind of things
that the notion of formal property applies to -

propositions express formal properties but they do not have them?

again - formal properties 'express themselves' in propositions - I wonder if there is
anything else they express themselves in?


4.1241. It is impossible to distinguish forms from one another by saying that one has
this property an another that property: for this presupposes that it makes sense to
ascribe either property to either form.


all properties per se are external


4.125. The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses
itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions
representing them.


internal relations between situations expresses themselves by means of the internal
relations of propositions


4.1251. Here we have the answer to the vexed question 'whether all relations are
internal or external'.


external relations are expressed by propositions

internal relations are expressed by means of the internal relations between
propositions

it is a distinction between what a proposition expresses - and what can be
demonstrated when a proposition's logic is displayed

internal relations are as it were hidden in the propositional form -

in the assertion of the proposition - all that is asserted are external relations

OK this is neat and essentially realistic -

putting it roughly - what is internal to a thing is internal to the proposition that asserts
that thing -

now this is really an argument about how things are expressed

the fact is they are - one way or another

does it still makes sense to say an internal property is not expressed by means of the
proposition?

isn't this really too narrow a definition of expression?

could we say instead that the proposition is not fully revealed in its ordinary
expression - in its statement

we can in fact go deeper than this -

perhaps what is expressed externally and internally - is despite the definitiveness of
the signs that express it - and the logical signs that can be displayed in its logical
analysis - really epistemologically never fully determined

do we ever know - apart from a decision to know - what the signs signify?

the propositional sign is never anything more than a proposal to operate in a certain
way - which is to see in a certain way - be that what we might term veridical - or from
some other stand point - metaphysical standpoint -

so - a proposition represents what?

a proposal for reality -

a proposal for what is ultimately unknown -

the point is that to deal with it - the unknown - we need to propose - it - as known

propositions propose a state of affairs - propose that reality is known - this way they
form a basis for other propositions - for actions

the final truth though is what a proposition represents is the unknown


4.1252. I call a series that is ordered by means of internal relation a series of forms.

The order of the number series is not governed by an external relation.

The same is true of the series of propositions

'aRb'
'($x):aRx.xRb'

'($x,y):aRx.xRy.yRb'
and so forth.

(If b stands in one of these relations to a, I call b a successor of a.)


any series ordered purely by logic (an internal relation) is a series of forms
the ordering by the internal relation is what determines forms - forms are what is
ordered -


4.126. We can now talk about formal concepts, in the same sense that we can speak of
formal properties.

(I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between
formal concepts and concepts proper, which pervades the whole of traditional logic.)

When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be
expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this
proposition. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it
signifies a number, etc.)

Formal concepts cannot, in fact, be represented by means of a function, as concepts
proper can.

For their characteristics, formal properties, are not expressed by means of functions.

The expression for a formal property is a feature of certain symbols.

So the sign for the characteristics of a formal concept is a distinctive feature of all
symbols whose meanings fall under the concept.

So the expression for a formal concept is a propositional variable in which this
distinctive feature alone is a constant.


when something falls under a formal concept - this is not expressed by a proposition -
it is shown by the sign for the proposition - a sign for a number signifies the number

a formal concept - i.e. the concept of number is not represented by a function -
however that which falls under it - a concept proper i.e. - a number ('1') can be -

formal properties are not represented by functions - formal properties are expressed
symbolically - that is they are shown

the sign for a formal concept is characteristic of all symbols (i.e. words) whose
meanings fall under that concept - i.e. it represents that concept -

a propositional variable (i.e. 'p') expresses the formal concept -


4.127. The propositional variable signifies the formal concept, and its values signify
the objects that fall under the concept.


i.e. - 'p' signifies the formal concept and the values of 'p' (that is its possible
representations) signify the objects that fall under the concept


4.1271. Every variable is a sign for a formal concept.

For every variable represents a constant form that all its values posses, and this can be
regarded as a formal property of those values.


in logic a variable stands for a formal concept - thus 'p' stands for a formal concept

'p' represents the constant form of all its possible formations (values) and as such is
regarded as the formal property of those representations (values)


4.1272. Thus the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object.

Wherever the 'object' ('thing', etc.) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual
notation by a variable name.

For example, in the proposition, 'There are 2 objects which.....', it is expressed by
'($x,y).....'.

Wherever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical,
pseudo-propositions are the result.

So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects' as one might say, 'There are
books'. And it is just as impossible to say, 'There are 100 objects', or, 'There are no
objects', or 'There are No objects'.

And it is nonsensical to speak of the total number of objects.

The same applies to the words 'complex', 'fact' 'function', 'number' etc.

They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by
variables, not by functions or classes (as Frege and Russell believed).

'I is a number', 'there is only one zero', and all similar expressions are nonsensical.

(It is just nonsensical to say, 'There is only one 1' as it would be to say, '2+2 at 3
0'clock equals 4').


formal concepts are not expressed in a proposition - they are shown - signed by
variable names (i.e. 'x')


NB.


a formal concept is of the internal dimension of a proposition - it is shown via a sign

propositions only refer to that which is external -

reference to such things a beauty or goodness is not possible - for these are pseudo
formal concepts - that is they do not signify external objects

to question this perspective - you need to query the notion of proposition that
underlies it -

is a proposition only that which pictures - the given - the external world?

it might be put that this is indeed a function of propositions - and that thus
propositions can be formed to fulfill that function -

the question is though - is this the only function of a proposition - and thus the only
type of a proposition?

the world is all that is the case

but what the case is - is not necessarily just what appears

if the question of the world is open - then the question of the proposition is not
decided

I don't know that we can say there is one type of proposition

what we can say is propositions reflect how we in fact think about the world and how
we act in relation to it - that is the many and varied responses to reality

a theory of propositions would reflect this diversity

OK - but could we still stick with a picture theory of propositions?

in this connection I have suggested that a proposition proposes

the idea of this view is that there is a type of proposition that proposes a reality

i.e. 'that flower is beautiful' - proposes beauty as a feature of the world - as a way of
speaking about the external world

beauty is proposed as an external - when in fact we really don't know what it is -

the thing is - it can and does function as an external

any picture here - therefore would be 'propositional' - that is proposed

it is to say a picture to be a picture must be proposed

and therefore that the 'picture' characterization of the proposition is a secondary
characterization

the proposition is primarily a proposal


4.12721. A formal concept is given immediately any object falls under it is given. It is
not possible therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects belonging to a formal
concept and the formal concept itself. So it is impossible for example, to introduce as
primitive ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions, as Russell does;
or the concept of a number and particular numbers.


a formal concept is given when an object that falls under it is given

yes I agree with this - though I would leave open the question of object - that is what
is to count as an object

it is the given-ness Wittgenstein suggests which makes it impossible to introduce
primitive ideas -

it is as if once the object appears the metaphysics is locked in

clearly Russell took a less claustrophobic view of the matter


4.1273. If we want to express in conceptual notation the general proposition, 'b is a
successor of a', then we require an expression for the general term of the series of
forms

aRb,
($x):aRx.xRb,
($x,y):aRx.aRy.yRb.
.... .

In order to express the general term of a series of forms, we must use a variable,
because the concept 'term of that series of forms' is a formal concept. (This is what
Frege and Russell overlooked: consequently the way in which they want to express
general propositions like the one above is incorrect; it contains a vicious circle.)

We determine the general term of a series of forms by giving its first term and the
general form of the operation that produces the next term out of the proposition that
precedes it.


yes the general term of the series of forms is a variable ('x') and we determine the
series suggested

'term of that series' - ('x') - is the underlying concept that defines the series - and is
therefore - a formal concept - a concept of the forms

succession is defined as the relation of 'a' and 'b' as terms of that series

'the series of forms' is a depiction of the proposition in logical sign


4.1274. To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical. For no proposition can
be the answer to such a question.

(So, for example, the question, 'Are there unanalysable subject-predicate
propositions?' cannot be asked.)


the formal concept in Wittgenstein's scheme it seems to me is the means by which we
can refer to what cannot be said - cannot that is be referred to

he puts that the inner life - (that which is not outside) can only be shown

language cannot refer to what is inside

we can depict it - in language - we cannot refer to it

still it seems to be overstating the matter to say we cannot ask if the formal concept
exists -

if it can be depicted it exists in some sense - (a depicted sense -)

what I don't get is why you can't say - OK - once depicted - the depiction can be
referred to

once depicted that is we have a public fact (the depiction)

therefore one calls into question this distinction - and its seems fundamental to his
argument between expression and depiction

what I have argued as a solution to this matter is that the proposition is neither an
external or for that matter internal form - that it represents the unity that is the world -
of which internality and externality are dimensions

so strictly speaking the proposition 'in itself' is not characterized -

(in Wittgenstein it is pinned to the external world - and I really doubt that there is any
true sense of internality in his concept - depiction - is really just another outward
expression)

on this view the proposition can be said to refer to the internal and external
dimensions of the unity it represents


NB.

some thoughts on the run -


(a) logical form


a proposition is a picture

what is common to the picture and the world it represents - is logical form

logical form we cannot say

it is the unknown

logical form cannot be expressed but it can be shown -

how can this be known?

how do we go from a logical analysis of proposition to logical form - that which the
proposition and the world have in common?

why should the logical analysis of proposition be - a display of logical form?


(b) the proposition


a proposition as an expression of the world

of the unity of the conscious and the non-conscious

any proposition expresses - this unity

therefore any proposition reflects this unity -

a proposition thus has an internal and external dimension

what does this mean?

the external - signs
the internal - sense

the relation between sign and sense?

sign the outside expression of sense

sense the inside of sign

the relation between the proposition and the world -

what the proposition expresses is the world - expressed in the proposition

(and what this is - is the subject of other - subsequent propositions)

if so - anything expressed reflects the world

the world is an open question - and is only given definition (form and content) in
propositions

propositions reveal the unknown


4.128. Logical forms are without number.


Hence there are no pre-eminent numbers in logic, and hence there is no possibility of
philosophical monism or dualism, etc.


number (as a noun) is the objectification of a term in an ordered series

outside of that series it has no meaning - that is the ordered series is always presumed

any talk of a number outside of such an ordered series is at best poetic

numbering is an operation of ordering - there are no numbers independent of this
operation

Liebnitz's notion of possible worlds suggests that worlds like any other series can be
numbered

again 'one' only has sense as the first member of an ordered series

'one' cannot have significance outside of a series

in so far as monism is just the view that there is no series - in so far as it involves
number - it is unstatable

we cannot speak of 'one' as independent of an ordered series

'one' can however apply given a theory of multiplicity

it might therefore be the resolution of such an argument - i.e. - there is no multiplicity

even so here we stop using number

the concept of number only applies - if you like given a series

or the possibility of ordering as a series

one might argue that monism and dualism are not are not theories of what is ordered

they are theories of substance

strictly speaking a theory of ordering (as number theory is) only applies given
something to order

if so theories of substance are theories of what there is to order

the question of the nature of that substance is not a question of number - it is a
different question

even so I think Wittgenstein has made a devastating argument here

if number theory does not apply to the question of substance - we cannot state any
such theory in terms of it

in so far as this is how such theories are stated - they are not possible theories

I like this argument

it is hard and comprehensive skepticism in relation to the question of substance

if we cannot state a theory of substance - we cannot know that there is substance - let
alone what it is

we cannot know


p.s.


monism and dualism (or pluralism) and indeed any other formulation of metaphysical
opposites - is the logic of consciousness (essentially x and ~x) reflected on - applied
to the world - the world as unknown - as the object of consciousness

what we have here is the argument of opposites

this is the argument of life

(its resolution is the unknown - the very point of its focus)


4.2. The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of
existence and non-existence of states of affairs.


a proposition is the logical space of a proposal

sense is what occupies that space

a proposed state of affairs characterizes the sense of a proposition

the proposition's sense is coloured by its agreement or disagreement with the existence
or non-existence of the proposed state of affairs

a proposal rendered false under the circumstances is withdrawn from action

agreement confirms - the proposal is reflected in the world outside itself

the world is enlightened by the proposition


4.21. The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition asserts the existence
of a state of affairs.


yes - but what 'a state of affairs' is here is always a matter beyond the proposition
asserted

that is - it is logically more correct to say a proposition asserts

if we are to call what it asserts 'a state of affairs' that is another matter - dependent on
considerations that go way beyond the proposition asserted

to say - 'an elementary proposition asserts the existence of a state of affairs' is to offer
a theory of the proposition

but as put here by Wittgenstein it appears as a definition


4.211. It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary
proposition contradicting it.


if so - an elementary proposition is always true - therefore it asserts nothing


4.22. An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of
names.


yes if the business of propositions is just the business of naming

this name theory of propositions suggests a straightforward one to one correspondence
of sign (name ) to object -

what is elementary is the way the matter is conceived

if it is assumed that the issue is like labeling - then yes it seems elementary

the real question is though - what in fact the name does?

does it somehow just reflect the object - or isn't it rather a making of - the giving of
content and form to the object -

if so naming is essentially problematic rather than elemental


4.221. It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary
propositions which consist of names in immediate combination.

This raises the question of how such combinations into propositions comes about.


indeed a proposition can be viewed in this way - we can decide to analyze it in such a
way

why you would proceed in this way depends on other considerations - philosophical
considerations - essentially about the nature of the world

hidden in any proposition - or waiting to be revealed is a complete (as far as this is
possible) picture of the world

a proposition cannot be fully appreciated unless its metaphysics is revealed

the fact of it is though - there is no unique metaphysical interpretation of the
proposition

the proposition lays itself open to the possibilities of thought

the proposition - in itself - if we can speak of it as an abstract - is empty

it is simply - elementally - a form - a proposal for logical space


4.2211. Even if the world is infinitely complex, so that every fact consists of infinitely
many states of affairs and every state of affairs is composed of infinitely many objects,
there would still have to be objects and states of affairs.


the argument being that the world consists of objects and states of affairs regardless of
its dimensions

the real truth here is that outside of consciousness we have nothing to say about the
world - it is ontologically unknown

but the thing is we are when we speak of the world - speaking of the human world -
consciousness in the world

it is clear that consciousness imposes categories of understanding

i.e.. consciousness objectifies

but you see what all this means is not without dispute

what categories we use to describe the world - i.e. 'object' 'state of affairs' - is finally
based on decision

decision to proceed - within some framework - and the framework used may be based
on whatever - its value is in terms of its utility - and even here we have no finality


4.23. It is only in the nexus of an elementary proposition that a name occurs in a
proposition.


this proposition raises some fundamental questions about the nature and the theory of
proposition

if I point and say 'red' - you would say 'red' is not occurring in a proposition - unless a
name by itself qualifies as a proposition

if my response to a question - 'what colour is that? - is the same as the first except that
it is non-verbal - is my pointing - propositional?

it raises the question - are we going to say that all propositions are verbal?

my gut feeling is no

that a logical space of sense can be made outside of language

the pointing in this case is the signing

so I guess I would argue all propositions - as in proposals - for this is my idea of the
proposition - are signed - verbally or non-verbally -

the Mona Lisa is I would argue is - logically speaking - a proposition

as is Mozart's Don Giovanni


4.24. Names are the simple symbols: I indicate them by single letters ('x','y','z').

I write elementary propositions as functions of names so that they have the form 'fx',
'f(x,y)', etc.

Or I indicate them by the letters 'p', 'q', 'r'.


an elementary proposition as a function of names - as in e.g. 'that book is red'

a name is what - or as more famously put - what's in a name?

really only a mark - syntax - and decision to have that sign function in a certain
manner

so is there any analysis here - or is it really just description in another language - i.e.
symbolic logic?

so what I am getting at here is that you could well just drop the term name - it really
has no significance - or its significance is not explained by it application?

the argument that it is just the elemental use of signs - yes perhaps

we decide to call such a sign a name - that's it

yes a 'rose' by any other name - would be any other name


4.241.When I use two signs with the same meaning, I express this by putting the sign
' = ' between them.

So 'a = b' means that sign 'b' can be substituted for the sign 'a'.

(If I use an equation to introduce a new sign 'b', laying down that it shall serve as a
substitute for a sign 'a' that is already known, then, like Russell, I write the equation -
definition - in the form 'a = b Def.' A definition is a rule dealing with signs.)


(a)


Wittgenstein thinks that the use of syntax avoids all the problems of semantics

the fact is once a sign is introduced synonymy is always finally a decision of
equivalence

that is equivalence of signs - meaning is always finally - regardless of sign equations -
irresolvable -

that is again - except by decision - by fiat - of one kind or another


(b)


signifying is an act of consciousness -

for all intents and purposes this is all we can say about it

language signifies the act - marks it

complex signs have an internal logic - they must have - that is in order to work as a
whole - as a proposition

(or perhaps this is how we must think about it)

the individual signs that make up a complex - a proposition - must if they are to
function relate or be related to each other

choice of language - and choice within language is pragmatic

if there are reasons to modify or even replace a sign - this can be done


(c)


the question of a logic to all languages - a common logic that is - is quite fascinating

on the face of it yes - if a language has an internal logic - then all language likewise
(it is the nature of the beast) - therefore the question - perhaps one underlying logic to
all languages?

yes and no

yes it does indeed make sense to see it this way

however we could never state any such logic

that is any proposal of this kind would be stated in a language -

if that language refers to itself - the theory of logic proposed can only apply to itself

a question - can language refer to itself - and still be a language?

only I think in Wonderland

if the theory of universal logic - being proposed - does apply to other languages - it
cannot be said to apply to the language it is proposed in

the point is we cannot step outside of language - any theory of language will be
internal

we have no way of knowing if a theory of logic applies to itself

we are best to see logic as a theory about how language works

to develop a theory about how logic works - we need another theory - another
description of signs - another language in effect - and so it goes on - languages
defining languages

the question of logic is only ever settled by fiat - a decision to stop - there is no natural
end to this process

this fact more than anything else gives us an insight into the essence of language - and
of consciousness

logic is without foundation


4.242. Expressions of the form 'a = b' are, therefore, mere representational devises.
They state nothing about the meaning of the signs 'a' and 'b'.


'a = b' if it is a 'mere representational' devise that states nothing about the meaning of
the signs a and b - the a and b represent what?

equivalence?

equivalence of what?

has to be meaning - otherwise there just isn't anything to represent

a representational devise - if it is such represents something

'the equivalence of'

the sign ' = ' signifies the synonymy of meaning of the signs either side of it

otherwise it means nothing

my general point is you cannot separate out representation from meaning

meaning (whatever you say this is) just is what is represented

otherwise the signs do not represent

and once put this way - it becomes clear - signs - just do represent

and so the question is always what?

and what that is - is perhaps never settled - hence different - even specialized
languages -

designed to come at the question of what - or substance if you like from different
angles

what signs represent is that we don't know

but this is not where we start - the process of understanding - or should I say
awareness -

it is rather where we end

and I should also say it is just where the natural and the mystic can be seen to be
equivalent

a logician is a Brahman in training


4.243. Can we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the same
thing or two different things? - Can we understand a proposition in which two names
occur without knowing whether their meaning is the same or different?

Suppose I know the meaning of the English word and of a German word that means
the same: then it is impossible for me to be unaware that they do mean the same; I
must be capable of translating each into the other.

Expressions like 'a = a' and those derived from them are neither elementary
propositions nor is there any other way in which they have sense. (This will become
evident later).


(a)


we can understand the function of two names - if they are given in a function

we can understand that the proposition's structure indicates reference

if I know two symbols mean the same - the translation is given in the statement of this
knowledge

translation here is really just substitution -

I don't think it can be any deeper than this - or have any real epistemological status -

it is really no more than placement - like a token on a board game


(b)


the expression 'a = a' can be regarded as a definition of equivalence

underlying this is of course the presupposition - unanalyzed - that equivalence is a
genuine concept - that can be deployed in our conceptual arrangements of the world

and what of equivalence itself?

if x = y then in some regard x is y

so a statement of equivalence is an existential statement in the broadest sense of this

if x = y then x and y are expressions of a unity that underlies even contradicts their
diversity

the nature of that unity is finally a question of the nature of existence

its essence if you like -

the answer to this (may I be so bold) is there is no essence

that existence - if you like simply is - 'its own' essence

we cannot go beyond existence in order to explain it

the best we can do is point to its manifestations - and assert equivalence

but it is an empty assertion

the sign ' =' may be held to represent everything

but it is a sign without content


(c)


in practice (as distinct from metaphysics) the expression 'a = b' asserts that a relation
that we use in our dealings with the world is equivalence

and really I suppose the logical definition of it - substitution - for practical purposes is
what it means

it's clear that if you have difference - you have equivalence - we use these concepts to
negotiate the world - nothing else really needs to be said than this (otherwise you end
up in the metaphysical dimension of my previous point)

we operate with these notions - and that may be all there is to logic


4.25. If an elementary proposition is true, the state of affairs exists; if an elementary
proposition is false, the state of affairs does not exist.


(a)


a state of affairs - is what?

a state of affairs is itself a description

the point being a state of affairs may be described variously - e.g. a physicist's
perspective of a table in a room - and his description in terms of atomic theory - will
be a different description to that of the visual artist - and that of the poet shall we say -
and all these different to what we would call a veridical account -

the point being any assertion will be judged against a perspective

therefore 'the state of affairs' is actually an open concept

description 1 we will say is true if it is consistent with perspective 1

2 with 2 and so forth

therefore any elementary proposition can in fact be true - if it is asserted within a
framework in which it is consistent

truth here is a matter of consistency within a theoretical framework

'the elementary proposition' like 'the state of affairs' is a question of perspective

how one views -

elementary propositions are not without possibilities - in fact an elementary
proposition is a point of possibility

a state of affairs is never determined - it can only be decided -

and strictly speaking the possibilities here are endless - hence the need simply to see
in a certain way - for whatever reason


(b)


I guess I want to say 'a state of affairs' is not beyond its description

there is nothing beyond what is described

any state of affairs can be described variously

a state of affairs really I suppose is the sum total of all possible descriptions

the world as the exhaustion of possibility


4.26. If all elementary propositions are given, the result is a complete description of
the world. The world is completely described by giving all elementary propositions,
and adding which of them are true and which are false.


the argument here is that an elementary proposition corresponds to a state of affairs

stating all true elementary propositions would on this view give a complete picture of
the world

the argument works if you accept that a state of affairs can be uniquely identified by
one and only one elementary proposition

this depends on the view that 'a state of affairs ' is a objectively determined - that is
that it can be described without any perspective - that is without any possibility of it
being viewed differently - that a state of affairs is in some sense fixed - and
independent of the observer

it also assumes that the place of the observer is fixed in eternity -

this must be rejected immediately - any 'complete description' can only be made at a
particular point of space and time

the argument would work if it made sense to speak of - all possible descriptions at all
times and at all places

even so we could still ask - what is being described?

that is we can always ask the objective question?

at this point it becomes clear that the answer is we do not know

what we can know at any point of time and place is that our description of 'x' - the
state of affairs - is valid given the terms of the perspective we bring to it

one way of seeing this is to say that the state of affairs does not determine the
description - rather the description determines the state of affairs - (in so far as
anything is determined) - and the description itself is never finally determined

(metaphysically speaking everything is in suspension)

that is the description of the state of affairs is one of a possible number

therefore 'the state of affairs' cannot be given outside of a description

if so the state of affairs just is the possibility of description

and by 'state of affairs' I mean here that which is known

if your idea of 'state of affairs' is that which is independent of knowledge - you are not
talking about anything that can be described

n n
4.27. For n state of affairs, there are Kn = S ( ) possibilities of existence and
v=0 v
non-existence.


Of these states of affairs any combination can exist and the remainder not exist.

what we can say is that what is described - defines what is not described
i.e. that which is outside of the terms or domain of the description

any description is a defining of reality - definition must determine what is and is not
included

the positive dimension of a definition is what our focus is directed to - it determines
what is

the negative is at least initially left inarticulate - it is the domain of what is not the
case

any proposition - a proposal for how to see the world - is a definition


4.28. There correspond to these combinations the same number of possibilities of
truth - and falsity - for n elementary propositions.


any elementary proposition is true or false relative to the description of the state
affairs it is placed against


4.3. Truth possibilities of elementary propositions mean possibilities of existence and
non-existence of states of affairs.


'states of affairs' I understand here as descriptions - on this view we are talking about
the proposal and use of descriptions


4.31. We can represent truth-possibilities by schemata of the following kind ('T' means
'true', 'F' means false; the rows of 'T's' and 'F's' under the row of elementary
propositions symbolize their truth-possibilities in a way that can be easily
understood):

p q r

T T T
F T T p q
T F T T T p
T T F ' F T' T .
F F T T F F
F T F F F
T F F
F F F


the above schemata does set out the truth possibilities -

the truth possibilities of combinations of elementary propositions

and this analysis is indeed useful for propositions of this kind - that is atomic
propositions


4.4. A proposition is an expression of agreement and disagreement with truth-
possibilities of elementary propositions


yes it can of course be analyzed this way - you can break it down in such a fashion

but really isn't it more to the point to say a proposition is a representational proposal -
a way of seeing the world

if it expresses anything it expresses a view of the world

its internal logic - the status of its elementary propositions - is not what is expressed

the truth of a proposition is not what the proposition expresses

its truth or falsity is the decision to use or not use the proposition


4.41. Truth possibilities of elementary propositions are the conditions of the truth or
falsity of propositions.


analyzing a proposition into its elements and assessing the truth or falsity of those
elements is a method for determining the truth or falsity of a proposition

the truth or falsity of a proposition is the decision to operate with it or not

a false proposition may of course have a utility - mistakes can be made - and indeed
intentions can be evil

here is the origin of man made suffering


4.411. It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction of elementary
propositions provides the basis for understanding all other kinds of proposition.
Indeed the understanding of general proposition palpably depends on the
understanding of elementary propositions.


is it not possible that a proposition could be true or false - quite independently of its
logical (grammatical) structure?

look I accept that at the end of the day we decide this issue - and the idea of the logic
of a proposition is an excellent proposal in this regard - but again there are no
guarantees

is the structure of a painting the structure of the piece of reality it depicts - we can
argue so - but how could this be settled?

Wittgenstein's answer is his theory of logical form - (4.12.) '...what they must have in
common with reality in order to represent it...'

and it is no more than the assertion that there is or must be something in common

his argument that this commonality is displayed in propositions - is rather ingenious

nevertheless it is no more than an assertion

why should logical syntax be representative of the structure of reality?

the structure of language yes - there is an argument here

however reality -

can we say that language enables human beings to operate effectively (that is within
the limits of their nature) in the world?

it may indeed be a useful presupposition to human behavior to assume that human
activity has the same logic as reality itself (whatever all this means) - but the fact is
we have no way of knowing whether such is true or false -

there is no way of seeing what the relationship between language and reality is

therefore the notion of logical form as that which is common to language and the
world - is an empty concept
Kn Kn
4.42. For n elementary propositions there are S ( ) = Ln
k=0 k

ways in which a proposition can agree and disagree with their truth-possibilities


what is being put here is that the proposition - as a whole agrees or disagrees
with its elementary propositions

there is something not quite right with this -

is it not like saying the door of the house agrees of disagrees with the house - or that a
room agrees or disagrees with the house?

the house stands - it's either in the wrong position or not


4.43. We can express agreement with truth possibilities by correlating the mark 'T'
(true) with them in the schema.

The absence of this mark means disagreement.


either the proposition is true or it is false

its elements are either true or false

this idea of the proposition as an expression of the agreement or disagreement of its
elements -

a proposition as an expression of agreement or disagreement with itself?

we have two senses of proposition here -

the proposition as a singularity - as a unity

and the proposition as - the consequence of its parts

so a proposition is what - simply a way of representing sentences?

does not this amount to the view that we have elementary propositions and that's it -
the rest is just packaging?

the question then of the sense of a proposition

a complex proposition has a sense - or senses?

the answer I think will be sense

but what is this - how is it a result of the relation of elements?

are we saying a proposition's sense is something other than the conjunction of the
senses of its elements? - yes

the question is what is this?

perhaps it's the difference between sense and truth conditions

that is the idea that the sense of a proposition is a singularity - and a different issue to
the question of its truth conditions

the truth conditions of a complex proposition will depend on the status of the elements


4.431. The expression of agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities of
elementary propositions expresses the truth conditions of a proposition.

A proposition is the expression of its truth conditions.

(Thus Frege was right to use the term as a starting point when he explained the signs
of his conceptual notation. But the explanation of the concept of truth that Frege gives
is mistaken: if 'the true' and 'the false' were really objects, and were the arguments in
~p etc., then Frege's method of determining the sense of '~p' would leave it absolutely
undetermined.)


yes - if 'the false' (an object) is the resolution of '~p' - then it may be so that '~p' is
false - but the sense of the negation of 'p' is not given - and therefore as Wittgenstein
says '~p' is not in any way determined


4.44. The sign that results from correlating the mark 'T' with truth-possibilities is a
propositional sign.


the sign 'T' correlated with truth possibilities is the sign of the status of the proposition

that is the proposition has legs


4.441. It is clear that a complex of the signs 'F' and 'T' has no object (or complex of
objects) corresponding to it, just as there is none corresponding to the horizontal and
vertical lines or to the brackets. - There are no 'logical objects'.

Of course the same applies to all signs that express what the schemata of 'T's' and 'F's'
express.


there are no logical objects -

the 'T's' and the 'F's'?

what do they signify?

the possibilities of response -

assent - dissent

and their pragmatic expressions -

assertion - denial

to operate with - to operate without

so

what we have here - is the logic of response

propositional response

perhaps this points to a deeper logic

to the nature of consciousness

the fact that it is essentially binary

it is just here that the metaphysical poverty of Wittgenstein's argument is apparent

granted logical syntax does not signify logical objects

this is indeed important to understand -

however - these signs to not appear out of no where for no reason

my argument - if they are signs they signify

now the question here is no different to the question of what any sign signifies -

and it is here we need as a matter of philosophical health - a rule of no exclusion

the possibilities - all possibilities need to be regarded as valid

and as matter of fact - we never have all possibilities on the table - only the possibility
of this

signs signify - just how and what and how deep is the challenge of thought

and it is out of this challenge possible understandings emerge

you see at base what any sign signifies is unknown

that is it points to the unknown

it's signification is a matter of decision

and any decision will be an endorsement of a conceptual scheme - a view of the world

actually held or at least implied

and even this is never finalized

there are no closed systems in thought


p.s.


(1)


possibility is a fact of the world but it is a fact of consciousness - of consciousness in
the world

the world has possibility - given consciousness

in a reality that is non-conscious there is no possibility

such a reality is necessary

necessity implies the absence of possibility

my view is that reality has two dimensions - internal and external

the internality of the world is consciousness

the key characteristic of this dimension is possibility

the external dimension is the non-conscious

its key characteristic is necessity

the world as given in human experience is the unity of the two dimensions

this one reality is the meeting of possibility and necessity

the interaction if you will -

the product of this relationship is the world as we know it

the world as a singularity is unknown

that is the meeting of possibility and necessity is the unknown


(2)


we can dispense with the dichotomy consciousness and the world

there is the world

consciousness is an attribute of the world

the non-conscious is an attribute

when we speak of the world this is what we usually mean

however the truth is the world is the logical space of the attributes

for all intents and purposes all we need to speak about is attributes

there is no underlying substance

beyond attributes is just what we do not know - cannot know


4.442. For example, the following is a propositional sign:

'p q '

T T T
F T T
T F
F F T.

(Frege's 'judgement-stroke' '/-' is logically quite meaningless: in the works of Frege
(and Russell) it simply indicates that these authors hold the propositions marked with
this sign to be true. Thus '/-' is no more a component part of a proposition than is, for
instance, the proposition's number. It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that
it itself is true.)

If the order of the truth-possibilities in a schema is fixed once and for all by a
combinatory rule, then the last column by itself will be an expression of the truth-
conditions. If we now write this column as a row, the propositional sign will become

'(TT-T) (p,q)'

or more explicitly

'(TTFT) (p,q)'.

(The number of places in the left hand pair of brackets is determined by the number of
terms in the right-hand pair).


a proposition is (in my view) a proposal to view the world

it has no truth value beyond what it is given

the proposition in itself is simply a way of seeing - it is therefore as such empty of
value

the decision that gives it (truth) value is (in the broadest sense) the decision to act or
not - on the basis of its assertion

and the decision to press forward may in fact be made on the basis that the proposition
does not reflect the world as given - i.e. it's terms do not correspond - nevertheless it
may be true (as in useful - or have heuristic value) despite this - that is its assertion
may be regarded as worthy of assent given theoretical considerations beyond the
obvious

truth here has to do with the consistency and the heuristic value of a proposition
within a web of belief - or a larger theoretical picture

facts are made - and those that aren't are unknown - and the subject of proposal


4.45. For n elementary propositions there are Ln possible groups of truth conditions.

The groups of truth-conditions that are obtainable from the truth possibilities of a
given number of elementary propositions can be arranged in a series.


so what do we say of the proposition here - that it is the possibility of the truth
conditions of the elementary propositions that make it up?

so on this view are we talking really about a proposition -

or simply the possibilities of elementary propositions?

and so does it still make sense to speak of 'the' sense of 'the' proposition?

'the' proposition here - once analyzed into its elements is what?

a possible combination of truth values -

and is there any substance at all to this?


4.46. Among the possible groups of truth conditions there are two extreme cases.

In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth possibilities of the
elementary propositions. We say that the truth conditions are tautological.

In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities; the truth
conditions are contradictory.

In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction.


Wittgenstein said in regard to Frege and Russell's judgement stroke that it is quite
impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true

yes though with tautologies and contradictions this is just what seems to happen

the proposition asserts its truth or its falseness

if so what does this tell us?

it makes me wonder whether we should speak of tautologies and contradictions as
propositions

could it be that they just have the appearance of propositions - but are in fact logical
atrocities?

if we break down the proposition to its elements - what then is the proposition?

really it is nothing but the sum of its elements -

so the original proposition is really an unanalyzed set of propositions?

what I wanted to get at here is that so called complex propositions are really concealed
arguments - that logical analysis can reveal

tautologies and contradictions - have the appearance of such - but in fact they are in
my sense here - non-arguments

but they are as it were quick demonstrations of - what?

the misuse of propositional logic -

and the making of what I would call useless propositional strings?

yes much to think about here -


4.461. Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they
say nothing.

A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a
contradiction is true on no condition.

Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)

(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know it is either raining or
not raining.)


my idea is that a contradiction is not a property of the proposition - but rather that it is
a propositional act -

as is a tautology - the act of asserting - what is - is asserted and a conclusion drawn -
that what is asserted is asserted

what I am getting at here is that what we are talking about is a propositional act -

that is an act in relation to propositions - plural

a contradiction is not a proposition - a property of a proposition -

it is an act in relation to a set of propositions

the key here is to give up the idea of a proposition as tautologous or contradictory

and to see you are talking about acts - not propositions

is also to understand that combining elementary propositions does not result in
anything but a string of elementary propositions

so tautology or contradiction - are not properties of - a proposition

they are acts in relation to propositions -

decisions about propositions

so propositions - do not contradict and they are not tautologous -

propositions - cannot be contradictions or tautologies

interesting


4.4611. Tautologies and contradictions are not, however, nonsensical. They are part of
the symbolism, much as '0' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic.


well if what I say above holds up - we have to re-think the notions of contradiction
and tautology -

we are not I say talking about propositions

we are talking about recognizing useless formations

take for example 'it is raining and it is raining' -

now I have argued this is not a proposition at all

elementary propositions are propositions

the above statement is a string - a conjunction of propositions

now a conjunction makes sense - is useful - if what is conjoined to one element is
something else -

why would you bother to repeat an elementary proposition?

in the case of a tautology this is just what happens -

yes the result is a propositional string

but one that is of no use

this same argument can be applied to the contradiction -

'it is raining and it is not raining'

recognizing uselessness is useful


4.462. Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent
any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations and the latter
none.

In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world - the representational
relations - cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation
to reality.


Tautologies and contradiction have the form of propositions - and even a hint of sense
- but they are in fact not propositions

this is my point - Wittgenstein wants to hold that they are propositions

I agree they do not represent possible situations

and I would say therefore they are not propositions

in a tautology or contradiction we do not in fact have from a logical point of view
complex propositions

that is we have strings of elemental propositions

and useless strings at that


4.463. The truth conditions of a proposition determine the range that it leaves open to
the facts.

(A proposition, a picture, or a model is, in the negative sense, like a solid body that
restricts the freedom of movement of others, and, in the positive sense, like a space
bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.)

A tautology leaves open to reality the whole - the infinite whole - of logical space: a
contradiction fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus
neither of them can determine reality in any way.


what I say here is that what is called a tautology or a contradiction is an empty
proposal - it is a misuse of the propositional form


464. A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's
impossible.

(Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we
need in the theory of probability.)


what I would argue here is that propositional arguments 'p and p' or 'p and -p' are not
genuine arguments

therefore truth conditions do not apply

and if so - it is not correct to say that the tautology is true - let alone certain (if that is
some higher grade of truth) - and it is not the case that a contradiction is false - let
alone impossible

the concepts of certainty and impossibility cannot be derived from tautologies or
contradictions - or more correctly - cannot be derived from apparent / false
propositional arguments that in fact have no conclusions - that is no truth values


4.465. The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says the same thing as the
proposition. This product therefore is identical with the proposition. For it is
impossible to alter what is essential to a symbol without altering its sense.


the fact is though the tautology has only the appearance of sense - it is therefore not
the same thing as the proposition - the proposition you might say that could be
extracted from it


4.466. What corresponds to a determinate logical combination of signs is a
determinate logical combination of their meanings. It is only to the uncombined signs
that absolutely any combination corresponds.

In other words, propositions that are true for every situation cannot be combinations
of signs at all, since if they were, only determinate combinations of objects could
correspond to them.

(And what is not a logical combination has no combination of objects corresponding
to it.)

Tautology and contradiction are limiting cases - indeed the disintegration - of the
combination of signs.


yes all this is so - and it is clear that Wittgenstein still wants to hold that the tautology
and the contradiction have some significance albeit place in the logical framework

at this point he should have tossed them


4.4661. Admittedly the signs are all still combined with one another even in
tautologies and contradictions - i.e. - they stand in a certain relation to one another:
but these relations have no meaning, the are not essential to the symbol


what this suggests is the argument of the 'determinate relation of signs' - is hollow

determinate relation can clearly exist in meaningless combinations

therefore it cannot be a criterion of sense or meaning

the question is really can a combination of signs be utilized?

what then are the grounds of utility?

we can say practice - but the question - what governs this practice?

apart from say that we cannot know the answer here -

my suggestion would be that it points to a natural correspondence between
propositions and possibilities of action

a sensible proposition is one that enables action

the fact of this possibility is just how we know that the combination of signs is
sensible

the relation here is symbiotic

in short we can recognize useful propositions - as those which are a valid
propositional arguments - and have truth value

this though is - metaphysically speaking - short hand -

a short hand that is the expression of an underlying natural state of affairs

genuine propositions have a path

ill-formed propositions have no path

possibility is there - but it is not without constraints


p.s.


this brings us back to the question of logical form

Wittgenstein argues that logical form is displayed in propositional syntax

this is a neat idea -

but really it is no different from saying propositional form is shown in the unanalyzed
proposition

the question is - is there such a thing?

we presume so because we say we make sense

sense it seems goes beyond the proposition -

reaches out - to the world - and we like to think is given back via the proposition

what if it was the case that there is no such form?

rather language is a hit and miss affair

a hit means the proposition has been of use

a miss that it has not

and with this a history of use -

what you would in this context call a 'praxis'

a praxis that we refer to and rely on - that we continue to modify - and add to

all within some kind of community of discourse

of which there are a multitude


4.5. It now seems possible to give the most general propositional form: that is, to give
a description of the propositions of any sign language whatsoever in such a way that
every possible sense can be expressed by a symbol satisfying the description, and
every symbol satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the meaning
of the names is suitably chosen.

It is clear that only what is essential to the most general propositional form may be
included in its description - for otherwise it would not be the most general
propositional form.

The existence of a general propositional form is proved by the fact that there cannot
be a proposition whose form could not have been foreseen (i.e. constructed). The
general form of the proposition is: This is how things stand.


this is the idea that a proposition reflects reality

this argument though relies on the proposition that things in fact stand

that is to say that there is a foundation to things - a foundation on which they stand

it assumes too that we can know this - that things stand - that they - stand on
something (for how else would they stand?)

I guess I would say in relation to this matter a proposition proposes

that a proposition is a proposal for how things stand

that the presumption of the proposition (that is any proposition) is that things stand

how they stand or whether in fact they do stand is not a question for the proposition -
it is its presumption

given such a presumption - the proposal is made

the proposal carries with it this presumption

this idea of the proposition as proposal as such does not state this is how things stand

it uses this presumption as a basis for itself

on this view how things stand is not settled - it is not even delved into - it is just
assumed

if the proposition functions - we might be tempted to temporally believe 'this is how
things stand' - but only because the use of proposition has been successful - successful
within the terms of its use

what I am saying is how things stand is how they are proposed

a stand is a proposal


4.51. Suppose that I am given all elementary propositions: Then I can ask what
propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions, and that
fixes the limits.


this argument again rests on the assumption of the world as a fixed state

for in a fixed state everything can be revealed

for such an argument to work we would have to be able to draw a limit - that is to
speak of the outside of the fixed state - of the world

only Leibnitz's metaphysics I think allows for such

in fact his possible worlds is the only solution to this problem

such a shame it has no currency

the big bang theorists wouldn't be in the logical mess they are in - if they had read and
understood some Liebnitz

the notion of a defined totality - is the metaphysical source of exclusiveness

a logically ridiculous notion - though nevertheless at the heart of dominant thought
systems and the source of irresolvable human conflict


4.52. Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality of all elementary
propositions (and, of course, from its being the totality of them all). (Thus, in a certain
sense, it could be said that all propositions are generalizations of elementary
propositions.)


a proposition is a proposal - verbal or non-verbal

the elementary propositions that Wittgenstein argues for are the results of analyses of
propositions

that is they are really a theory of a certain type of propositions

you can generalize the elementary argument but nothing is really added in so doing
- the point is just missed - in general


4.53. The general propositional form is a variable.


OK


17/04/07/35.
Tractatus 5


5. A proposition is a truth function of elementary propositions.

(An elementary proposition is a truth function of itself.)


OK - a proposition is a truth function - either of elementary propositions - or in the
case of an elementary proposition - of itself -

a literal reading of this could result in the view that a proposition is just a truth value

we might normally say -'its' truth value - but if truth value is all there is to it - that's it

this is a literal reading - but it is one that gives - potentially the greatest scope

if e.g. we were to say a proposition's truth value is it assent or dissent - that this is
finally all truth comes to - then on such a view a proposition is just that which is
assented to or dissented from -

I like such an idea

what it does is leave the question of the nature of proposition - really up to experience

we could in this connection ask - what in fact do people give there assent to or not?

undoubtedly sentences would figure in this - but what else?

that's the interesting question

a work of art - a sunrise - a thought - a symphony - a good act?

I guess what I think is the real power of such a view is that it leaves the question of
substance (if you like) of propositions entirely open -

open that is in a positive way -


5.01. Elementary propositions are the truth arguments of propositions.


yes for the life of me I really can't see that Wittgenstein has any other theory of the
proposition - but the elemental proposition

I entirely agree that elementary propositions placed together - put together - are an
argument - and if proposition - 'the' proposition is to mean anything - this is all it can
mean - it is an argument

an argument here is - the internal (logical) relations of the elementary propositions

this if anything - is what the proposition is

but it is not really anything

it is a possible argument - and when it is actual - actualized - it can be an argument
about anything - and then it is gone

whereas the elementary proposition - the initial statements do have or can have some
continued currency

the elementary proposition can be placed in an infinite number of propositional
arguments

let us say for example the world is such and such

propositional arguments will have no necessary connection to how the world is

are they not simply - the placing of elemental propositions in argument?

perhaps I was right a proposition is a ghost

albeit a necessary one - a logical one

what I suppose I am getting is the question of the form of such

what do we say of the nature of logical argument?

does it have any necessary expression?

does it indeed have to have any expression at all?

an argument in thought - manifests itself how?

the point being it may or may not

the proposition here is truly an open entity

it has to be - if it is to be a genuine argument

for any genuine argument must also hold itself in argument

that is its own status is an open question

and this does not mean that it has no value - or no utility

you don't need to know the nature of something in order to use it

and in fact I suggest that the openness of the argument or the proposition is just what
indeed guarantees the possibility of its utility

what this amounts to is that the essence of the proposition is an internal relation
(between elements)

the external form of the proposition is an accidental property


p.s.


so how are we to understand propositional elements?

I will put that a propositional element is a focus of consciousness

how that focus is expressed is optional

the optional possibilities here begin with the senses

that is sight hearing smell taste and touch

the senses function as portals for focus

so the elements we begin with are sensual

a proposition though is more than a reflection in the senses

a proposition is a proposal based on the elements given

it is thus always a reflection on

and is expressed in whatever form (language) as a proposal

what is given is the ground of description

how we describe this (i.e. I have put that it is elemental and sensual) is a question of
metaphysical decision

what we have before us prior to description is unknown

we do however have a relationship with it

a relationship that is enhanced with proposal


p.p.s.


the mind and the body - dimensions of the unity

the unity is represented in the proposition

it is the representation that cannot be described

its elements are the description


5.02. The arguments of functions are readily confused with the affixes of names. For
both arguments and affixes enable me to recognize the meaning of the signs
containing them.

For example, when Russell writes '+c', the 'c' is an affix which indicates that the sign
as a whole is the addition-sign for cardinal numbers. But the use of this sign is the
result of arbitrary convention and it would be quite possible to choose a simple sign
instead of '+c'; in '~p', however, 'p' is not an affix but an argument: the sense of '~p'
cannot be understood unless the sense of 'p' has been understood already. (In the name
Julius Caesar 'Julius' is an affix. An affix is already part of a description of the object
to whose name we attach it: e.g. the Caesar of the Julien gens.)

If I am not mistaken, Frege's theory about the meaning of propositions and functions
is based on the confusion between an argument and its affix. Frege regarded the
propositions of logic as names, and their arguments as the affixes of those names.


the propositions of logic - of propositional logic - are functions

the elementary propositions are the function of the proposition

names are essentially irrelevant to the question of function

I would say propositional signs signify rather than name

naming as I see it is the proposal of logical point


5.1. Truth functions can be arranged in series.

That is the foundation of the theory of probability.


the idea being that truth function possibilities are the foundation on which probability
theory begins or is launched


5.101. The truth functions of a given number of elementary propositions can always
be set out in a schema of the following kind:

(TTTT) (p,q) Tautology (If p then p and if q then q.) (p q. q q)
(FTTT) (p,q) In words: Not both p and q. (~(p.q)
(TFTT) (p,q) " " : If q then p. (q p)
(TTFT) (p,q) " " : If p then q. (p q)
(TTTF) (p,q) " " : p or q. (p v q)
(FFTT) (p,q) " " : Not q. (~q)
(FTFT) (p,q) " " : Not p. (~p)
(FTTF) (p,q) " " : p or q, but not both. (p. ~q: v : q. ~p)
(TFFT) (p,q) " " : If p then q, and if q then p. (p = q)
(TFTF) (p,q) " " : p
(TTFF) (p,q) " " : q
(FFFT) (p,q) " " : Neither p nor q. (~p. -q or p/q)
(FFTF) (p,q) " " : p and not q. (p. ~q)
(FTFF) (p,q) " " : q and not p. (q. ~p)
(TFFF) (p,q) " " : q and p. (q . p)
(FFFF) (p,q) Contradiction (p and not p, and q and not q.) (p. ~p . q. ~q)

I will give the name truth-grounds of a proposition to those truth-possibilities of its
truth-arguments that make it true.


the truth grounds of a proposition are the grounds on which it is true

its 'false grounds' the conditions under which it is false


5.11. If all the truth grounds that are common to a number of propositions are at the
same time truth-grounds of a certain proposition, then we say that the truth of that
proposition follows from the truth of the others.


yes truth follows from truth


5.12. In particular, the truth of a proposition 'p' follows from the truth of another
proposition q if all the truth-grounds of the latter are truth grounds of the former.


latter and former?

what determines what follows from what?

not truth -

if p follows from q

then p is contained in q

if q is true
then p is true


5.121. The truth grounds of one are contained in the other: p follows form q


yes exactly


5.122. If p follows from q, the sense of 'p' is contained in the sense of 'q'


yes this puts it nicely


5.123. If a god creates a world in which certain propositions are true, then by that very
act he also creates a world in which all the propositions that follow from them come
true. And similarly he could not create a world in which the proposition 'p' was true
without creating all its objects.


in the beginning was the word


5.124. A proposition affirms every proposition that follows from it.


we need to avoid logical mysticism here

what follows from a proposition is given in the proposition - once it is seen to follow
from it

that is - what follows from a proposition follows an act upon the proposition - a
definitive use of it

strictly speaking nothing follows from anything - unless it is made to - unless that is
there is reason for it

and once 'p' is seen to follow from 'q' - we are not talking a proposition per se - rather
a propositional argument.

out of the argument the proposition is dead wood

though in practice - the proposition does not exist outside of the propositional
argument - though you could get this impression listening to logicians

mysticism and logic a fine line


5.1241. 'p . q' is one of the propositions that affirm 'p' and at the same time one of the
propositions that affirms q.

The two propositions are opposed to each other if there is no propositions with a
sense, that affirms them both.

Every proposition that contradicts another negates it.


a proposition that contradicts another is a proposal against the first proposition

the proposing of it puts the negating proposition into the argument -

the resolution of the argument is a decision on the truth values of the proposals

either p or ~p

if -p in fact negates p then -p is held to be true

which is to say the world does not contain p - there is no such state of affairs

so there are two phases of the argument here - the proposal and the resolution

the proposal sets up the argument - the resolution is the decision regarding truth
values


5.13 When the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others we can see
this from the structure of the propositions.


what we see here is propositional structure

truth is really no more than a proposal in such a scheme

if p is true then all that follows from p is true

the question of the truth of p is separate from the setting out of p and its possibilities

the setting out of p is it's display - its demonstration

the truth or not of p and its progeny is its reality -

i.e. p refers to a state of affairs or it does not

in the event that it does not ~p has no positive value -

that is it has no use


p.s.


(a)


my impression is that Wittgenstein wants to say that truth is a function of structure

that is that truth can only apply given a propositional structure - and the propositional
theory and structure outlined in the 'Tractatus'

what I am suggesting is that there is no necessary connection

that truth is a proposal of resolution

that can indeed apply to propositions as outlined in the 'Tractatus' - but perhaps in
other forms also - other forms that is of propositions

the general idea being that there is more to propositions than Wittgenstein would
allow

and yes truth can be a function of elemental propositions - of strings of propositions in
the sense that it can be a calculation of values

but all this is only made possible if the values of the elements are already determined

logic can determine possible values and combinations

I think we would say reality decides the issue

and the criterion of this I would say is utility or fruitfulness

but be that as it may reality decides the matter

(or is it we decide reality and reality determines the value?)


(b)


as I have been putting it a proposition is a proposal - it may or may not take the form
of a sentence - a statement - it could be in the form of a musical notation - an image
painted or represented in another form - i.e. sculpture or some other form yet to be
seen - the possibilities are open

truth value is a response to the proposition - it is the response of assent or denial

what I am suggesting is that what truth value is ascribed to is an open matter

this is to say if you like that logical form is an open question

we have various expressions of it - various formulations - but the form is never
exhausted by any formulation

where in fact people do assent or dissent (deny) there you have logical form

there is no confusion it is simply a matter of understanding different formulation and
with that different criteria -

criteria I would suggest are form dependent and that forms are expressions of
perspectives - ways of viewing the world

(this of course will not make sense to anyone who thinks there is or should be just one
way of seeing things)


(c)


the idea of the proposition as picture can still work in this conception - here we would
speaking about different kinds of picture

still I prefer proposal - picture has too much of a visual association to it - and some
propositional forms are expressed in the terms of the non-visual senses

the other advantage of 'proposal' is that it avoids Wittgenstein's problem of logical
form -

logical form is the proposal of the proposition - or more correctly the ground of the
proposal - but this ground too is proposed

that is the relation between the proposition and the world is itself proposed

and thus logical form is the meta dimension of any proposition - or the meta
proposition

the meta dimension of any proposition - its meta statement - is not obvious - it is in a
sense hidden

it can though be expressed on reflection as a meta proposition

that is the logic of the proposition can be expressed as a different or another mode of
the proposition


5.131. If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds
expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand to one another;
nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them, by combining them
with one another in a single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are internal, and
their existence is an immediate result of the existence of the propositions.


the internal relations of propositions exist if propositions are placed in relation to each
other - that is if an argument is constructed

otherwise you are committed to some Platonic like notion of logical forms

a proposition has a form and structure - (things do have structure) - relationships are
made / constructed - they are not the immediate result of the existence of propositions


5.1311. When we infer q from p v q and ~p, the relation between the propositional
forms of 'p v q' and '~p' is masked, in this case, by our mode of signifying. But if
instead of 'p v q' we write for example, 'p\q.\ .p\q', and instead of '~p', 'p\p' (p\q =
neither p nor q), then the inner connection becomes obvious.

(The possibility of inference from (x). fx to fa shows that the symbol (x). fx has
generality in it.)


how a proposition is stated will determine how it is revealed

a proposition can fulfill a number of functions

these function are dimensions of possibility

their articulation or representation is found in the set of propositions that the original
proposition represents

the original proposition is a flagship

the logic of a proposition - how it works - its internal workings can be stated in the
kind of propositions that are found in the 'Tractatus'

this is to see the proposition as a logical function - to represent it as such

the veridical use of a proposition - i.e. its effect - the use it is put to is yet another -
indeed more common characterization

'the' proposition as such is a 'place of possibility'

it is a given - once given - but is given in another question or set of questions

Wittgenstein I think regards his logical signage as something other than language -
perhaps its depiction

the point is though that the proposition may be expressed in any number of ways
- and logical sign language is just another expression

one may ask why express the proposition in such a manner?

Wittgenstein's answer that such an expression clarifies the logic of the proposition is
good enough

why do this you may ask?

perhaps to find another way of seeing and understanding the world?

that would be good enough


p.s.


I would put that we create ontologies to enable functions to be performed

the notion of logical form for instance is needed given the kind of issue that
Wittgenstein is addressing

perhaps it will be argued by someone that it is not necessary - but this is just the point

what we say exists is determined by what we wish to achieve

in this case explanation of the relation of language to the world -

and from this it can be seen that languages are created to express the ontologies
postulated

and I suggest that there is never a case of one to one correspondence between
languages

that is to say a new language will always in some respect be different from the
language it was developed out of -

and how it will be different will be in terms of its ontology

new things are created in new ontologies -

what you need to factor in - in any translation is the fact of intellectual leap

that is to say essentially there will always be gaps - chasms - between languages

always though enough connections to suggest coherence - these of course can be
argued for or against

in language we are always writing on the unknown or speaking to it


5.132. If p follows from q, I can make an inference from q to p, deduce p from q.

The nature of the inference can be gathered only from the two propositions.

They themselves are the only possible justification of the law of inference.

'Laws of inference', which are supposed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege
and Russell, have no sense, and would be superfluous.


the inference is expressed in 'q then p'

the inference is not a property of p and q

it is a relation that can exist between two propositions - i.e. p and q

the inference may only be 'active' in an actual propositional argument

we can nevertheless refer to it as a possible relation - as a kind of relation

Wittgenstein is forced into this corner - just because he cannot explain logical
relations as propositions

(his theory of propositions - and particularly of internal relations - rests on a
distinction between expression and display

in short internal relations cannot be expressed in or by propositions - but they can be
displayed in the logical syntax

as I have said quite an ingenious argument - but it is based on a suspect premise
- that display is something other than expression -

and further that a display of the logical syntax of a proposition is something other than
its expression (albeit in alternative sign language)

we can state inference in any number of ways -

we can refer to as I have as a relation between entities (propositions)

we can even give it a behavioural definition - as in what people do under certain
circumstances (i.e. infer)

we can state it as Wittgenstein has above

it may even be expressed / represented artistically

etc.


5.133. All deductions are made a priori.


deductions are logical streams


5.134. One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another.


an elementary proposition can be the conclusion of a deductive argument

the form of the deductive argument is such that an elementary proposition cannot be
the first premise


NB.


an elementary proposition -

the argument is that an elementary proposition is one that does not contain any other
proposition

it is a statement of a simple fact - not a complex fact

is an elemental statement just the reflection of a singular fact - or is it that the
statement makes or constructs the fact as simple?

can we speak i.e. of pure observation statements - statements that cannot be reduced to
anything else?

we can understand the desire to base our theories on such a foundation

but is this simply a form of sentence construction - and meta pragmatism - or an
accurate account of how the world is?

do we make facts or do we come upon them?


(b)


we can also ask does it make sense to speak of elementary propositions in isolation
- that is outside of a theoretical context?

the individual proposition I suggest only has meaning and significance in a broader
context of understanding

statements in theoretical physics will not make sense outside of - separate from the
theories that produce them

veridical statements likewise only have significance given certain presuppositions
regarding the nature of the world


5.135. There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one
situation to the existence of another, entirely different situation.


we need a clear drawing here of the logic of 'situation' - what is an 'entirely different'
situation?

if I infer from the presence of clouds in the sky that it will rain I may or may not be
right - but it is a valid inference

is this because we are speaking of different aspects of the one situation - the weather?

now if I also infer from the presence of clouds that I will be unhappy today - on the
face of it not a valid inference - two different situations - the weather and my
emotional state?

however it is conceivable that there is some underlying connection - for example let
us say there is in certain individuals a peculiar sensitivity to sunlight so that the less
sunlight they have the less well being they experience - this let us say turns out to be
explainable as a matter of chemistry - something to do with a connection between sun
light and endorphin production in individuals with a certain variation in brain
chemistry

in such a case we would not in linking clouds and happiness be dealing with different
situations

the point this leads to is that what is to count as one situation and what is to count as
another is an open question

'situation' is just a matter of where you are

change your position you change the situation


5.136. There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.


we can't decide causal nexus a priori

Wittgenstein assumes there are situations that are independent of each other - in some
extreme sense

how can such situations (it is a suitably vague notion isn't it?) exist in the same world?

if x causes y then x is in y

the observation of such an outcome - y - is the observation of a causal relation
between x and y

5.1361. We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.

Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus.


(a)


we cannot infer events of the future from those of the present - why not?

causation is a reasonable attempt to explain a dynamic world

we see repeated correlations of events (a following b) we say a causes b therefore if a
then b -where's the drama?

any such inference is light -

it is a way of correlating events -

and a little more seriously the positing of an underlying relation between surface
events

on the face of it in normal circumstances a useful way of conceptualizing the world

- emotionally satisfying anyway

it's like saying there must be a connection between events

a fair enough metaphysical 'observation' - and OK you can call such superstitious

nevertheless in dynamic situations we see that one event comes out of another

what this in fact means - well that's another question -

a question perhaps for science -

science - that is - a more empirical form of superstition


(b)


in general it makes sense to regard the causal nexus as just a working hypothesis - a
way into the study of things


5.1362. The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that
still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity
like that of logical inference. - The connection between knowledge and what is known
is that of logical necessity.

('A knows that p is the case', has no sense if p is a tautology.)


the argument that if we did know the future - there would be no freedom of will
there would be no choice - any matter would be determined -

therefore freedom of will is prefaced on not-knowing

ignorance (metaphysical) is our guarantee of freedom

if causality was an inner relationship rather than as it is thought or proposed - an
external relationship then we could know what lies in the future?

that is if the causal relation was a logical relationship - etc.

logical necessity is an inner relation between propositions

logical necessity is essentially a syntactical relation / operation - the relation of signs
as in a tautology

one might argue that Wittgenstein's argument for freedom demands that freedom is
the absence of knowledge per se

that is in so far as we have knowledge we are not free -

if I know now (don't worry about the future) - I cannot be free

on the other hand if free - I have no knowledge

his idea of knowledge here is logical necessity -

my view is that logical necessity has nothing to do with knowledge -

that logical necessity is just a syntactical arrangement - a relation of signs

and if so freedom of the will as he puts it - is another matter altogether


5.1363. If the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact that it is self-evident
to us, then its self-evidence in no way justifies our belief in its truth.


if self-evidence is not self-evidence of truth - what is it self evidence of?

if self-evidence does not justify belief - what is the point of it?

is the point being made here that self-evidence is just a feature of the structure of a
proposition and that it does not bear on belief and truth?

anyway

a self evident proposition is one that justifies itself or appears to assert it's own truth

now quickly I would say either view of self evidence - can be shown to be without
sense -

that a proposition cannot justify itself and cannot assert it's own truth

if so whither self evidence?

is the point here that self evidence is a false notion?

that we should actually abandon it - take it from the logical lexicon?

yes I think so

if this is Wittgenstein's point - it was made badly

self evidence (if it means anything) is given in the proposition - in the propositional
argument

whether someone accepts the conclusion - believes in its truth - is not itself a matter of
the truth of the proposition - it is a matter of psychology


5.14. If one proposition follows from another, then the latter says more than the
former, and the former less than the latter.


I would say the opposite here - if p follows from q - p is contained in q -
therefore q has more content than p


5.141. If p follows from q and q from p, then they are one and the same proposition.


if p = q then q = p therefore p does not follow from q and q does not follow from p -

p and q can be placed in a propositional form i.e. p and q - however this is a false
proposition if p = q

the point is we should be wary of being too carried away with syntactical form - the
fact is we can be deceived -

and this may be quite an important point against Wittgenstein - display is not
necessarily what is real - let alone what is 'really real'

what presents is what presents that is all you can strictly speaking predicate of it

reality is always a question


5.142. A tautology follows from all propositions: it says nothing


isn't it time to get real about the tautology - the tautology is a false as in deceptive
proposition - I think for all intents and purposes you could drop it - drop it as a real
propositional form - use it as an illustration of false syntax - bad display


5.143. Contradiction is that common factor of propositions which no proposition has
in common with another. Tautology is the common factor of all propositions that have
nothing in common with one another.

Contradiction, one might say, vanishes outside all propositions: tautology vanishes
inside them.

Contradiction is the outer limit of propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at
the centre.


yes one can wax poetical regarding tautology and contradiction - vanishing acts and
vanishing points - outer limits and non-existent centres

the tautology and the contradiction are useless propositions

this illustrates the deception of logic -

yes shock horror

well formed syntactical 'arrangements' can mean nothing - have no significance

in this sense they might function as reminders that logic is not without deception


5.15. If Tr is the number of truth grounds of a proposition 'r', and if Trs is the number
of truth grounds of a proposition 's' that are at the same time truth-grounds of 'r', then
we call the ratio Trs: Tr the degree of probability that the proposition 'r' gives to the
proposition 's'.


propositions are related in terms of their truth conditions

probability as a measure of the 'truth strength' one proposition gives another

probability is measured in terms of the number of truth grounds common to
propositions

however probability it needs to be understood is a relation between propositions if
they are placed in relation to each other and ordered in relation to each other

probability is thus a function of propositional action - an assessment of relative truth
strength

Wittgenstein always leaves propositional action out of the analysis as if logic has a
life of its own - independent that is of - life - wishful thinking


5.151. In a schema like the one above in 5.101, let Tr be the number of 'T's' in the
proposition r, and let Trs be the number of 'T's' in the proposition s that stand in
columns in which the proposition r has 'T's'. Then the proposition r gives to the
proposition s the probability Trs: Tr.


propositions stand in relation to each other in the form of propositional arguments -
schemas are the representation of the ground of any argument

probability arguments are propositional actions


5.1511. There is no special object peculiar to probability propositions.


probability is a calculation premised on the absence of object


5.152. When propositions have no truth arguments in common with one another, we
call them independent of one another.

Two elementary propositions give one another the probability 1/2.

If p follows from q, then the proposition 'q' gives to the proposition 'p' the probability
1. The certainty of logical inference is a limiting case of probability.

(Application of this to tautology and contradiction).


how can it be that propositions have no truth arguments in common?

i.e. if a proposition q is either T or F and a proposition r is either T or F - what they
have in common is a truth argument

all propositions are related in terms of truth arguments

elementary propositions do not give each other probability

elementary propositions can be related to each other in a probability argument
- in an argument of two possible outcomes the probability is 1/2

if p follows from q then q has the same probability as p

this application does not apply to tautology or contradiction as these are not real
propositional arguments (as I argued above) -

p does not follow from p as p is not contained in p - p simply is p - the idea of it being
contained in itself is non-sensical -

the same is true of p and ~p - are we to say p and ~p follows from p and ~p?

p and ~p does not contain - p and ~p - you can put one after the other - but there is no
deduction

the propositional argument that is p and ~p - a contradiction - is like the tautology
without truth value - it is simply not a valid propositional formulation - it is
syntactically innocent but semantically senseless

the so called tautology and contradiction are useless propositional strings

any theory of probability based on the idea of tautology as the centre point of
probability and contradiction as the outer limit of probability is founded on nonsense


5.153. In itself, a proposition is neither probable nor improbable. Either an event
occurs or it does not: there is no middle way -


probability is assigned in the absence of happening

probability theory is the logic of imagination - of imagined states - weighted against
experienced or given reality


5.154. Suppose that an urn contains black and white balls in equal numbers (and none
of any other kind). I draw one ball after another, putting them back in the urn. By this
experiment I can establish that the number of black balls drawn and the number of
white balls drawn approximate to one another as the draw continues.

So this is not a mathematical truth.

Now, if I say, 'The probability of my drawing a white ball is equal to the probability of
my drawing a black one', this means that all the circumstances that I know of
(including the laws of nature assumed as hypotheses) give no more probability to the
occurrence of one event than to the other. That is to say, they give each the probability
1/2 as can easily be gathered from the above definitions.

What I confirm by the experiment is that the occurrence of the two events is
independent of the circumstances of which I have no more detailed knowledge.


what is confirmed here is that in order to perform the experiment in the terms outlined
the decision is taken to limit the field of knowledge to the operation performed -

the two events are defined as independent of more detailed knowledge

the operation is performed on the assumption of a uniformity of nature during the
whole operation - i.e. - that balls will remain balls - colours colors - perception
'veridical' etc. -

probability assessments are only possible given these assumptions and the definition
of the domain of knowledge

probability it seems can only occur in a context of necessity - or its assumption


5.155. The minimum unit of probability proposition is this: The circumstances - of
which I have no further knowledge - give such and such a degree of probability to the
occurrence of a particular event.


yes probability - or the minimum unit of probability propositions - depend on the
absence of knowledge - or the decision to absent knowledge


NB.

crucial understandings -


a sign or symbol represents what happens - represents an act - we may not be able to
make sense of the event without the sign - but let us never forget it is always of a
secondary order to what happens - to what occurs

the second crucial point to get is that a sign - any sign represents a relation between
consciousness and the world

I have a distinct feeling that Wittgenstein would have us believe that the essential
relationship - in fact the only relationship is between the sign and the world -

this I think is the idea behind his idea of logical form - the relation between language
and the world - he asks what do they have in common?

it's the wrong question - and it comes about because the logic that underlies it is all
wrong to begin with

language is a window to the world yes - and a window to consciousness

otherwise language is not possible

I can well understand Wittgenstein's attempt to deny the place and relevance of mind -
Wittgenstein is smart enough to see that a physicalist reduction of mind is not on - it's
not even what it's about - I guess he just hoped he get to where he wanted to by going
around - and leaving the centre unspoken for - not an invalid approach - any monk
looking up from his prayer book or any housewife putting out the washing would see
the point -


5.156. It is in this way that probability is a generalization.

It involves a general description of the propositional form.

We use probability only in default of certainty - if our knowledge of a fact is not
indeed complete, but we do know something about its form.

(A proposition may well be an incomplete picture of a certain situation, but it is
always a complete picture of something.)

A probability proposition is a sort of excerpt from other propositions.


probability must be able to formulated outside the issue of certainty - for there is an
argument that no proposition can be regarded as certain

probability as a calculation of what might happen given the parameters of the situation
and its objects

such an idea suggests probability as an exercise in uncertainty

I think it best to regard probability theory as meta game theory

a proposition is never a complete picture of anything - it can be a proposal to view a
situation as complete - and it can be a proposal to regard a situation as incomplete

any proposition is an expression of much more than the situation and objects it refers
to -

hence a proposition never stands alone - though it may be presented in such a way and
appear to have a stand alone form - it always entails a view of the world - a
metaphysic - for practical purposes this is rarely stated - and in most cases it is not in
fact 'known' or articulated - but it is there

a proposition is like this - it is what appears to the world of the world proposed

a third and most important point to make I think is that Wittgenstein's theory of logic -
or logical form is a proposal - is a proposal for how we should (or in my terms can)
view the world - it is finally a proposition

and like all meta propositions it is not guaranteed from the outside - any support it has
is internal - that is if you accept certain premises the conclusion follows - it is a way
of seeing -

to understand this way of viewing metaphysical / philosophical theories you have to
understand what is seen is not known -

this is the reason for conception - for ways of seeing - for perspective

metaphysical views are essential for without them we have no way of mapping or
navigating the world we are in -

the fact of meta theory is simply the fact of consciousness - consciousness in relation
to the unknown

what metaphysics tells us is that consciousness is indeterminate

this indeterminacy is the source of human creativity

creativity is the essential characteristic of the animal

it is the human tool


5.2. The structures of propositions stand in internal relations to one another.


internal relations - there's more pretty girls than one

the ground of propositional argument is always an assumption - usually undefined - or
unexplored

propositions can be thrown together - and linked up in terms of an underlying notion
or idea - which may eventually emerge as a proposition and its off-spring

the point being the relation between propositions is always the propositional argument

propositions can be plucked out of the sky

or indeed thrown back out there

what's in and what's out is can be a very 'physical' robust matter when the job needs to
be done

this is not to argue against 5.2 - rather to point out it is not a one dimensional matter


NB.

logical form


what happens happens - logical form is a description of the happening in terms of its
necessary elements

these necessary elements are really undefined posits - but they are posits of what is
deemed necessary for the occurrence

a theory of logical form thus has the characteristic of generality

logical form is not a property of language

language is an expression of logical form

when we express logical form - put forward an account of - we are proposing a meta
description of reality - based on an analysis of a state of affairs - it is really no more
than a description of what has occurred - and the argument that - the event in question
points to a view of reality beyond itself - it is to say this event is not unique - rather
that it is an expression of reality - this is the full sense of the proposal - or at least a
sketch of the full sense

the terms of this proposal - the proposal of a meta description (logical form) depend
on the metaphysical perspective that is adopted

there is no one account of the nature of events - there are any number of perspectives

hence logical form is itself always a question


5.21. In order to give prominence to these internal relations we can adopt the
following mode of expression: we can represent a proposition as a result of an
operation that produces it out of other propositions (which are the bases of the
operation).


propositions can be produced internally -

to do so is really to explore the implications of a given proposal - it is not actually
strictly speaking to make a new proposal


5.22. An operation is an expression of a relation between the structures of its results
and its bases.


the use of an internal operation can be such an expression


5.23. The operation is what has to be done to the one proposition in order to make the
other out of it.


yes this is really the theory of implication


5.231. And that will, of course, depend on their formal properties, on the internal
similarity of their forms.


like can only be produced out of like


5.232. The internal relation by which a series is ordered is the equivalent to the
operation that produces one term from another.


the study of internal relations can bring to awareness what is already given - nothing is
actually produced that was not already there


5.233. Operations cannot make their appearance before the point at which one
proposition is generated out of another in a logically meaningful manner; i.e. the point
at which the logical construction of propositions begins.


the operation never actually makes an appearance - and it must exist prior to the
construction of propositions otherwise nothing would occur

the operation is an act of consciousness - it can be represented in propositional form
i.e. an operational proposition - a proposition that describes / expresses the operation

propositional representation can occur without the operation being performed - as
Wittgenstein's theory of operations as represented in these (his) propositions testifies


5.234. Truth functions of elementary propositions are results of operations with
elementary propositions as their bases.

(These operations I call truth-operations.)


truth functions are results of operations with elementary propositions as their bases

truth operations - give us a picture of the truth possibilities of elementary propositions

the result of truth operations is a statement of the possibilities for assent or dissent
in relation to given elementary combinations

all logic is based on the notion of truth - and this is that any proposition whatever that
may be is true or false - we begin with is concept - p is T or F -

all logical operations are generated one way or another from this foundation - this
notion

it is simply a notion necessary to practice

we need to have a concept of assent and it's opposite in order to decide

decision which is unavoidable (necessary) - given the nature of consciousness is based
on this either / or possibility

logic is disjunction

(the law of the excluded middle is the law of consciousness)


5.2341. The sense of a truth-function of p is a function of the sense of p.

Negation, logical addition, logical multiplication, etc. etc. are operations.

(Negation reverses the sense of a proposition)


sense is defined by p - sense is given in consciousness - sense is consciousness -
consciousness in the world - it is pre-propositional - sense is the ground of
propositional knowledge -

propositions simply describe sense - that is the internal logic of propositions (which is
itself an open question - one that Wittgenstein has given an answer to) is a description
of consciousness in the world in relation to a particular focus

there is no mystery to sense - it is like the tree or a rock - it is a feature of the natural
world - and by this I mean a two dimensional world - the physical outside - the
conscious inside - sense is an internal fact -

sense is just what consciousness gives to the world -

and its quality is openness


5.24. An operation manifests itself in a variable; it shows how we can get from one
form of proposition to another.

It gives expression to the difference between forms.

(And what the bases of an operation and its result have in common is just the bases
themselves)


an operation does not manifest itself in a variable

an internal - logical operation is nevertheless an act - the act is performed - its result
can be shown - we can see difference from one series against another - but the
operation itself is not external - so it cannot be shown - it can be known - and it can be
described in a propositional form - yes

an operation of the kind Wittgenstein has in mind - is more in the line of a calculation
- it is an operation that is itself strictly defined -

to calculate you must know the principle of the calculation

the act of calculation - changing forms - is in itself without meaning

that is e.g.. - from the point of view of an observer who does not know a calculation is
taking place - or what the principle of the act is

the meaning of the act is internal to the act - the meaning can be given external form -
in the form of an explanatory proposition

Wittgenstein here as in other places would dearly love to avoid any reference to - or to
give any significance to the place - the function - the reality of consciousness

logical operations are acts of consciousness -


5.241. An operation is not the mark of a form, but only the difference between forms.


a form is always the result of a logical operation -

an operation always occur within a form - within a formal context -

the operation has no meaning - no actual existence outside of forms -

what would be the mark of a form?

it's expression -

an operation is in a sense the difference between forms

for their to be a difference there must be an operation


5.242. The operation that produces 'q' from 'p' also produces 'r' from 'q' and so on.
There is only one way of expressing this: 'p', 'q', 'r', etc. have to be variables that give
expression in a general way to certain formal relations.


is this Wittgenstein's argument that the proposition is an operation - a logical
operation?

it would seem so

if so this is like confusing number with calculation

it really amounts to an operational view of reality

which cannot make sense - if all you have in your world is operations

for an operation can only be - can only make sense if there is something to operate on

look I don't know - but it wouldn't surprise me if Wittgenstein would like to hold such
a view

that the world really is just logical process / operation


5.25. The occurrence of an operation does not characterize the sense of a proposition.

Indeed, no statement is made by an operation, but only by its result, and this depends
on the bases of the operation.

(Operations and functions must not be confused with each other.)


no an operation has no bearing on the sense of a proposition

the operation is not the statement of the proposition

I would say an operation can be put in propositional form - and this Wittgenstein
would oppose

he thinks you can talk about logical operations without expressing them -

the relation between operations and functions

an operation is performed on a proposition

a function is a property of a propositional argument

the function is as it were embedded in the propositional argument

to express it an operation is required


5.251. A function cannot be its own argument, whereas an operation can take one of
its own results as its basis.


a function is not an argument - a function is a relation within an argument

an operation can use its results as a basis for itself


5.252. It is only in this way that the step from one term of a series of forms to another
is possible (from one type to another in the hierarchies of Russell and Whitehead).

(Russell and Whitehead did not admit the possibility of such steps, but repeatedly
availed themselves of it.)


operations I would argue are logical actions

they are defined by the possibilities of forms

they are what we can do with forms - i.e. the step from one term of a series of forms to
another

the operation is the logical action that results in a desired outcome


5.2521. If an operation is applied repeatedly to its own results, I speak of successive
applications of it. ('O'O'O'a' is the result of three successive applications of the
operation 'O' x' to 'a'.)

In a similar sense I speak of successive applications of more than one operation to a
number of propositions.


an operation is a decision to utilize propositions

it is defined by the possibilities of the propositional argument and it is the exercise of
a possibility -

a logical operation is essentially translation


5.2522. Accordingly I use the sign '[a,x, O'x] for the general term of the series of
forms a, O'a, O'O'a.... . This bracketed expression is a variable: the first term of the
bracketed series is the beginning of the series of forms, the second is the form of a
term arbitrarily selected from the series, and the third is the form of the term that
immediately follows x in the series


this is the proposition you are having when you can't have a proposition

it is description of a logical operation - definition

such propositions are propositions which describe actions (logical) that can be
performed on subject propositions

logical propositions establish the ground for logical operations

they are in this sense postulates - proposals for how to operate with

operational propositions per se are directions for action - action in relation to
propositional possibilities - and these possibilities are contained in propositional
arguments

logical objects are really postulates - that are designed to enable logical operations of
propositions

logical operations enable the use of propositions


5.2523. The concept of successive applications of an operation is equivalent to the
concept 'and so on'.


'and so on' - so very technical

the point is that logical operation as in 'and so on' is simply a kind of action -

its basis is that consciousness is aware of succession and here I mean temporal
succession

repetition is succession without time - that is time taken out of the equation

it should be clear that such operations are not based in the propositional form - their
basis is extra-propositional -

propositions are simply forms that can be operated on - objects are other forms - in
fact any form can be the subject of an operation


5.253. One operation can counteract the effect of another. Operations can cancel one
another.


an action is never actually canceled - an action occurs - it has its time -

nevertheless one act can counteract the effect of another -

and in such a case what you have is the action of denial - that is the logic of negation
transformed into action

the world is changed

this is no great shakes - the world you can say is the possibility of change - or just
simply possibility

actuality is stillness - and this finally is a deception - even if a necessary posit of
consciousness

illusion is necessary for survival


5.254. An operation can vanish (e.g. negation in '~~p': ~~p = p).


vanishing

an operation performs

performance is the act of transformation

in a transformative action objects (of whatever kind) are held in a transitive mode

it is not a magic act - it is that which is in transition

it is a way of regarding things - that is regarding a series as transitive

negation is dissent in the sense of denial

do we say one act denies another?

strictly speaking any action that changes a state of affairs is from a logical point of
view at base an action of denial

it might be argued from here that the only logical operation that has real content is
negation -

so what is the place and significance of assertion?

it is at least to recognize a state of affairs

in the pragmatic sense it is perhaps the decision to leave things as they are -

it could be argued that in a changing reality no genuine assertion can be made - or that
any such assertion is hollow

and against this has been argued a metaphysic of underlying changelessness

the logic of Parmenides


NB.


the assertion it seems does depend on their being a state of affairs that can be fixed by
a proposition

this is not the case with negation

negation is not time or space dependent -

it does not presume a metaphysics

for this reason the negation is logical speaking contained

the assertion on the other hand is like a leaking boat

for this reason the assertion and the negation cannot be regarded as logical opposites

the negation I think is properly regarded as an operation

the assertion as the attempt to state a state of affairs

they are very different matters


p.s.


perhaps this is the reason why there is a sign for negation '~' but not one for
assertion?

and was this the reason behind Frege's idea of the judgement stroke

it would make some sense - even if you are to argue against it finally


5.3. All propositions are results of truth operations on elementary propositions.

A truth-operation is the way in which truth-function is produced out of elementary
propositions.

It is of the essence of truth-propositions that, just as elementary propositions yield a
truth-function of themselves, so too in the same way truth-functions yield a further
truth-function. When a truth-function is applied to truth functions of elementary
propositions, it always generates another truth function of elementary propositions,
another proposition. When a truth operation is applied to the results of truth
operations on elementary propositions, there is always a single operation on
elementary proposition that has the same result.

Every proposition is the result of truth-operations on elementary propositions.


(a)


when you add a room to a house are you making a new house?

or if you remove a room are you making a new house?

Wittgenstein wants elementary propositions to be the basis of his propositional theory

but let's ask the question - are there such things?

what I mean is this - are not elementary proposition really analytical constructions
from a proposition - that is analyses?

now I am not here suggesting that 'the' proposition is something set in concrete - it is
usually I would say a work in progress - stabilized only by decision to stop work and
to get going

once decided on - yes you can analyze it into elements - this can be useful in terms of
clarification

but the thing is the proposition is not something built up from elements

a proposition is a net cast - what it catches - what's in - while important and of great
interest - is a secondary matter


(b)


truth functional analysis of propositions is just that - an analysis

it is the setting up of a form for propositions - propositions as truth functions and then
the argument that all propositions are truth functions

so you have a theory of propositions and then the analysis of propositions in terms of
that theory

the argument is deductive

therefore in so far as a proposition is a truth function the argument follows

what we can at least say is that such propositions are truth functions

can we argue therefore all propositions are truth functions?

Wittgenstein's argument here is that a proposition has only one form - the form of a
truth function -

any statement that is not of this form is whatever else it is - not a proposition

I think Wittgenstein's concept of the proposition stands in the context of truth
functional use of propositions

if we wish to have a truth functional analysis of a set of propositions then it follows
those propositions must be put in truth functional form

this is to suggest that propositional form is not a set piece - form is finally a question
of use - of purpose - of end

and truth function is not the only use of propositions

the thing is the propositional form - if you can speak of it in the abstract - outside of
use - is without form


5.31. The schemata in 4.31. have a meaning even when 'p', 'q', 'r', etc. are not
elementary propositions.

And it is easy to see that the propositional sign in 4.442 expresses a single truth-
function of elementary propositions even when 'p' and 'q' are truth-functions of
elementary propositions.


the schemata in 4.31 shows us that truth function really has nothing to do with kinds
of proposition

if you decide that a proposition is a truth function - then any proposition can be
analyzed as a truth function

even so the idea of truth function really leaves open the question of the nature of
proposition

how far you want to take this is another question

if i.e. you were to hold that a painting is a proposition - would you then say it has a
truth function?

clearly we are used to and comfortable with the idea of truth function applying to the
proposition as a statement in language


5.32. All truth functions are results of successive applications to elementary
propositions of a finite number of truth-operations.


the point is - you may want to argue elementary propositions are the subject of truth
function - but the thing is truth function can apply to the proposition as an unknown

the move to elementary propositions is not really a theory of logic - it is I think an
onto / epistemological argument - though I think Wittgenstein does not want it viewed
this way


5.4. At this point it becomes manifest that there are no 'logical objects' or 'logical
constants' (in Frege's and Russell's sense).


an operation does not exist without something to operate on

is there not an argument for saying that Wittgenstein's 'elementary proposition' is such
a logical object?


5.41. The reason is that the results of truth-operations on truth functions are always
identical whenever they are one and the same truth-function of elementary
propositions.


this would also suggest that the elementary proposition functions at least in the
'Tractatus' as a constant

what is the logical status of the elementary proposition?

is Wittgenstein saying it has no place in logical theory?

and also truth operations - clearly they are an action - but what distinguishes such
operations from any other action?

I say the truth operation is a logical operation

and further that this means it is an essential operation of consciousness

and this might be to distinguish between fundamental actions of consciousness and
any other operation that might derive from such

anyway it doesn't strike me that Ludwig has explained truth function or truth operation
- and I think his idea was to try to avoid such - by arguing that logical form is not
expressed - but nevertheless shown - as in the schemata of 4.442

I think he thinks logicians just draw pictures - that what we only ever have is display

even so - he really has no account of what they sketch - outside of the sketch

a very clever attempt to avoid metaphysics - or even just some kind of explanation

the thing is we may not know what logic is - OK - nevertheless there is value in the
attempt to give it a place in - the rest of what we don't know


5.42. It is self-evident that v, , etc. are not relations in the sense in which right and
left are relations.

The interdefinability of Frege's and Russell's 'primitive signs' of logic is enough to
show that they are not primitive signs, still less signs for relations.

And it is obvious that the ' ' defined by means of '~' and 'v' is identical with the one
that figures '~' in the definition of 'v'; and that the second 'v' is identical with the first
one; and so on.


'v' is not a relation - it is a domain sign

'v' is a sign that signifies logical domain - the domain of discourse - the possibility of
discourse

it is a sign of domain

in the case of p q the domain is given in p

q is an argument of that domain

primitive signs only exist if there are primitives

primitives indeed are required for certain operations -

they are posited - that is primitiveness is assumed for the purpose of the operation

the reality of the primitive is an epistemological issue

in truth the only primitive is the unknown 'U'

the beauty of this is that it is a primitive that allows and in fact requires that it be
instantiated

relations are facts of the world

given the fact of consciousness

outside of consciousness there is no relation

nothing is related

consciousness brings relation to the world

its very presence - is the fundamental relation


5.43. Even at first sight it seems scarcely credible that there should follow from one
fact p infinitely many others, namely ~~p, ~~~~p, etc. And it is no less remarkable
that the infinite number of propositions of logic (mathematics) follow from have a
dozen 'primitive propositions'.

But in fact all the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing.


nothing follows from p

~~p is not a result of p - it is p in alternative form - which is to say p is not confined to
a one sign description - that is all

~~p is like reflecting p in a mirror and ~~~~p reflecting p in another mirror etc.

logic (the propositions of logic) is a description of the basis on which whatever is said
can be said

we can say what we say - quite well as it were - without logic - without knowing a
theory of logic that is

however if you wish to know the ground on which possibility and from this actuality
and therefore the possibility of language - of description rests - then the propositions
of logic are that description - or at least our best shot at it - well a shot anyway -

logic is like knowing there is an end to the road you are walking down - you may
never reach it - or go to the end of it - but it gives you your bearings to have this
knowledge -

logic is mapping


5.44. Truth functions are not material functions.

For example, an affirmation can be produced by double negation: in such a case does
it follow that in some sense negation is contained in affirmation? Does '~~p' negate -
p, or does it affirm p - or both?

The proposition '~~p' is not about negation, as if negation were an object: on the other
hand, the possibility of negation is already written into affirmation.

And if there were an object called '~', it would follow that '~~p' said something
different from what 'p' said, just because the one proposition would then be about '~'
and the other not.


'~p' is only possible given 'p'

'~p' is an 'external' definition of 'p'

that is what 'p' is not

the assertion of 'p' makes no sense has no definition unless '~p' is understood

'p' and '~p' are the logical domain

'p' and '~p' represent the world

much more is to be found in '~p' than 'p'

the domain of negation in propositional arguments is always greater than that of
affirmation

'~p' contains 'p'

p and ~p both are domain signs

that is the signify logical domain

one cannot be asserted without the other

for in that event no domain is established

and i.e. 'p' has no logical sense - no definition - and I mean definition in the most
literal sense of the term

what this tells us too is that logical domain is only ever brought into existence by the
assertion of p

~p is / becomes the ground of p

the sign '~' is a domain sign


5.441. The vanishing of the apparent logical constants also occurs in the case of '~($x)
. ~fx' which says the same as '(x) . fx', and in the case of '($x) . fx . x = a', which says
the same as 'fa'.


yes you can change or rearrange the clothes on the mannequin and have quite a
different shop front display


5.442. If we are given a proposition, then with it we are also given the results of all
truth-operations that have it as their base.


what we are talking about here is truth functional propositions - it needs to be
mentioned that propositions can have other functions than truth functions - this seems
to have been entirely missed in the Tractatus - as if i.e. people's daily affairs are
nothing more than the calculation of truth functions - true enough for the poker
machine - but in fact human beings are never so grounded


5.45. If there are primitive logical signs, then any logic that fails to show clearly how
they are placed relatively to one another and to justify their existence will be incorrect.
The construction of logic out of its primitive signs must be made clear.


this is as it should be - if you are to construct a discourse it must be seen to function
internally

bear in mind though - that any such construction will be based on nothing - in a
logical sense

the only basis - and this is without foundation (but it has motion) is practice

we create out of delight and then pretend our constructions have steel

also let's not get too excited about obviousness

what is at issue in any attempt at clarity is the dissolution of an underlying issue or
mystery

I don't think we ever get it right - what it's about in fact is the attempt to see clearly

what we know from metaphysics is that there are various ways of seeing and they all
come out of a blindness that is never fully cured by what is ultimately seen

we can't see everything - but we can know that we don't see


5.451. If logic has primitive ideas they must be independent of each other. If a
primitive idea has been introduced, it must have been introduced in all the
combinations in which it ever occurs. It cannot, therefore, be introduced first for one
combination and later re-introduced for another. For example, once negation has been
introduced, we must understand it in propositions of the form ~p and in propositions
like '~(pvq)', '($x) . ~fx', etc. We must not introduce it first for the one class of cases
and then for the other, since it would be then left in doubt whether its meaning were
the same in both cases, and no reason would have been given for combining the signs
in the same way in both cases.

(In short Frege's remarks about introducing signs by means of definitions (in
Fundamental Laws of Arithmetic) also apply mutatis mutandis, to the introduction of
primitive signs.)


the point of a primitive sign is that it applies to each and every instance of the
propositional form - this is the definition of primitive

all we really need to decide to begin with is what propositional form the sign applies
to

in the case of '~' we would say it applies to propositions of logical (mathematical)
syntax

if what '~' signifies is negation - and negation is thought to have a broader application
than propositional syntax - then in other contests negation is expressed by other signs

if we say negation is a primitive idea of logic - what this means is that it is not defined
by any particular sign

the sign or signs point to the idea - and the idea is more than any one application

OK - but what can this really mean?

the primitive idea has different formal applications

but can we actually speak of the primitive idea sensibly?

if negation has meaning in different contexts and we can only represent it by different
signs - how do we represent the idea (itself) outside of its applications?

I don't think we can - just creating a sign for the primitive idea - in the end will lead to
the question what distinguishes one primitive sign from another - nothing but a
decision


and yes we could define the idea of negation by a new sign - but as Wittgenstein says
here it would have to be introduced in all the combinations it occurs

do we therefore drop the notion of primitive idea?

if we define logic as just the operations of propositional syntax - the problem doesn't
arise

as to the application or use of an idea like negation outside of logic - to contexts other
than propositional logic - we can say 'well it happens'

and what this points to is that propositional forms influence each other and not in a
'logical' way -

that the practice of life is not 'logical' -

and that the inter-relationship of forms happens despite attempts to keep the forms
separate and pure

this attempt to keep forms separate and pure is the origin of much wrongheadedness
and much social evil (i.e. racism sexism etc.)

the only other way out of this that I can see is to say the primitive idea is always
undefined

that what distinguishes one primitive idea from another is the context in which it
arises?

that there is no fixed definition of any primitive notion

primitive notions are known by their signs

the relationship of signs - the inter-relationship of signs is explained in terms of
epistemological communities - what groups know and how they know it

these groups again are not strictly defined - and the knowledge (the inter-relation of
sign understandings) is never precise or clear

the study that is the inter-relation of forms and their signs is therefore properly the
subject of an epistemological anthropology

is this what semiotics is supposed to be about?

this approach would suggest that logic is to be replaced by empirical study of forms

and that forms are not some essential eternal categories or types that we investigate
independently of what goes on in the world - but are in fact - what does goes on

perhaps too we can say there are as many logics as their are forms

this argument world leave propositional logic intact - but very clearly focused


5.452. The introduction of any new device into symbolic logic is necessarily a
momentous event. In logic a new devise should not be introduced in brackets or in a
footnote with what one might call a completely innocent air.

(Thus in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica there occur definitions and
primitive propositions expressed in words. Why this sudden appearance of words? It
would require justification, but none is given, or would be given, since the procedure
is in fact illicit.)

But if the introduction of a new device has proved necessary at a certain point, we
must immediately ask ourselves, 'At what point is the employment of this device now
unavoidable?' and its place in logic must be made clear.


it is a little disconcerting when Russell does that - but it really doesn't matter at all

the sudden appearance of definitions and primitive propositions in words is mostly to
do with literary expression - the logical objection to such has some basis - if there are
no correspondence rules implicit or explicit -

really Wittgenstein's argument here is dealt a fatal blow - with what one might call an
innocent air

the translatability of forms is necessary if there are to be any forms at all

the argument of the 'Tractatus' - the establishment of the language of propositional
logic - depends on the fact of translation - i.e. natural language to symbolic logic

symbolic language doesn't just come out of nowhere

we begin in any such analysis (and its results) with what we have - natural language

the setting up of a symbolic language does not render natural languages irrelevant or
useless - symbolic languages do not replace - they stand with

so it is no great drama to translate symbolic logic back to natural language mutatis
mutandis

my point is there is no fundamental language - fundamental in terms of hierarchy and
significance -

there is just a table a feast and many exotic dishes - and the chef is still creating - and
we are all at the table - the only question - what is your desire?


5.453. All numbers in logic stand in need of justification.

Or rather, it must become evident that there are no numbers in logic.

There are no pre-eminent numbers.


numbers are signs or rightly speaking names of operations - and 'names' here is an
unexpected use of the term - nevertheless - operations can be named

they are functional names - they are utility names

e.g. '0' is the absence of operation or motion - '1' an operation

'an' operation only has conceptual sense given possibility

possibility is the space of action

these notions possibility and space of actions are conceptual creations

that is they only occur given consciousness in the world

in a non-conscious reality possibility and the idea of operation do not exist

in formal logic the 'reality' of numbers is behind the screen of syntactical schemas

that is you can construct propositional logic without reference to numbers

(it's the family picture without grandpa)

mathematics for that matter makes no difference to how the world is

it is a parallel language -

there are no pre-eminent numbers unless there are pre-eminent operations

number theory - mathematics is the language of operation theory

we can say it is developed in logic to give expression to and operational function to
the operational dimension of logic

without such logic is either dead or mute


5.454. In logic there is no co-ordinate status, there can be no classification.

In logic there can be no distinction between the general and the specific.


logic is - propositional logic is - the operation of primitive signs -

the operation is truth function

the theory of all this is the theory of propositional logic


5.4541. The solutions to the problems of logic must be simple, since they set the
standard of simplicity.

Men have always had a presentiment that there must be a realm in which the answers
to questions are symmetrically combined - a priori - to form a self contained system.

A real subject to the law: Simplex signillum veri.


all very well but does this view of logic provide a definition of a theory of simplicity?

I suspect the answer will be - what you see is what you get -

yes - but hardly good enough

one man's simplicity another's complexity

the point being if simplicity is the standard we need to know how and on what basis
the standard is set

there is no philosopher's stone here

the concept is like every other product of consciousness - made

it is not found

men have always had a presentiment - hardly a basis for argument - if indeed it can be
shown that such is in fact the case

assuming for the argument's sake that it is - a presentiment to an a priori self contained
system is not as impressive as it seems

men have at various times had various presentiments - in times of war - perhaps there
is a presentiment to chaos and violence - so what follows?

presentiments are a good basis for artistic efforts

and are we to see logic as one such creation?

a picture of the world - without paint - sound or movement - or unlike a sculpture -
substance

Wittgenstein's presentiment argument does raise the question what is his structure
based on - built on?

he is saying its basis is a priori - but what can this mean?

is this not - at least in this context - simply to say we have no basis for our argument -

but it does have the aesthetic strength of simplicity?

now I think this presentiment argument is really disingenuous - or at least bad
thinking

I say bite the bullet and state that this theory of logic has no basis

that at the best it is just an outcome of an argument in a field of discourse that is
essentially about the issue of foundation

I am not fazed by this -

yes logic is based on a presentiment - that in the scheme of things has no more
intrinsic value than any other presentiment

just another shot in the dark - another attempt to give form and function to the world

a shot that like all others lives or dies on its usefulness - that is how it enables us to
negotiate the unknown


the discussion of Tractatus 5 will continue in Skeptikos III



(c) Copyright: Greg. T. Charlton. 2007.
All rights reserved. Killer Press.